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THE DEATH OF FAIRNESS: TEXAS'S FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
REVISITED
AnaM Otero*
Abstract
The death penalty in America continues to be a controversial topic; a rapidly changing
landscape, whose efficacy is eroding under the weight of glaring injustices and proven
error. In the last eight years, six states have abolished it and 146 exonerations nationwide
rattle confidence in its accuracy and fairness. This article examines the future
dangerousness inquiry of the Texas death penalty statute, a unique and lethal provision
hastily engrafted into the revamped statute when it was enacted in 1973. Predictions of
future dangerousness - whether a convicted capital defendant will engage in subsequent
acts of violence and constitute a continuing danger or threat to society - are offered by the
State in the sentencing stage of capital litigation to persuade a jury to render a sentence of
death, rather than life imprisonment. This article argues that these predictions are
unconstitutional and inadmissible under Texas law.

* This article is dedicated to Craig Washington, a staunch champion forjustice, and indefatigable advocate for
truth. This article is a labor of love; a long journey derailed by life's vicissitudes. I owe a debt of gratitude to
many who have accompanied me in this long and winding road. To Sally Green, for not only encouragement and
support throughout, but for getting down and dirty with the first run of this piece and for letting my voice shine.
To Docia Rudley, an endless source of sustenance, and to Fernando Colon, for carrying my load while I was
down. A debt of gratitude to Lynda Cevallos who gave up a bit of sun to keep me from catching fire. My thanks
for your passion and for feeling the pain. I want to thank Ken Williams for his time and his invaluable insights
and suggestions. I am deeply grateful to my numerous research assistants for their contributions to this article. To
Benjamin James, for his meticulous and thoughtful excursion into the amendments to the Texas death penalty
statute. I am grateful for his patience, our long conversations, and his measured insights. I am grateful for Aaron
Cowan's brilliant and analytical mind, and for his ability to excavate deep in the chambers of the 63rd Texas
Legislature and the Court of Criminal Appeals. To Kavita Nair Brignac, for lending me her sharp eye, for her
unyielding scalpel, and for her masterful edits. To Christopher Self, for his thoughtful ideas, excellent research,
and for walking with me to the end of the road. My sincere thanks goes to the University of Denver Criminal
Law Review for outstanding editorial assistance. Finally, to an unsung hero for an endless reserve of patience
and support; my deepest thanks for standing by me when the road seemed impossibly hard to traverse.

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2014

7

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

INTRODUCTION: A CONVINCING CASE FOR CHANGE

Texas law governing the punishment phase of capital litigation has been
incisively and fittingly described "as difficult to navigate as a trip blindfolded across
Texas."' One aspect of this law - predictions of future dangerousness - allows the
introduction of junk science into the courtroom, duping judges and juries, and oftentimes
creating irreparable consequences for defendants.
Predictions of future dangerousness - whether a convicted capital defendant will
engage in subsequent acts of violence and constitute a continuing danger or threat to
society 2 - are offered by the state of Texas in the sentencing stage of capital litigation to
persuade a jury to render a sentence of death, rather than life imprisonment.3 Presumably
designed to eliminate arbitrariness and to better guide the jurors in making this difficult
decision, these predictions have been widely challenged and criticized because they are
used to support a death sentence based on unreliable and faulty scientific evidence.

-

Of the thirty-two capital jurisdictions, Texas and Oregon are the only two states
that require future dangerousness determinations by the juy.5 The sentencing stage of
most capital jurisdiction requires jurors to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in deciding whether to render a verdict of death. In some jurisdictions,
future dangerousness plays a role as an important factor to be considered by jurors in
making their sentencing decision while in others, it is influential in determining the
presence of aggravating factors; and in some states, evidence of the lack of future
dangerousness acts as a mitigating factor.6 In Texas, future dangerousness is the
touchstone of the death sentence because jurors must answer one question unanimously
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society," before they can consider mitigating
evidence to support a verdict less than death.8

' Janet Morrow & Robert Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas PunishmentLaw in CapitalMurder Cases, 43 S.

TEX. L. REV. 979, 982 (2002).
2 TEXAS

DEFENDER SERVICE, DEADLY SPECULATION -MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH FALSE
PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 4, (2004) [hereinafter Deadly Speculation], available at

http://texasdefenderorg/wp-content/uploads/TDS Deadly-Speculation.pdf ("Thus, the institutional adjustment or
ability of capital defendants to conform their behavior to a prison setting is generally the critical issue to consider
when evaluating whether they actually continue to represent a threat to others."); In Texas, for example, effective
September 1, 2005, a capital defendant who does not get the death sentence will serve life without parole. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. an. 37.071 (West 2013).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. an. 37.071 (West 2013); Predictions of future dangerousness may be offered in
other criminal settings as well. For example, one of the statutory factors the coun may consider in setting the
amount of bail is the future safety of the victim and the community. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. an. 17.15
(West 2013). Additionally, the couns may consider future dangerousness in making probation determinations,
offering deferred adjudication, and approving plea bargaining agreements. Finally, future dangerousness is one
of the factors considered by parole boards in making their determinations.
4 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated May
21, 2014).
Eugenia T. La Fontaine,A Dangerous Preoccupationwith FutureDanger: Why ExpertPredictionsofFuture
Dangerousnessin Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional,44 B.C. L. REV. 207, 228 (2002) (stating that Oregon is

the only other state that allows this factor when making the decision to grant life or death.).
6 William W. Berry, III, Ending Death By Dangerousness:A Path to the De Facto Abolition ofthe Death
Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 893 (2010) (explaining the varied use of future dangerousness as it applies to all
capital jurisdictions).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § (b)(1) (West 2013).
'Id. at § 2(e)(1).
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Noted psychiatrist, Alan Stone, alluded to the difficulties of predicting future
dangerousness:
The decision to impose the sentence of execution is an awesome human
responsibility. The retributive taking of a life in the name of justice
forces the law-givers to reexamine the very concept of justice. Judges
and juries should not be led to believe that the discipline of psychiatry
has a scientific shoulder on which their terrible burden of decision can
rest. I would, therefore, urge psychiatrists, on the grounds of humility if
not truth, to inform courts that we have no professional or scientific
basis for participating in a capital sentencing hearing. 9
These unreliable predictions became a staple of the sentencing scheme and a prerequisite
to capital punishment after Texas revamped its statute pursuant to Furman v. Georgia,' 0
the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court case which struck down the then existing death penalty
statutes. While the Court did not rule that capital punishment was per se violative, the
Court held that the death penalty statutes reviewed were arbitrary and capricious and
constituted a violation of the 8 th Amendment." Although Furman'splurality opinion
lacked clarity, its effect was enormous-invalidating the death penalty statutes of over
thirty-five states and sending legislative bodies into a frenzied scramble to revamp their
statutes to meet Furman's mandate.12
The Texas legislature acted quickly. By 1973, it had enacted a new death penalty
statute designed to address the concerns of the Furman Court. In fact, the legislative
history of the bills, presented to both the House and the Senate, indicates that many hours
were spent in drafting and amending the proposed law, in public hearings, and in heated
debates on the floor of the legislature. Nevertheless, the future dangerousness inquiry was
added with seemingly little discussion or legislative scrutiny.
In 2004, the Texas Defender Service,13 reviewed 155 cases in which prosecutors
had used experts to predict a defendant's future dangerousness. 14 Its comprehensive study
found that the experts were wrong 95% of the time, '5 and it made the following salient
findings: (1) of the total 155 inmates against whom state experts testified, five percent
9 Alan A. Stone, Revisiting the Parable: Truth Without Consequences, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 79, 91

(1994). Unfortunately, Stone also states '[I have] been unable to convince my colleagues that our
epistemological problems create an unbridgeable abyss in the criminal courtroom." Id.
'o Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In a plurality decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
current form of the death penalty was unconstitutional and violated the 8 and 14' Amendments. Id. at 255-56.
The Court reasoned that abdicating the decision to juries necessarily produced arbitrary and capricious results;
therefore, it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Immediately following this decision, death penalty states
scrambled to amend their death penalty statutes to comply with Furman's mandates. Marcia A. Widder, Hanging
Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial,

68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1994).
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. The U.S. Supreme Court decided two other death penalty cases along with
Furman:Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. Id.
12 See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, CapitalPunishment and the Substantive CriminalLaw: The Rise and
Fall ofMandatory CapitalPunishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 148 (1986).
1" The Texas Defender Service is a nonprofit organization established in 1995 by experienced Texas death
penalty attorneys. The organization's mission is to improve the quality of legal representation for those who are
facing the death penalty and to expose and eradicate the systemic flaws within the Texas death penalty statutes.
TEx. DEFENDER SERVICE, http://texasdefender.org/about (last visited Jun. 9, 2014).

14 Deadly Speculation, supra note 2, at xiii.
15 Id
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engaged in seriously assaultive behavior; (2) many inmates sentenced to death based on
predictions of future dangerousness have proven to be non-assaultive, compliant inmates
who pose no risk to other inmates or prison guards; and (3) the use of future
dangerousness question injects impermissible racial components into the sentencing
16
process.
The study aptly concluded that this component of the Texas sentencing process
was highly flawed. Further, it questioned the validity and fairness of many Texas death
sentences1-a grave and disturbing concern given Texas's dubious distinction of leading
the nation by approximately 400 executions. ' With Texas's top governmental leader
either seemingly clueless to the depth of its broken system, or cunningly unwilling to
acknowledge it, the Texas death penalty statutes have been long ignored and only serve to
perpetuate a grievously flawed system.

A. TEXAS'S "THOUGHTFUL [AND] VERY CLEAR PROCESS": THE EGREGIOUS CASE OF
CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM

On September 7, 2011 at the Republican debate held at the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Foundation and Library, the moderator, Brian Williams, asked Governor
Perry whether he struggled to sleep at night with the idea that any one of the 234 death
row inmates executed in Texas might have been innocent.1 9 Fueled by an unexpected
20
round of applause in support of Texas's executions, Perry responded confidently.
While he may glibly boast that Texas has in place a "thoughtful [and] very clear
process," the opposite is true. Texas's death penalty system is profoundly flawed and the
irrevocable consequences of its myriad problems, many of which resonate embarrassingly
in the national news, are disconcerting and shameful. As this section will show, Governor
Perry's statement reflects, at best, a profound ignorance; at worst, an intentional and
flagrant indifference to a serious and endemic problem that continues to rattle the minds of
those who battle deep in the trenches of the Texas death penalty system.
In a recent article, noted prohibitionist, David Dow, mentioned possibly one of
the most egregious "mistakes" - well-known to Perry - that should have caused him to
lose a bit of sleep.21 On December 23, 1991, a fire moved quickly through a one-story

16

Id. at xiv.

SId. at xv.
I

Juan A. Lozano, Texas Woman Set to be 500th Execution in State, YAHOO NEWS (June 26, 2013),

http://news.yahoo.com/texas-woman-set-500th-execution-state-073800079.html.
'9 The Republican Debate at the Regan Library, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.?, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/201 i/09/08/us/politics/08republican-debate-text.html?pagewanted=all
20 Perry said the following:
No, sir. I've never struggled with that at all. The state of Texas has a very thoughtful, a
very clear process in place of which -when someone commits the most heinous of
crimes against our citizens, they get a fair hearing, they go through an appellate process,
they go up to the Supreme Court of the United States, if that's required. But in the state of
Texas, if you come into our state and you kill one of our children, you kill a police
officer, you're involved with another crime and you kill one of our citizens, you will face
the ultimate justice in the state of Texas, and that is, you will be executed.
Id.
21 David Dow, Rick Perry'sLethal Overconfidence. THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:17 PM),

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/09/rick-perry-and-the-death-penalty-executing-innocents.html
("There are some I think could well have been innocent-Frances Newton, for example, who supposedly killed
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house in the city of Corsicana in northeast Texas.22 The neighbors hurried to see Cameron
Todd Willingham's house engulfed in flames as he was screaming, "My babies are
burning up!" 23 His three daughters were trapped inside the house while he remained
helpless standing on the front porch. He told the neighbors to call the fire department as he
attempted to reenter the house, but it was too late. Willingham had lost all three of his
children to smoke inhalation.2 4
The trial began in August 1992 in downtown Corsicana and ended after two days
with the jury only deliberating for barely an hour; they returned with a unanimous guilty
verdict.2 5
The prosecution brought forth two medical experts to confirm for the jury that
Willingham was a sociopath. The first medical expert, Tim Gregory, was a psychologist
with a master's degree in marriage and family issues who had also previously gone
hunting with the assistant district attorney, John Jackson.2 6 The other medical expert was
James P. Grigson, a forensic psychiatrist also known as Dr. Death because of how
frequently he testified for the prosecution in capital punishment cases. 2 7 Dr. Grigson
diagnosed Willingham as an "extremely severe sociopath." 28 Neither had even met
Willingham.29 Three years after Willingham's trial, Grigson was expelled from the
American Psychiatric Association for ethics violations.3 0
her husband and two children without getting even a spot of blood or speck of gunpowder on herself; or Charles
Nealy, who did not remotely match the description of the person who killed the convenience store clerk. But
there was no DNA in either case, and so I am left being unsure."). Anthony Graves, Ernest Willis, Michael
Toney, Michael Blair, and Robert Springsteen are just a few of the men exonerated during Perry's tenure. Id.
David Dow is a professor at the University of Houston Law Center, where his teaching areas include
constitutional law, contract law, and death penalty law. U. Hous. L. CENTER,
http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/ddow2/dpage2/ (last visited May 20, 2014). Dow formed the Texas Innocence
Network, where he has represented more than a hundred death row inmates and worked to exonerate them. Id.
22 David Grann, Trial By Fire, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa fact gmnn (last visited May 20, 2014). This article
was featured in 2009 asking the question, "Did Texas execute an innocent man?" It is a detailed article
portraying the events that took place in the life of Cameron Todd Wilingham and his family. Id. It reveals the
step-by-step record of the tragic fire that killed Willingham's three daughters, the investigation of the fire, the
alleged charges brought against Willingham, faulty arson forensic science, false expert witness testimony,
incompetent counsel, and other errors that contributed to his execution. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

Id. While in prison, Willingham wrote letters to his prison pen pal, Elizabeth Gilbert, a forty-seven year-old
French teacher and playwright from Houston. She began corresponding with Willingham and took an interest in
his case when she noticed several contradictions in the eyewitness accounts. She filtered through the statements
of witnesses that became complete opposites by the time the news spread throughout the community and the trial
had begun over eight months later. Id. ("Diane Baibee had reported that, before the authorities arrived at the fire,
Willingham never tried to get back into the house-yet she had been absent for some time while calling the fire
department. Meanwhile, her daughter Buffie had reported witnessing Willingham on the porch breaking a
window, in an apparent effort to reach his children. And the firemen and police on the scene had described
Willingham frantically trying to get into the house.). Furthermore, several of Willingham's friends and relative
had doubts that he was guilty, including his former probation officer, Polly Goodin, and even former Judge Bebe
Bridges. Id.
25

26 Id.

27 Id.; Mike Tolson, Effect of fDr. Death' and His Testimony Lingers, HOUS. CHRON.
(June 17, 2004),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Effect-of-Dr-Death-and-his-testimony-lingers-1960299.php.
28 Grann, supra note 22
2
9

Id

30 Id.; Laura Beil, GroupsExpel Texas PsychiatristKnown for Murder Cases,
DALL. MORNING NEwS (July 26,

1995) ("A statement issued last week by the psychiatric association says that Dr. Grigson violated the
organization's ethics code by 'arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without first having examined the individuals in
question, and for indicating, while testifying in court as an expert witness, that he could predict with 100 percent
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In 1996, Willingham received a new court-appointed attorney by the name of
Walter Reaves, who filed a writ of habeas corpus to introduce new evidence such as
perjured testimony, unreliable medical experts, and false scientific findings. 31 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ in October of 1997.32 However, Willingham
was granted a temporary stay of execution when he filed another writ in federal court.33
By 2002, the Federal District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
Willingham's writ without even a hearing, and the U.S. Supreme Court later declined to
hear his case in December of 2003.34
Thirteen years later, in the days leading up to Willingham's execution,
[in a last-ditch clemency appeal,] his attorneys sent to Governor Rick
Perry and the Board of Pardon and Parole a report from Gerald Hurst, a
nationally recognized arson expert, saying that Willingham's conviction
was based on erroneous forensic analysis. Documents obtained by the
Innocence Project show that state officials received that report but
apparently did not act on it. 35
At 6:20 p.m. on February 17, 2004, Cameron Todd Willingham was executed at the Texas
State Penitentiary in Huntsville, TX.36
A few months after Willingham's execution, the Chicago Tribune published an
investigative report challenging the forensic analysis. 37 Five of the nation's leading
independent arson experts, assembled by the Innocence Project, reviewed the evidence in
the case, issuing a forty-eight page report that none of the scientific analysis used to
convict Willingham was valid.3 8
In 2005, the Texas Legislature created the Forensic Science Commission to
regulate state crime labs and investigate complaints that allege professional scientific
negligence or misconduct.39 In 2008, the agency began looking into the Willingham case,
and the Ernest Ray Willis case, another similar arson case. The agency retained a wellknown national arson expert, Craig Beyler, to do an analysis of the fire investigation
certainty that the individuals would engage in future violent acts."'). In response to inquiries about Dr. Grigson,
Dr Jonas Rappeport, medical director for the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, stated that "no
psychiatrist can predict with 100 percent certainty whether someone will be dangerous to society." Id.
" Grann, supra note 22.
32 Id.

3 Id.
34 Id.

3 Cameron Todd Willingham 's Surviving Relatives Petitionfor PosthumousPardon 20 Years After Conviction:
Nation 'sArson Experts Uniformly Agree Evidence Was Flawed, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2012),

http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/CameronToddWillinghamsSurviving Relatives Petition for Post
humousPardon_20_YearsAfterConviction.php#.
36 Id. For an article comparing the Willingham case with another very similar arson case, that of Ernest Ray
Willis, see Michael Hall, Separatedat Death, TEx. MONTHLY (December 2009),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/separated-death?fullpage= 1.
3 Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on DisprovedForensics,CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2004),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0412090169decO9,0,1173806.story.
Douglas J. Carpenter et al., Report on the Peer Review of the Expert Testimony in the Cases of State of Texas
v. Cameron Todd Willingham and State of Texas v. ErnestRay Willis, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2006),
3'

http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf
3 House Bill 1068, amended Chapter 38, Code of Criminal Procedure by adding 38.01 Texas Forensic Science
Commission ("FSC"). The bill's authors were Senator Whitmire, Senator Hinojosa and Representative Driver.
About Us, TEx. FORENSIC SC. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.state.tx. us/about/ (last visited February 8, 2014).
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methods and procedures used in both criminal arson cases. 4 0 On August 17, 2009, Dr.
Beyler issued a comprehensive sixty-four page report, in which he concluded:
The investigations of the Willis and Willingham fires did not comport
with either the modem standard of care expressed by NFPA 921, or the
standard of care expressed by fire investigation texts and papers in the
period 1980-1992. The investigators had poor understanding of fire
science and failed to acknowledge or apply the contemporaneous
understanding of the limitations of fire indicators. Their methodologies
did not comport with the scientific method or the process of elimination.
A finding of arson could not be sustained based upon the standard of
care expressed by NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by fire
investigation texts and papers in the period 1980-1992.
Dr. Beyler was scheduled to testify before the Forensic Science Commission in
October 2009, and the commission's final report on the cases was scheduled to appear in
early 2010. However, just two days before Dr. Beyler was scheduled to present its
damaging findings to the commission, Governor Perry replaced the Chairman of the
commission, along with three other appointees. 42 In what many called a cover-up, Perry
appointed to the seat a Williamson County District Attorney, whom he had originally
appointed to the district attorney's office in 2001: "It looked an awful lot like the governor
had used a crony to scuttle a meeting at which the commission was going to hear from an
expert that Perry had overseen the execution of an innocent man."43
Despite national outcry and ridicule for the many Texas cases gone awry, there
continues to be endemic indifference to the problems plaguing the Texas's criminal justice
system. Despite the realities that confront them, the Texas movers and shakers remain
disconcertingly steadfast about the "thoughtful" implementation of capital punishment and
recalcitrant on the issue of modifying statutes to follow advancements in forensic medical
data. In Texas a flawed capital punishment system is particularly disturbing because of the
staggering statistics. Since the revision of its death penalty statutes in 1976, Texas has
executed 515 individuals as of June 30, 2014; the most recent on April 16, 2014, when
Texas executed #999417, Jose Villegas. With the diligent efforts of the Innocence
Project, Texas has had 12 exonerations from 1973 - 2012, and they continue to work on
45
hundreds of cases every year.
2014 marks the 41st anniversary of the post-Furman Texas death penalty statute.
This article argues that, as enacted, Article 37.071 did not meet the requirements set forth
in Furman. Namely that the future dangerousness provision of that statute allows the
CRAIG L. BEYLER, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES USED IN THE
CRIMINAL ARSON CASES OF ERNEST RAY WILLIS AND TODD CAMERON WILLINGHAM 1 (2009), available at
40

http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/ 11/09/rpt.tx.forensic. willes.willingham.anaylsis.final.pdf
41 Id at 52.
42 Matt Smith & Ed Lavandera, Perry "Squashed" Texas Execution Probe. Ex-official Says,"
CNN POLITICS
(Sep. 8, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/09/07/texas. execution.probe/.
43 Hall, supra note 36.
44 Executed Offenders, TEX. DEP'T CRIM. JUST. (June 30, 2014),

http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/deathrow/dr executed offenders.html.
45 See Exoneration Statistics by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Mar. 12, 2014),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty. Per the National Registry of Exonerations, total
exonerations in Texas number 133; in 2013, Texas had 13 exonerations -the highest number of all states for that
year. See NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2013 1-19 (2014),

http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations-
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admissibility of unreliable expert testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution and the Eighth Amendment. Further, it argues that these unreliable
predictions are inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because they do not meet
the requirements for scientific reliability established under Texas law. Thus, there is no
alternative but to abolish it to prevent further abuses and injustices.
Future dangerousness has been the subject of a voluminous jurisprudence from
mental health and legal professionals. Yet there has been no systematic attempt to
examine both the legislative history of the 1973 statute, and its amendment history to
show the consequences of its flawed inception. Additionally, there has been no critical
analysis of Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' opinions involving these unreliable
predictions to show the inexplicable pattern of incongruent holdings, the result of which
being precisely the arbitrary decisions Furman sought to eradicate. This article attempts to
fill that void in numerous ways. Part I examines in detail the legislative history of the 1973
statute, and concludes that the hasty addition of the future dangerousness provision was
simply a codification of then existing practice. This part will show that long before 1973
prosecutors were already relying on the testimony of unreliable forensic mental health
professionals to convince ajury to render a death verdict. Since 1973, the Texas
46
Legislature has amended Article 37.071 at least nine times. Part II explores three of the
amendments that relate to future dangerousness to show the constitutional deficiencies of
the statute, and how a hodgepodge of repairs has failed to yield the lofty promises of
Furman. It argues that, despite legislative tinkering and the significant transformations of
expert admissibility, the future dangerousness provision remains immutable. Part III
examines the early decades following the enactment of the statute, showcasing the
infamous testimony of "Dr. Death" to show the State's abuse of future dangerousness
predictions. This section examines the evolution of stricter standards of expert
admissibility and judicial gatekeeping. Further, this section argues that in spite these
changes, Texas continues to admit unreliable scientific testimony to support its death
sentences. It concludes with a brief review of Dr. Richard Coons's testimony, and the
landmark Coble case, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was forced to
acknowledge the unreliability of this testimony.
Part IV explores the futility of appellate review in Texas to correct trial error. It
examines a number of opinions from the Court of Criminal Appeals that demonstrate an
evident pattern of judicial contradiction. This section demonstrates how failure to correct
error in the trial court proceedings results in an ineffective and meaningless appellate
review of capital opinions ultimately resulting in impermissible constitutional outcomes.
-

PART I. THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND FURMAN: FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS INQUIRY
A HASTY ADDITION TO THE REVAMPED DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

Under the current death penalty scheme, once a defendant is convicted of a
capital offense, the court holds a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant is sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. During this hearing,
both sides may present evidence that the court deems relevant to the sentence. 8 Upon the
conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the jury must answer two questions

46

TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2013).
§ 2(a)(1). In 2005, Texas passed a bill that gave juries the option of sentencing a defendant to life without

47 Id.

parole. See Texas Governor Signs Life Without ParoleBill Into Law, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (2014),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/158.
48 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 2(a)(1) (West
2013).
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unanimously: 1) "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"; and 2) "whether the
defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually cause the death of
the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life
would be taken." 49 The state is required to prove each issue beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the jury must answer "yes" unanimously, or "no" only if ten jurors agree. 0 Once the
jury answers both issues affirmatively, it must then answer the following issue:
whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background,
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence be
imposed.'
But to understand how future dangerousness became the touchstone of the death penalty
statute, a short journey into the 6 3 rd Legislature in 1973 is warranted.
A. TEXAS IS FORCED TO MOVE

QUICKLY TO REVAMP

ITS DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

Prior to Furman, the Texas death penalty statutes contained no sentencing
guidelines; there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances or objective standards
of any kind to guide or regularize the process, so that death penalties throughout Texas
were "wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed.5 2 It was precisely this unfettered and arbitrary
discretion that Furman sought to eliminate. After Furman, Texas moved quickly to
revamp its death penalty legislation to ensure its compliance with Furman'sconstitutional
mandate against the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. The Texas
statute that ultimately became effective on June 14, 1973,53 contained five capital
54
offenses, and a procedure for the sentencing stage of a capital trial. This procedure was
designed to provide structure for the jury, based on three special questions or issues that
the jury had to answer during deliberations. On May 28, 1973, a Conference Committee of
the 6 3 rd Legislature, composed of ten members, produced the future dangerousness inquiry
as one of three special questions or issues in HB 200:
1)

2)
3)

49 Id.

whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result;
whether there is probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.

2(b)(1)(2).

51 Id.

§ 2(d)(2).
SId. § 2(e)(1).

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.").
5 Act of June 14, 1973, ch. 426 art. 1-3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1125.
54 See id. art. 2 § 1, at 1123.
52

5 CONF. COMMITTEE, CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 200, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 8-9
(Tex 1973)

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2014

15

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

10

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

56
Under the statute, the state was required to prove each issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
The capital defendant would receive either a sentence of death or life imprisonment based
on the jury's answer to these questions. Although the statute did not direct the jury's vote
either way, it required them to answer the questions where an affirmative answer by
twelve jurors to all issues would result in a death sentence. However, a negative response
to any issue would result in a life sentence, but the jury could not give a negative response
to any issue unless ten or more jurors agreed.

While the legislative history of the death penalty statute reveals numerous hours
of debate and haggling over the bill itself, these three special issues came out of the
Conference Committee with little, if any, debate or legislative scrutiny-a significant flaw
that would ominously presage lethal consequences. Unquestionably, heated debates on the
floor of the legislature and the numerous amendments to the bill reveal a single-minded
objective: to ensure that the revamped death penalty statute would pass Furman's
constitutional mandate. Yet, amazingly, the section of the bill that has been most
problematic-the future dangerousness inquiry-remains shrouded in mystery. The record
reveals that it was engrafted into the bill by a handful of members over the weekend
before the session came to a close, and received no thoughtful consideration or debate on
the issue in either House.

B. LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE TO RESTORE A DEATH PENALTY THAT WOULD COMPLY
WITH FURMAN - A BRIEF JOURNEY TO THE 6 3 RD TEXAS LEGISLATURE

The Senate introduced two death penalty bills, which were not considered in a
public hearing until shortly after the House passed H.B. 200: S.B. 10, authored by Senator
William Meier 8 and S.B. 20, authored by Senator Ogg. 59 As introduced, both bills
contained the same leniency provision as H.B. 200, but upon consideration in committee,
Meier convinced the committee to substitute for S.B. 10 a completely revamped bill.60
Discussion from the Senate Jurisprudence Committee hearings reveals that some senators
took the District and County Attorneys Opinions and the House's response to mean that a
mandatory bill would be the only way to make H.B. 200 constitutionally permissible.61
Senator Meier disagreed with the idea that a mandatory bill would be constitutional; in
62
fact, he stated that this was erroneous. Focusing not on the swing justices in the majority,
56

Id. at 9.
5 Id.
51 S JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 593 (Tex. 1973).
id. at 71.
S Subcomm. on Criminal Matters, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973); Hearings on Tex. H.B. 200 Before the
S.

59See
60

Comm. on Jurisprudence., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973) [hereinafter Hearings], Deb. on HB 200 on the
Floor ofthe S., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
61S Subcomm. on Criminal Matters, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973) (statement of Sen. Ogg on May
23, 1973).
62 Id. In 1976, Meier's views were proved correct by the holding of the
Supreme Court in Woodson v. North
Carolina, a case which struck down the state's mandatory death penalty statute for a broad category of
homicides. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("The history of mandatory death penalty
statutes in the United States thus reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a
particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid. The two crucial indicators of evolving
standards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society -- jury determinations and
legislative enactments -- both point conclusively to the repudiation of automatic death sentences. At least since
the Revolution, American jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict
defendants where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict. As we have seen, the
initial movement to reduce the number of capital offenses and to separate murder into degrees was prompted in
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but those in the minority in Furman, Meier believed that neither Chief Justice Burger nor
Justice Blackmun would vote for a mandatory death penalty, but that their votes were
63
necessary to uphold any death penalty statute. Meier convinced the Committee to report
to the Senate Floor Meier's substitute for S.B. 10, as part of an agreement with Senator
Ogg to "debate the two different philosophies of how the death penalty may be reinstated
,64
in light of the Supreme Court decision this past summer....
Meier and Ogg came to an
agreement that Meier's bill would be reported out by the Committee, and Ogg would offer
an amendment to the bill striking the remainder of Meier's bill below the enacting clause
and substitute it with the mandatory bill passed by the House.6 5 Ogg's amendment was
66
tabled after a discussion of the merits between the two approaches. Meier reiterated his
view before the Senate Floor, as he did before the Committee, that the Supreme Court
would hold a mandatory death penalty bill unconstitutional. 67 Additionally, Senator Meier
believed that a second aspect of the bill, which made it constitutionally impermissible
under Furman, was the lack of guidance given to the jury in making the decision to render
the death penalty. 68 Referring to the three companion cases decided by the Furman Court,
he noted that there were no "statutory guidelines for the juries in any of those three
cases."69 Meier's argument ultimately prevailed in the Senate, and his proposed
amendment was the one accepted by the Senate as the starting point for further
amendments of the bill from the Senate floor. 70 All subsequent amendments after Meier's
bill were accepted with regard to the substantive elements of a capital offense. 7 No
amendment purported to change the procedure as enunciated in Meier's bill. 72 The record
indicates that legislators were more concerned with death penalty eligible offenses than
they were with the procedure under which someone would be sentenced to death, a
miscalculation that has become more significant as the multiple subsequent amendments
to cure an initially procedurally flawed statute have proven.
Meier's answer to Furman'smandate, with respect to the procedure under which
juries were to sentence capital defendants, was to bifurcate the guilt and innocence phase
before the same jury. 73 The language in Meier's bill regarding aggravating and mitigating

part by the reaction ofjurors as well as by reformers who objected to the imposition of death as the penalty for
any crime.").
63 See Deb. on HB 200 on the Floor of the S., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
1973).
64 Id.; Hearings, supra note 60 (statement
of Sen. Meier).
65 See Hearings, supra note 60 (statement of Sen. Meier); See also S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1441-42
(Tex. 1973).
66 See S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess.,
at 1442 (Tex. 1973).
67
Deb. on H.B 200 on the Floor of the S., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
68 Id.
69 Id.

a See S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1442 (Tex. 1973).
71 Id. at 1442-53
72 Id.

7 Id. at 1442, 1445. Although the Model Penal Code formulation and procedure was in existence for some time
before Furman, it was adopted by no state until afterFurmanwas decided:
In recent years[,] academic and professional sources have suggested that jury sentencing
discretion should be controlled by standards of some sort. The American Law Institute
first published such a recommendation in 1959. Several States have enacted new criminal
codes in the intervening 12 years, some adopting features of the Model Penal Code. Other
States have modified their laws with respect to murder and the death penalty in other
ways. None of these States have followed the Model Penal Code and adopted
statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202-03 (1971) (emphasis added).
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circumstances was substantially the Model Penal Code's formulation.74 However, Meier
omitted one aggravating factor covering multiple or serial murders and one mitigating
factor concerning circumstances that the defendant believed provided a "moral
justification" for his conduct. 5 Although the Texas statute was later amended to give the
prosecutor discretion whether or not to seek the death penalty in a capital case, a
prosecutor who charged a capital offense under Meier's bill, as first passed by the Senate,
76
would necessarily proceed after a guilty finding by the jury to the sentencing phase. As
in the former statutes, the jury chooses between confinement or death. Under the new bill,
the jury would be instructed on the aggravating factors, which make a particular crime
death-eligible; and mitigating factors, which make the individual characteristics of the
defendant inappropriately suited for the punishment of death.7 7 The recurring tension
between Senator Ogg's belief that a mandatory bill would be constitutional and Meier's
belief that it would not was that Senator Ogg did not believe a mandatory death penalty
was ideal from a policy perspective.7g The bill was ultimately passed by the Senate on
74 Compare S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1445-46 (Tex. 1973) (offering an amendment so as to substitute

Sen. Meier's bill), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)-(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (listing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of criminal homicide). The aggravating and mitigating circumstances
listed in the Model Penal Code were as follows:
(3) Aggravating Circumstances. (a) The murder was committed by a convict under
sentence of imprisonment. (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (c) At the time the
murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder (d) The defendant
knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. (e) The murder was committed
while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or
deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat or force, alson, burglary, or kidnapping. (f)
The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from lawful custody. (g) The murder was committed for pecuniary
gain. (h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances. (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity. (b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (c) The victim was a participant in
the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. (d) The murder was
committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to provide moral
justification or extenuation for his conduct. (e) The defendant was an accomplice in a
murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was
relatively minor. (f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person. (g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication. (h) The youth
of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.

Compare S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1445-46 (Tex. 1973) (offering an amendment so as to substitute
Sen. Meier's bill), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) to (4) (listing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of criminal homicide).
76
See S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1442, 1445 (Tex. 1973).
COMM. SUBSTITUTE H.B. 200, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., (Tex. 1973); S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1445-46
(1973). Commenting on these factors before the Senate Jurisprudence Committee, Meier interpreted the intent of
the drafters of the Model Penal Code, "what I would think they're trying to get at is that it's going to have these
narrowly confined circumstances to look at in terms of aggravating and mitigating factors." S. Subcomm. on
CriminalMatters, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
7' As the chair of the Senate Jurisprudence Committee remarked, "My heart goes with Meier's bill if we're going
to have one, because at least there's a-but I think it would be unconstitutional, and [Ogg's] is just cold
[laughter]." Then Ogg interjected: "it's just cold, it's callous, it's killing, but if anything we've got for us it's
constitutional." S. Subcomm. on CriminalMatters, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).; Commentator Eric Citron
describes the Senate debate as "Justice vs. Discretion," where the illustrative exchange between Senator Meier
and Senator Adams on May 23, 1973, reflects the "ways in which the legislators' constitutional confusion
prevented them from fully reaching the deep moral issues that could have been at stake in an ideal debate about
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May 23, 1973, but rejected by the House, which did not concur with the Senate
Amendments.7 9 On Friday, May 2 5th, the Senate bill was referred to ajoint Conference
Committee to "adjust the differences between the two Houses on the bill."o It is in this
10-man committee that the future dangerousness language of the special issues was
mysteriously crafted into the bill. 81
C. PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: A HASTY ADDITION TO THE BILL

The Conference Committee met every day of the weekend from the Friday it was
appointed. 82 The changes made retained Senator Meier's framework for capital
sentencing,83 but also included the three special issues for the jury to determine, one of
which is the future dangerousness inquiry. 4 Of the original three issues passed by the
Legislature in 1973, only the issue of future dangerousness remains in the death penalty
statute today. 5 The other two issues the jury was mandated to answer under the statute: 1)
"whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result;" and 2) "if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any,
by the deceased"-reflected the influence of the House Bill calling for a mandatory
86
statute. The absurdity, that these two issues essentially duplicate the findings of the jury
87
in the guilt phase of the capital murder trial, was not lost on all legislators.
capital punishment policies." Eric F. Citron, Sudden Death: The Legislative History ofFuture Dangerousness

and the Texas Death Penalty, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 143, 166-67 (2006); Adams offered no policy
justification for a mandatory bill, but rested his argument on the fact that Meier's version gave the jury a guided
discretion, which was, in fact, more discretion than existed in the mandatory bill passed in the House. Deb. on
Tex. H. B. 200 on the Floor ofthe S., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).

7 H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. 4678, 4985 (Tex. 1973).
so Id.

" The Conference Committee was composed of Representatives Cobb, Washington, Lombardino, Doyle, and
Maloney; Senators Ogg, Wallace, Meier, Sherman, and Adams. S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1535, 1539
(Tex. 1973). Of these ten members, Members Washington, Wallace, and Sherman did not sign the Conference
Committee report, but this is not indicative of lack of participation in the conference committees. HOUSE
CONFERENCE COMM.,, CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 200, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.

1973). The Conference Committee met each day over the weekend from the Friday it was appointed. Deb. on
Tex. H.B. 200 on the Floor ofthe H, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (May 28, 1973).
82

Hearings, supra note 60.
HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM., ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL

NO.
200, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
84
Id. at ¶¶ 8-10; HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM., CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 200, 63d
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 8 (Tex. 1973).
85 Act of May 28, 1973, ch. 426, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1125
(current version at TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. an. 37.071 (West 2013)).
86

HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM., CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 200, 63d Leg., Reg.

Sess., at 8-9 (Tex. 1973).
87 The point here is that, arguably, these issues are covered by the guilt
phase finding of an "intentional" or
"knowing" killing, and the unreasonableness issue covered by then existing law providing for a jury charge of
Voluntary Manslaughter, if raised by the evidence. H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg, Reg. Sess., 4978 (Tex. 1973); This
absurdity was observed by Representative Spurlock:
I want to make a motion that the House not concur in the report of the Conference
Committee and instruct our conferees to go back and try again. Look on page one, you
have the punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death or life
imprisonment if this, this-then you turn over to page eight and see what the criteria are to
put someone to death. You find those criteria stated there are the same, basically, as the
criteria that are required under a finding of murder with malice aforethought. You've got
to have a jury find murder with malice aforethought in effect in two different places.
That'll never hold up.
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The special issues were recognized simply as a condensed version of Senator
Meier's "much lengthier bill."88 There were two aggravating factors in Meier's Senate bill,
which related to a defendant's future dangerousness. One aggravating factor being
whether "the murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment" or
whether "the defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence." 89 The mitigating circumstances stated in Meier's
bill relevant to future dangerousness were the converse of the aggravating factorswhether "the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity." 90 Presumably,
the assumption underlying Meier's criteria, which mirrored the Penal Code, is that a past
criminal history can be used to predict continued future violence. 91 The point of these
criteria is not to punish for past conduct, which has already been addressed by the legal
system by barring double jeopardy, but to use a history of criminal behavior as predictions
of future conduct. These rearward looking factors that a jury could consider became a
single unifying dispositive formula that mandated the special issue the jury had to answer:
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society."9 2
Representative Robert Maloney, a member of the committee, is credited with
authoring the issue of future dangerousness. 93 On Monday, May 28, 1973, the Dallas
Morning News reported that a legislative compromise had been reached on Sunday night
and that the ten-man conference committee would meet later in the day to review the bill
one more time and to resolve any final problems before it was signed.94 The article listed
the special issues to be decided by the jury in sentencing, but these were different from the
ones that were ultimately crafted into the committee's report 95-indicating that the
compromise bill was tweaked and tugged into its final form up to the last minute of the
last week of the session. Amazingly, despite the new language engrafted into the bill in the
96
committee, it was adopted by both houses with little, if any, legislative scrutiny. The

Deb. on Tex. H.B. 200 on the Floor ofthe H., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
" Deb. on Tex. HB. 200 on the Floor ofthe H., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973).
9S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. 1445-46 (Tex. 1973).
90 Id.
This assertion is not unsupported by research. See, e.g., Gordon Hall, Prediction of Sexual Aggression, 10
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 239 (1990), as cited in Russell Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler 's Ghost: The
Influence ofthe Model Penal Code on Death Penalty SentencingJurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189,
9'

257 n.330 (2004).
92 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2013).
9 Deb. on Tex. HB. 200 on the Floor ofthe H., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973) (showing that Cobb wanted

Maloney to be recognized for helping Lombardino and Cobb come up with the language of the death penalty
statute).
94 Compromise Reached on Death Penalty Bill, DALL. MORNING NEwS, May 28, 1973, at A8.
9 Id.
96 However, the record does show definite references made by the district attorneys regarding the issue of a

defendant's future dangerousness. In the February 6, 1973 public meeting attended by Representative Maloney,
one of the members of the ten-man conference committee, John Green, Ector County's District Attorney,
testified in an exchange that uncannily prophesied the use of psychiatrists to make these predictions. Mr. Green
spoke of a defendant who had committed multiple murders to which he eventually confessed, and had plead
guilty to life on the hopes of getting out on early parole. He said that he had the defendant examined by one of
the top psychiatrists in the State of Texas who said: "The man, if he gets back out of the penitentiary will again
continue to kill." During Mr. Green's testimony, Representative Craig Washington probed him further: "You
indicated that no matter how long he stays in the penitentiary, if he ever gets out, that he will more than likely, if
he gets another opportunity, kill again?" Subsequently, at the same hearing, Carol Vance, Harris County D.A.
made the following statement:
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only time the issue is specifically mentioned, other than when it was read before the
House, is Cobb's reference to the future dangerousness issue as a showing the defendant is
a "menace to society."97 During the debate on the final passage of the bill in the House,
Cobb observed that the criteria provided by the three special issues were to be narrowly
construed.9 8 In a last-ditch attempt to force discussion on the new language added by the
Committee, Representative Craig Washington, one of the ten members of the committee,
and a vocal advocate against the proposed death penalty bill, raised a point of error against
consideration of the Committee Report on the bill "on the grounds that it contains
language not included in either the House or Senate versions of the bill." 99 The point of
order was overruled. 00
On June 14, 1973, H.B. 200 was signed into law. 0 ' The bill amended Article
1257 of the 1925 Penal Code, and added as part of the new penal code §19.03 to include
five capital offenses. In addition, it added Article 37.071-the capital sentencing scheme
containing the three special jury issues. The hybrid bill reflected a compromise between
the two houses of the legislature. Yet, the last-minute inclusion of the special issues
reflected only the will of the seven lawmakers who signed the conference committee
report. As one commentator has shrewdly observed:
The effect of the conference committee's decision to add new language
never before debated was thus to transform themselves into a sevenperson state legislature, for it was impossible for either house to alter the
bill without dooming it and unlikely that either would vote to kill it.
Future dangerousness thus became law without a word.102
Arguably, the Texas legislature merely codified an existing statewide
practice by district attorneys of relying on psychiatrists to make predictions of
future dangerousness to convince the jury to render a death sentence; a practice
well-documented and explained by prosecutors at that fateful House Committee
on Criminal Jurisprudence. Between 1970 and 1972, at least four newspaper
articles had appeared in the Dallas Morning News recounting the use of forensic
psychiatrists, most notably, Doctors Grigson and Holbrook to testify at the
I think that there are just certain types of cases that juries look on as being death penalty
cases. I wish we had a crystal ball, and could go into the minds of these individuals and
find out exactly what's wrong and give them an instant shot to counteract whatever it
may be and to make them well. But despite all of our progress in other areas, I don't even
think we've dented the surface so far as doing this.. .but the psychiatrists could not give
an answer... [I] just think that there are certain persons, either because they will kill again,
or else because the death penalty should be in our law, or that there are a lot of persons
that sit and think "well, if I hijack that store and take the money, I better not kill this
person because the 10 years, or five years to life that I might get might turn into the death
penalty."
Pub. Hearingon HB. 200, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. Feb. 6, 1973).
9 H. Deb. on Tex. HB. 200 on the Floor of the H., 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1973).
9' "[T]he criteria is so narrow and the burden upon the prosecution so great-the burden is such that he won't
attempt to seek the death penalty in a case where there appears to be any circumstantial. . ." At this point,
Representative Cobb is interrupted, but it seems that the thrust of this statement, derived from the context of the
discussion, is that the presence of mitigating circumstantial evidence would contraindicate to the jury the
imposition of the death penalty under H.B. 200. Id.
9 H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4985 (Tex. 1973).
100 Id.
1o1
102

See Act of June 14, 1973, ch. 426 art. 3 § 1(c)-(d), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1125.
Citron, supra note 78, at 173.
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sentencing hearing of capital defendants.1 03 The testimony by prosecutors at the
public hearings of HB 200 clearly shows that prosecutors honestly relied on these
doctors' predictive ability-a reliance that at best was grounded on sheer
ignorance, and at worst a blind determination to obtain a verdict of death even if
the scientific testimony was shrouded in junk science.
D. TEXAS'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME IS CHALLENGED: JUREK V. STATE - THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE STATUTE AS CONSTITUTIONAL

From its inception, the future dangerousness element of the revised capital
sentencing statute in Texas has attracted much deserved criticism. 0 4 Critics have argued
that the purpose of Texas's revised statute
[A]imed to make the individualized assessment required by
Furman the touchstone of the infliction of the State's ultimate
punishmentos . . [a]s implemented has backfired: the sentencing
procedure fails to give juries meaningful-rather than merely
inflammatory-information about defendants. It has led to an obscene
ballooning of the number of people sentenced to death, an expansion far
06
beyond those deserving the death penalty.1
Texas cases support this contention. The first challenge to the constitutionality of the
revamped capital scheme in Texas was made by Jerry Lane Jurek who was charged with
the capital murder of ten-year old Wendy Adams in Cuero, Texas. 17 Jurek argued that the
imposition of the death penalty under Articles 1257 and 37.071 constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under Furman.10 The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed salient
points of Furman and examined in detail portions of the revamped Texas statute to
conclude that the latter were constitutional.
The Court's examination of the special issues offered to the jury under the statute
is particularly relevant to the subsequent amendments of the statute. The Court considered
Jurek's argument that the special issues submitted to the jury under Art. 37.071(b) were
too vague to provide adequate guidance to the jury in choosing between life and death.1 09
The Court, however, rejected this argument focusing only on the second special issue, the
future dangerousness inquiry. The court stated that in reaching an answer the jury could
consider: (1) whether the defendant had a significant criminal record; (2) the range and
severity of the prior criminal record; (3) the age of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the offense;, (4) whether the defendant at the time of the offense was under
'0 See, e.g., Accused Killer Called Sociopath by Doctor, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 1970, at 17A; Tom
Johnson, Nathan Curry, 25, Left Enigm atic Legacy, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 4, 1971, at IA, 26A;
PsychiatristFeels Calley Didn'tHave Intent to Kill, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 28, 1972, at 13A; Marc
Bernabo, Five Testify Gross Is Insane, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 18, 1972, at 23A; Marc Bernard, Doctors
Testify In Murder Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 21, 1972, at 4A; FinalArgumentsSet in Gross Murder
Trial, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 22, 1972, at 13A; and Henry Tatum, Jury Finds DanielsGuilty In Slaying of
NASA Man, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1971, at ID.
104 Deadly Speculation, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Michael Kuhn, House Bill 200: The Legislative Attempt to Reinstate Capital Punishment in Texas, 11 HOUS.
L. REv. 410, 423 (1973-1974), as cited in Deadly Speculation, supra note 2, at 2 n.17, 3-4.
106 Deadly Speculation, supra note
2, at 3-4.
10

107 Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). It is worth noting that the court stated
that this

case was the first to reach the court under the new Texas Penal Code. Id. at 936 ni.
' Id. at 937.
109

Id. at 939

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol4/iss1/6

22

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue

2014]

THE DEATH OF FAIRNESS

17

duress or domination of another and; (5) whether the defendant at the time of the offense
was under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure less than insanity."o The
Court held that the ability of the jury to consider these factors gave the jury a reasonable
and controlled discretion required by Furman in imposing the death penalty."'
However, the dissenting justices agreed with Jurek that the second special issue
2
was too vague to be constitutional.11 They both noted that the word "probability" was not
defined by statute and, therefore, the usual acceptation of the word in common language
applied. 113 Potentially it could mean that a jury would vote for the death penalty even if
they believed that there was only "a chance" the convicted defendant would be dangerous
in the future. As the Justices aptly pointed out, such a definition would almost always
4
compel an affirmative answer."
In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed Jurek's case, and the
5
new death penalty statutes of three other states: Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina."
In his appeal, Jurek argued "that the imposition of the death penalty under any
circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."1 6 Jurek further argued that the substantial legislative changes made to the
..
0 Id. at 939-40. Over twenty years later, the Texas high court in Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987), outlined eight specific factors that the jury could consider:
1. the circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant's state of mind and
whether he was acting alone or with other parties;
2. the calculated nature of the defendant's acts;
3. the forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime's execution;
4. the existence of a prior criminal record and the severity of the prior crimes;
5. the defendant's age and personal circumstances at the time of the offense;
6. whether the defendant was acting under duress or the domination of another at the
time of the commission of the offense;
7. psychiatric evidence; and
8. character evidence.
See also Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the jury could find that the
defendant would be a continuing threat to society by evidence presented of the brutal nature of the crime, and the
lack of remorse of contrition); Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding evidence in
the punishment phase of the trial supported the jury's finding of future dangerousness, where the evidence
showed that the defendant set out to kill his employer but killed someone else instead so he could steal his car
when, besides the murder weapon, the victim was carrying a number of other weapons, and a notebook that
included his plans for the year stated: "30 + victims dead. 30 + armed robberies. Steal a lot of cars."); Alvarado
v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that in addition to the circumstances of the
capital case, the jury can consider criminal history, reputation evidence, and psychiatric testimony of a violent
personality).
..Jurek, 522 S.W.2d at 940.
112 Id. at 945 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Article 37.071 is so confusing that even the
majority of this Court have been misled. They have not even addressed the vagueness of that issue upon which
the operation of this mandatory statute pivots. I would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague in violation of
Article 1, Section 10, Texas Constitution and the due process clause of Amendment XIV, United States
Constitution."); Id. at 946 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The conclusion is thus inescapable that the appellant's
punishment was decided to a significant degree by the answer to a question which- as a result of its vagueness
and overbreadth -[c]ould not have been answered in his favor. It is equally clear that such a procedure violates
due process and thus constitutes error.").
113 Id. at 945-46 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 947-48 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 945-46 (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Id. at 948 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
115 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). On the same day that Jurek was decided, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Florida and Georgia statutes in Proffitv. Florida, and Greggv. Georgia, respectively. 428 U.S.
242 (1976); 428 U.S. 153 (1976). However, the Court struck down the death penalty scheme in Woodson v.
North Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976).
116 Jurek 428 U.S at 268
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Texas capital sentencing statute in response to Furman were "cosmetic" in nature and
failed to eliminate the 'arbitrariness' and 'caprice'that Furman held to be violations of the
Constitution. "7 With respect to the second statutory question, Jurek argued that "it is
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be
meaningless."'' 8
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas statute. In
specifically, with respect to the issue of future dangerousness, the Court reasoned that
while this determination may be difficult, it can be made.119
The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory
question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal
justice. What is essential is that the jury has before it all possible
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must
determine.1 20
Not surprisingly, "the tasks performed countless times each day" alluded to by the court
were instances in criminal litigation. Such instances include admitting a defendant to bail,
determining sentencing alternatives, and parole determinations-none of which involved
the serious consequences of capital litigation. 121
In the last forty-one years, Article 37.071 has been amended at least nine times.
The next section examines the three amendments that relate to future dangerousness - the
1991, 2001, and 2005 amendments. The analysis of the reasons prompting the
amendments show how the procedural infirmities, highlighted by Justices Odom and
Roberts in their dissent in Jurek, have resulted in irreparable consequences.
PART II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE: THE BUMPY
ROAD OF AMENDMENTS

17

118

Id. at 274.

Id.

Id. at 276. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, noted that the Texas statute requires that the
jury find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be imposed, "but a
sentencing system that allowed the jury to consider only aggravating circumstances would almost certainly fall
short of providing the individualized sentencing determination that we have held in Woodson v. North Carolina
to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 271. Woodson v. North Carolina, decided the
same day as Jurek, invalidated the North Carolina death penalty statute on Eighth Amendment grounds. 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976). The death penalty in Woodson was mandatory upon a guilty finding. Id. at 305. (Brennan, J.,
and Marshall, J., concurring). The Court of Criminal Appeals interpretation of the second special issue curiously
led the Stewart plurality to conclude that the Texas Court's interpretation, listing five factors that could be
considered with reference to future dangerousness, broadly authorized the defense to present evidence of
"whatever mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant can be adduced." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
The plurality also found that "Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced," in spite of the
fact that the statute does not explicitly speak of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 272, 276. The touchstone of
Jurek is that "the constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors." Id. at 272. Having found that these dictates were satisfied in
this case, the Court affirmed the judgment. Id. at 277 (Burger, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring).
120 urek, 428 U.S. at 275-76. The court alluded to a number of instances where predictions of future criminal
conduct were essential elements of decisions rendered throughout the criminal justice system: whether to admit a
defendant to bail; determining sentencing alternatives, parole determinations. Id. at 275. But none of these
decisions alluded to by the court involved capital litigation-a process that has been repeatedly attacked for the
fatal consequences of its endemic flaws.
121 Id. at 275-76
19
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Despite numerous amendments, future dangerousness has remained intact. This
history of constant change and revision and the apparent immutability of future
dangerousness, highlights the impossibility of establishing an infallibly accurate death
penalty system. It also speaks to the long, dark consequences of a procedure that was
hastily conceived and poorly vetted.
A. THE 1991 AMENDMENT: THE PENRY FACTOR-Two OF THE SPECIAL ISSUES ARE
DELETED

In yet another effort to comply with Furman, Texas amended Article 37.071
twice in 1991. The second amendment was the result of Penry v. Lynaugh.1 22 Eighteen
years after the enactment of the revamped death penalty statute, the 72d Legislature
abolished two of the special issues, which were hastily engrafted into the bill. However,
the future dangerousness inquiry remained intact.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Penryv. Lynaugh. 2 3 InPenry,
the Court held that although Art. 37.071, as interpreted by Jurek v. Texas,124 allowed a
defendant to present mitigating evidence on his or her behalf, the jury was not able to give
any meaningful effect to such mitigating evidence.1 25 In other words, if the jury answered
affirmatively to the three special issues set forth in Art. 37.071 but, at the same time did
not think the convicted defendant deserving of death due to mitigating evidence offered,
then the jury had no vehicle through which to express its leniency. Under this
circumstance the jury would have to give an intentionally false answer to one of the
special issues in order to avoid the death penalty. Moreover, the Penry Court held that
some evidence that had a mitigating effect such as an abused childhood, the effects of
which are irreversible, also served to increase the likelihood of an affirmative answer to
the future dangerousness special issue (the "two-edged sword").126 The Court concluded
that "in the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect
to mitigating evidence," the abovementioned problems inherent in Art. 37.071 rendered
the Texas statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
27
Amendments.1
Penry was predictable given a line of cases that were decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court between 1976 and 1982 dealing with individualized consideration at
capital sentencing. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that North
Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments because of the fear that the jury, finding a mandatory death penalty unduly
harsh and unworkably rigid, would factor in the severity of the penalty in finding guilt.128
Hearkening back to Justice Stewart's admonitions in Jurekthat sentencing procedures
129
must allow for consideration of particularized mitigating factors,
in Lockett v. Ohio and

122

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogatedby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

123

Id.

124

Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269, 276.

125

Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28; Lisa L. Havens-Cotes, The Demise of Individualized Sentencing in the
Texas

Death Penalty Scheme, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 49, 56 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Courts requirement that a
jury be able to give meaningful effect to mitigating evidence offered by a convicted defendant).
126 492 U.S. at 323-24; See Havens-Cotes, supra
note 125, at 56-57.
127 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328; See Havens-Cortes, supra
note 125, at 57-58.
128 428 U.S 280, 304-05
(1976).
129 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-72 ("Thus, in order to meet
the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment,
a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances . . the
Texas statute does not explicitly speak of mitigating circumstances; it directs only that the jury answer three
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in Eddings v. Oklahoma the court expanded the rule from Woodson. 130 The Court held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in capital trials "not be
precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death."131 The jury must be afforded an opportunity to give
independent mitigating weight to the circumstances presented by the defendant at the
sentencing hearing.1 32 This rule, the Court explained, "is the product of a considerable
history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the
individual."1 33
In 1988, the habeas petitioner in Franklin v. Lynaugh seized upon these
principles in seeking to attack the constitutionality of his death sentence.1 34 Franklin v.
Lynaugh involved a case where the only mitigating circumstance that the defendant was
able to present at his sentencing hearing was that his conduct record during time periods
where he was incarcerated showed no disciplinary infraction. 135 The petitioner argued that
even if the jury believed that the two special issues submitted to them under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Art. 37.071, ought to be answered yes, then the mitigating evidence
offered by petitioner at his sentencing hearing stripped the jury of an opportunity to
impose life imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty. This was because the
mitigating evidence had no weight toward imposing a life sentence except as relevant to
and channeled through the special issues.136 The court held that the Eighth Amendment
was not violated in sentencing the petitioner to death. 137 While the plurality's reasoning
rested on the grounds that it was appropriate for the mitigating evidence, presented by the
38
defendant, to influence the jury's consideration of the answers to the special issues,1
Justice O'Connor's cautious concurrence affirming the death sentence rested on narrower
grounds. In expressing her doubts about the Texas death penalty scheme, Justice
O'Connor observed that the principle underlying Lockett and Eddings is that "punishment
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." 139 The
statute as drafted left open the possibility that mitigating evidence, offered by a defendant
against the death penalty, would have relevance towards the defendant's moral culpability.
Yet the sentencer would not be permitted to give effect to its consideration in answering

questions. Thus, the constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors.").
30
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
13 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 ("[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death."). Recognizing that the "imposition of death by public authority
is... profoundly different from all other penalties," the Court held that the sentence must be free to give
"independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and to circumstances of the offense
proffered in mitigation." Id. at 604-05. In Eddings, the Court cited to the rule in Lockett as cited above. Eddings,
455 U.S. at 110 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
132 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
133 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-11.
134 487 U.S. 164, 177
(1988).
135 Id.
136 Id.

137 Id. at 183 (plurality opinion); Id. at 188 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1

3
39

Id. at 182.
Id at 184
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the special verdict questions.1 40 As applied, such a situation would present an Eighth
Amendment violation.' 4 However, Justice O'Connor concluded that the death sentence in
this case was constitutional because the defendant's single piece of mitigating evidence
"had no relevance to any other aspect of petitioner's character."1 42 The jurors were able to
weigh with the fullest consideration the mitigating effect of this evidence without
exceeding the built-in limitations of the statute.
Thus, Penry v. Lynaugh presented the Court with a case where the mitigating
effect of the evidence presented at sentencing was capable of expanding beyond the
constraints of the three issues presented under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.
37.071. 143 The constitutional proviso reserved by Justice O'Connor in Franklin v. Lynaugh
was triggered, and the Texas Legislature once again was sent to the drawing board to
revise its death penalty statutes. Justice O'Connor joined the Franklin dissenters to
conclude for the Court in Penry that the sentencing jury was not able to consider and give
effect to the defendant's mental retardation and history of childhood abuse "without any
jury instructions on mitigating evidence." 4 4
The Court found that the jury could not give full effect to Penry's mitigating
factors through Special Issue Two, which asks whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society.
The defendant's retardation and consequent inability to learn from
mistakes is a mitigating factor in the moral sense, but it is turned into an aggravating
factor in evaluating whether the defendant shall be a future danger.146 A jury that wanted
to use the defendant's retardation as a mitigating factor was precluded from doing so by
the wording of Special Issue Two. '4 Lastly, the third special issue, which requires the jury
to evaluate "whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased," was examined. 48
The Court found that it did not provide the jury with a vehicle for expressing their
disapproval of the death penalty in Penry's case. Even if a juror concluded that Penry's
mental retardation and arrested emotional development rendered him less culpable for his
crime in a moral sense, this in itself did not diminish the "unreasonableness" of
committing murder. None of the special issues satisfied constitutional scrutiny "in the
absence of instructions informing the jury it could consider and give effect to the
mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused background." 149 As a result,
50
Peniy received a new sentencing hearing.1
A year earlier in Franklin, Justice White had characterized the dissenting view
that effectively imposed an additional special issue to be given to the jury: "Does any
140 Id. at 185. In her discussion, Justice O'Connor alluded to the holding
in Jurek where the Court had noted that
the Texas statute did not explicitly mention mitigating circumstances but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
had construed the special issue regarding future dangerousness to permit consideration of the defendant's prior
criminal record, age, mental state, and the circumstances of the crime in mitigation. Id. at 183-84.
141 Id. at 185.
142 Id
143 492 U.S. 302, 302, 310-13 (1989), abrogatedby Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
144 Id. at
322.
145 Id. at
324.
46
1 Id. at 323.
147 Id. at
324.
48
1 Id. at 310.
149 Id. at
328.

Iso id
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mitigating evidence before you, whether or not relevant to the above two questions, lead
you to believe that the death penalty should not be imposed?" '5 Ironically, the Texas
Legislature's response to Penryhewed close to Justice White's assessment.
While the basic sentencing statute remained, the Penry decision provoked many
significant changes to Art. 37.071 when the Texas legislature convened in 1991.152 Special
issues one and three were deleted; special issue two on future dangerousness was retained,
and is now re-designated as the first special issue under Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.
37.071(b). A second special issue was added to subsection (b), which asks, in cases where
the capital murder conviction is obtained under a theory of vicarious liability, "whether
the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually cause the death
of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that human life
would be taken." 153 As before, both issues must be answered "yes" unanimously under the
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the defendant to receive the death
penalty. 54 When answering these one or two issues, the statute is explicitly amended so
that the jury is instructed that
[i]n deliberating on the issues submitted under Subsection (b) of this
article, it shall consider all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence
stage and the punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant's
background or character or the circumstances of the offense that
militates for or mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty.
This hearkens back to the flaws in the death sentence in Penry. The amendment, by its
deletion of special issues one and three, places all of the argument during a death
sentencing hearing (not encompassing a theory of vicarious liability) squarely on the issue
of future dangerousness. Arguably this was the practical result under the pre-1991 statute.
Special issues one and three escaped a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality;
nevertheless, they were subject to constant attack in the courts as duplicative of the finding
of guilt in a capital trial.156
The House Research Organization's analysis of the 1991 amendments notes that
the purpose of deleting these two special issues was to clarify the questions presented and
make them less vulnerable to appeal. 57 Supporters of the bill admitted that "juries have
often interpreted "deliberate" to mean "intentional." 5 Lastly, the reason for deleting
special issue three is that it will now be subsumed under an additional step included in the
amendment to the statute, addressing the Penry mandate of allowing the jury to properly

151 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 180 n.10 (1988).
152 S.B. 880, 1991 Leg., 72nd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1991) (amending TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West
1973)); SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE., BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 880, 1991 Leg., 72nd Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 1991) (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1973)).
153 SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 880, 1991 Leg., 72nd Reg. Sess.

(Tex. 1991).
154 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(d) (West 2013).
155 Id.

156 Sattiewhite v. State, 786 S.W.2d 271, 289-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 244

(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Heckertv. State, 612 S.W.2d 549, 552-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (finding "deliberate"
under art. 37.07 1(b)(1)(pre-1991) not to be the linguistic equivalent of "intentionally" so as to avoid rendering
art. 37.071(b)(1) a nullity).
157

See HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS FOR H.B. 1240, 72nd Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Tex. 1991).
158

Id
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consider factors which mitigate against the imposition of capital punishment.1 59 The
additional step dictates that the jury considers an additional question that must be
answered before the death penalty may be assessed:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background,
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of
60
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.1
The jury, in order to answer the question so as to assess the death penalty, must
unanimously answer this question "no," while a "yes" finding requires the agreement of
only 10 jurors.161 A "yes" finding or a failure to agree results in a sentence of life
imprisonment. Specifically in response to Penry, the jury decides the special issue with the
specific instruction that the jury "shall consider mitigating evidence to be evidence that a
62
juror might regard as reducing a defendant's moral blameworthiness."1
Thus, the 1991 amendments 63 underscored the glaring deficiencies of the 1973
statute. The deletion of the two original special issues speaks directly to the flawed
process under which the statute was crafted; the addition of the mitigation language, a
recognition that the original three issues that were upheld in Jurek, in fact, failed to allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors.164 Opponents of the bill, however,
astutely observed that "although th[is] bill attempts to conform current law to recent
judicial decisions . . . still would leave the sentencing statute subject to a number of
potential constitutional challenges." 165
Between 1982 and 1991 Texas executed forty individuals,166 arguably under a
sentencing scheme that was not consistent, principled, humane, or sensible to the
uniqueness of the individual.167 The 2001 amendment, however, reveals an even more
159 Id.
16o
16

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711(e) (West 2013).
TE. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(f)(1)-(2) (West 2013).

6 2

1 Id.; art. 37.071(f)(4); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogatedby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
16' Act of Sept. 1, 1991, ch. 838 §§ 1-6, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 838 (West). The amendments retain the
requirement that neither the court, nor the attorneys inform the jury of the effect of a failure to agree as to any
issue. Id. Lastly, the 1991 bill created a statutory exception to the requirement that the sentencing phase be
conducted as soon as practicable in the trial court. Id. This exception is provided for in article 44.29(c), and
provides for a procedure in the event that a resentencing procedure is held after reversal of error affecting the
punishment stage of the trial, if the punishment after reversal is not reformed to life under article 44.25 1. TEX.
CODE CRIM. ANN. art. 44.29(c) (West 2013). The entire conviction is not reversed, but a new jury is empanelled
for the sentencing hearing as if proceeding directly from a guilt finding. Id.
164 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976). Recall that "Lockett underscoredJurek's recognition
that the
constitutionality of the Texas scheme 'turns on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of
particularized mitigating factors. "'Penry, 492 U.S. at 317 (citing Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272).

165 See HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS FOR H.B. 1240, Tex. H.B. 1240, 72nd

Leg., Reg. Sess., at 14-16 (Tex. 1991). Opponents observed that the bill still contained vague language that
would lead to confusion, inconsistency, and appeals, and they recommended that it define several terms. Id.
Specifically, they alluded to the "watered down" mitigation definition, and vague, undefined terms like
"probability," which "lead to inconsistent application of the law, which has been a principal reason why the
Texas capital punishment law has been invalidated in the past." Id.
166 1982-1 individual; 1984-3 individuals; 1985-6 individuals; 1987-6 individuals; 1988-3 individuals;
1989-4 individuals; 1990-4 individuals; 1991-3 individuals (data through June 1991, before the statute was
amended). Executions, TEx. DEP'T. CRIM. JUST.,

http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/deathrow/dr executions by_year.html (last updated Apr. 17, 2014).
167 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982).
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insidious problem with the statute - it permitted the jury to consider race as a predictor of
future violence.
B. THE 2001 AMENDMENT - PROHIBITS RACE AS A PREDICTOR OF FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS

In 2001, the Texas legislature again amended Art. 37.071 at the indirect behest of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Saldano v. Texas. 16 In 1999, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals upheld 69 on procedural grounds 7 0 Victor Hugo Saldano's death sentence, despite
the sentencing jury hearing the testimony of Dr. Walter Quijano, a licensed clinical
psychologist.' 7 ' Quijano testified that Saldano constituted a future danger to society in part
because he is Hispanic.1 72 In fact, Dr. Quijano had testified in six other capital murder
S.B 133, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001) (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1973)); see
Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000).
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. App. 1999), vacated, Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000);
161

Diana L. Hoemann, Why the Injection ofRace in Saldano v. State Constitutesa FundamentalError, 4 SCHOLAR

261, 262-63, 265 n.18, 268 (2002).
170 Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 891 (holding that Saldano's race claim was procedurally defaulted
as his defense
attorney failed to object to Dr Quijano's testimony regarding Saldano's race); Hoermann, supra note 169, at
268.
17' Hoermann, supra note 169, at 265 n. 18.
172 Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 891; Hoermann, supra note 169, at 265
nn.21 & 23, 267-68 nn.24-25
(citations omitted). The following are the pertinent excerpts from Dr. Quijano's testimony at
Saldano's sentencing proceeding. At Victor Hugo Saldano's trial, Dr. Quijano testified on direct
examination by the prosecutor as follows:

Q. Okay. What is the fourth category?
A. The fourth category is race.
Q. Well, let's talk about that. In this age of political correctness, that somehow it is an
item that we tend to gloss over. But, empirically, there is a statistical analysis of it. Is that
correct?
A. Yes. This is one of those unfortunate realities also that blacks and Hispanics are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.
Q. And there may be social problems for that; we don't know. But that doesn't alter the
fact that, statistically, that's a reality of life.
A. The race itself may not explain the over-representation, so there are other subrealities
that may have to be considered. But statistically speaking, 40 percent of inmates in the
prison system are black, about 20 percent are - - about 30 percent are white, and about 20
percent are Hispanics. So there's much over-representation.
Q. In the category - categorization of races, how is an Argentinean fitted?
A. That - he would be considered a Hispanic.
Reporters Record, supra note 22, at 75-76. Not only did Mr. Saldano's trial defense attorney not object to Dr.
Quijano's testimony, he elicited even more of it on cross-examination:

Q. Now, one of the factors - one of your other statistical factors you mentioned was the
factor of race. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And you - you pointed out a fact that's probably pretty well-known to
everybody; that blacks and Hispanics are over-represented in the United States prison
population.
A. Yes.
Q. And, basically, what we mean by that is, if African-American people make up about
16 percent of the population, but 40 percent of the people in prison are African-American
people, then we can say, Well, if the population in prison corresponded to the free
population, then there should only be 16 percent African-American people in prison, so
that fact that there's only 40 shows that they're over-represented. Right?
A. Yes.
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sentencing proceedings stating that the defendant's race should be a factor in considering
73
future dangerousness.1 Saldano subsequently requested certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, asking the Court to consider whether the State could constitutionally impose the
death penalty on the basis of the petitioner's race.' 74 In response to Saldano's filing with
the High Court, then Texas Attorney General John Cornyn confessed that "the infusion of
race as a factor for the jury to weigh in making its determination violated [Saldano's]
constitutional right to be sentenced without regard to the color of his skin."'7 5 In light of
Cornyn's confession of error, the Supreme Court vacated Saldano's death sentence and
remanded the case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.1 76 Prior to 2001, Art. 37.071
permitted either the state or the defense to present any evidence "that the court deems
relevant to sentence." 7 The Texas Legislature did not wait for the Court of Criminal
Appeals to hear Saldano on remand before amending Articles 37.071 and 37.0711 of the
Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure. The legislature added the proviso that during the
capital sentencing hearing "evidence may not be offered by the state to establish that the
race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely that the defendant will engage in future
criminal conduct." 78
Supporters of the amendment argued that
[it] would correct a wrong in the Texas criminal justice system. It is
fundamentally unfair for the state to present evidence that a defendant's
race is a predictor of his or her likelihood to commit new crimes. The
AG has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that this practice is
inappropriate and that race should not be considered as a factor in the
criminal justice system. This pseudoscience should be disallowed in a

Q. . . Now, the Hispanics that have been considered in coming up with these statistical
factors are the Hispanics that are in American prisons. Is that correct?
A. Or American criminal justice system.
Q. All right. And do you think it would be fair to say that the overwhelming majority of
those Hispanics would be Mexican people?
A. In this part of the country, yes. In the East Coast, Puerto Ricans.
Hoermann, supra note 169, at 265 n.23.
1'
See John Cornyn, Statement from Attorney General John Comyn Regarding Death Penalty Cases, OFF.
ATT'Y GEN. (June 9, 2000), https://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/newspubs/newsarchive/2000/20000609
saldanocases.htm (identifying the following six capital defendants (in addition to Saldano) at whose sentencing
proceedings the state used Dr. Quijano's testimony, using race as a foundation for finding future dangerousness,
to seek the death penalty: Julian Garcia, Eugene Alvin Broxton, John Alba, Michael Dean Gonzales, Carl Henry
Blue, Duane Buck (all were sentenced to death)); Hoermann, supra note 169 at 269 n.34; HOUSE COMM. ON
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 133, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001) (amending TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1973)).
174 See Saldano, 530 U.S. at 1212; Hoermann, supra note 169, at 261, 268..
171 See Saldano, 530 U.S. at 1212; SENATE RESEARCH CTR., BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 133, 77th Leg., Reg.
Sess.
(Tex. 2001) (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. at. 37.071 (1973)); Hoermann, supra note 169, at 261, 268-69.
176 See Saldano, 530 U.S. 1212; Hoermann, supra note 169, at 269. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Saldano's death sentence primarily on the grounds that the Attorney
General's confession of error did not address the issue on which Saldano's death sentence had originally been
upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeals: procedural default (at trial, Saldano did not object to Dr. Quijano's
testimony and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Dr. Quijano's introduction of race and recidivism into the
sentencing proceeding did not constitute fundamental error.). Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. App. 1999);
Hoermann, supra note 169, at 270 n.41 & 46. Saldano presently remains on death row. Offenders on Death Row,
TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death row/dr offendersondr.html, (last updated May 20,
2014).
177 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1999) amended by S.B 133, 77th Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2001);
SENATE RESEARCH CTR., BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 133, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
178 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2 (a)(2) (West 2013); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711

§ 3 (a)(2) (West 2013); Act of Sept. 1, 2001, ch. 585 §§ 2-3, 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (amending TEX.
CODE CRTM PROC ANN art 37 071 37 0711 (West 1973))
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courtroom just as other unreliable evidence, like lie detector tests,
already is.1 79
Amazingly, despite this acknowledgement that the future dangerousness inquiry permits
unreliable pseudoscience to enter the courtroom, the latter remained intact.
The next amendment demonstrates how the statute as enacted did not permit
reasonable notice of expert testimony in death penalty cases, although under the law it was
required in non-capital cases.
C. THE 2005 AMENDMENTS - To PERMIT REASONABLE NOTICE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN CAPITAL CASES

Subject to the prohibition on the state using race to demonstrate future
dangerousness during the capital sentencing hearing of a Texas defendant, "evidence may
be presented by the state . . that the court deems relevant to sentence . . . ."18o This
provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure called for the types of evidence typically
offered under Texas Rules of Evidence 404(b).'' The notice requirements of Rule 404(b)
as a prerequisite to admissibility under the rule are read into the requirements of the
introduction of such extraneous evidence in non-capital cases. 8 2 However, no provision
was made governing notice in capital sentencing in Art. 37.071, and Art. 37.07 did not
govern in capital cases.
In 2005, the legislature amended Art. 37.071 § 2(a)(1)' 83 to incorporate the notice
requirement under Art. 37.07(3)(g),"' which in turn is that under Texas Rule of Evidence

179

HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS FOR S.B. 133, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.

2001) (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1973)).
" TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2 (a)(1) (West 2013).
1Id. (stating that the introduction of extraneous evidence is governed by notice requirements of TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3 (g) (West 2013)).
182 TEx CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3 (a), (g) (West 2013). The notice requirement under Texas Rules
of Evidence 404(b) is as follows:
Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon timely request by the accused in a criminal case, reasonable
notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State's case-in-chief such
evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.
TEx. R. EVID. 404(b).
183

This statute reads:

If a defendant is tried for a capital offense in which the state seeks the death penalty, on a
finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or
life imprisonment without parole. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court
and, except as provided by Article 44.29(c) of this code, before the trial jury as soon as
practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented by the state and the defendant
or the defendant's counsel as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence,
including evidence of the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the
offense that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. This subdivision shall
not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or
the defendant's counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of
death. The introduction of evidence of extraneous conduct is governed by the notice
requirements of Section 3(g), Article 37.07. The court, the attorney representing the state,
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404(b).
The amendment to Art. 37.071, as said in the Bill Analysis, codifies existing
practice, as the notice requirement of 37.07(3)(g) is "followed routinely by
prosecutors."186 Yet the distinction did previously preclude claims under Rule 404(b) for a
new sentencing hearing based on the reasonableness of the notice provided by the
prosecutor in sentencing hearings.
Prior to the amendment and during the time that Texas Rule of Criminal
Evidence 404(c) governed in capital sentencing hearings, the applicable rule read:
In the penalty phase, evidence may be offered by an accused or by the
prosecution as to the prior criminal record of the accused. Other
evidence of his character may be offered by an accused or by the
prosecution. Nothing herein shall limit provisions of Article 37.071,
Code of Criminal Procedure. 8 7
The Court of Criminal Appeals specifically held the notice provision of Rule 404(b) did
not govern in capital cases. As such, the defendant was not entitled to object on the basis
that the notice provided was unreasonable."" The standard in capital cases was whether
89
the introduction of such evidence without reasonable notice constituted unfair surprise.1
The Court acknowledged the change in the notice standard governing capital sentencing
hearings, and rejected the claims raised under it in a number of cases.1 90 For example, in
Vuong v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously allowed the
State's expert to testify at the punishment phase without providing him with reasonable
notice of the expert's testimony pursuant to TRE 404(b).191 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that 404(b) did not apply:

the defendant, or the defendant's counsel may not inform a juror or a prospective juror of
the effect of a failure of a jury to agree on issues submitted under Subsection (c) or (e).
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. an. 37.071 § 2 (a)(1) (West 2013).
184 The notice requirement under anicle 37.07 (3)(g) is as follows:
On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence under this
anicle shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of
Evidence. If the attorney representing the state intends to introduce an extraneous crime
or bad act that has not resulted in a final conviction in a coun of record or a probated or
suspended sentence, notice of that intent is reasonable only if the notice includes the date
on which and the county in which the alleged crime or bad act occurred and the name of
the alleged victim of the crime or bad act. The requirement under this subsection that the
attorney representing the state give notice applies only if the defendant makes a timely
request to the attorney representing the state for the notice.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. an. 37.07 § 3 (g) (West 2013).
185 Act of Sept. 1 2005, ch. 399, § 1, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West).
18

HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1507, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.

2005).
187 Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 942 & n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (enbanc).
188 Id.; See also Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); See also Rojas v. State, 986
S.W.2d 241, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
89 Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
190 Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 358-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that the government provided
adequate notice of its intent to introduce a prison guard's testimony that the defendant threatened to kill the guard
during the punishment phase); See Robertson v. State, No. AP-71224, 2011 WL 1161381, at *12-13 (Tex. Crim.
App. March 9, 2011) (holding that the government provided sufficient notice for testimony offered in rebuttal to
mitigation evidence suggesting that the defendant valued human life); Wilkins v. State, No. AP-75878, 2010 WL
4117677, at *8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 2010) (holding that no harm was caused by the lack of notice of the
evidence and the effect that the lack of notice had on the defendant's ability to present an adequate defense).
'9' 830 S.W 2d at 942
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In deciding questions concerning the admissibility of character evidence
at the punishment stage of the trial, the appropriate governing statute is
Rule 404(c) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. Rule 404(c)
contains no notice provision, nor does Article 37.071 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, the provisions of which specifically govern the
scope of Rule 404(c) in capital murder cases.192
D. THE LOFTY PROMISES OF FURMAN UNFULFILLED BY THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE
In the modern world of business, the effectiveness and success of a new product
launch is directly tied to rigorous pre-launching activities: long hours of meticulous
design, planning, preparation, defining, and testing. Once launched, an unsuccessful
product with proven errors is recalled or abandoned. The launching of Texas's new
product - Article 37.071- was from its inception beset with challenges. The numerous
revisions to Art. 37.071 underscore the criticisms leveled against the statute in Judge
Odom's 1973 dissent in Jurek v. State, when he labeled it "so confusing that even the
majority of this Court have been misled."1 93 Further, Judge Odom argued that the statute
94
was unconstitutionally vague in violation of both the Texas and the U.S. Constitution.1
Arguably, the amendments reflect an attempt by the legislature to rectify the
constitutional deficiencies, but this piecemeal effort spanning a period of over forty years
shows that Furman'spromise of eradicating arbitrary and capricious statutes has not been
fulfilled. Furthermore this begs the question: After forty years of dicey implementation,
shouldn't Texas abandon future dangerousness?
The next two parts squarely address this question. Together, they demonstrate
how neither evolving stricter standards of admissibility, nor appellate review have
deterred the parade of forensic experts willing to offer predictions of future
dangerousness on the reliability of a crystal ball. Part III covers the early decades
following the launch of Art. 37.071 which briefly features the infamous testimony of "Dr.
Death," and the evolution of stricter judicial gatekeeping. Additionally, Part III features
the testimony of Dr. Richard Coons in numerous capital cases, leading to the landmark
2008 Coble case, which forced a unanimous Court of Criminal Appeals to find his
testimony inadmissible. Part IV questions the effectiveness of appellate review as it
showcases a litany of capital cases reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals whose
opinions are rife with judicial contradictions.
PART III. HANGING PSYCHIATRISTS' PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: THE
LONG AND WINDING ROAD FROM BAREFOOT TO COBLE
A. "SLIDE INTO ETHICAL CHAOS" 195 - "DR. DEATH" REIGNS SUPREME IN TEXAS

The amendment history of Art. 37.071 incisively demonstrates how twenty-eight
years after its enactment, the Texas Legislature amended the statute after the debacle with
Dr. Quijano's testimony in a number of cases.Although acknowledging that pseudoscience
is unreliable, the legislature chose not to abolish predictions of future dangerousness. For
almost forty years, Texas has relied on the testimony of psychiatrists to persuade juries to

192

Id.

522 S.W.2d 934, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id
195 The phrase is borrowed from Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable ofthe ForensicPsychiatrist:Ethics and
the
19'

194

Problem ofDoing Harm, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 255 (1990).
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render a death verdict in answering the special issue. Although some defendants'
convictions were ultimately reversed after the use of future dangerousness led the jury to
impose a death sentence, others have not been as fortunate. A litany of Texas cases shows
how the State used Dr. Grigson to abuse future dangerousness with irreparable
consequences.
In 1973, Ernest Benjamin Smith was indicted for murder by a Texas grand
jury.196 The State sought the death penalty, and its attorney was informally ordered to
arrange a psychiatric examination for Smith to determine his competency to stand trial.1 97
The State called Dr. Grigson, who concluded in a letter to the judge that Smith was
competent after interviewing the defendant for only 90 minutes.1 98 Smith was then
convicted of murder, and Grigson was once again asked to testify at his sentencing
hearing,1 99 this time on his assessment of Smith's future dangerousness.2 00 Over defense
counsel's objection, Grigson testified to the jury:
(a) that Smith 'is a very severe sociopath'; (b) that 'he will continue his
previous behavior'; (c) that his sociopathic condition will 'only get
worse'; (d) that he has no 'regard for another human being's property or
for their life, regardless of who it may be"; (e) that '[t]there is no
treatment, no medicine... that in any way at all modifies or changes this
behavior,'; (f) that he 'is going to go ahead and commit other similar or
same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so'; and (g) that he 'has
no remorse or sorrow for what he has done.' 201
As a result, Smith was sentenced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal
202
Appeals affinned the conviction.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the death
sentence, holding that Smith's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the
introduction of Dr. Grigson's testimony during the penalty phase.203 This makes Smith
problematic on a number of levels, but principally because Dr. Grigson's role as an
examiner in a competency hearing was entirely different from his role as an expert witness
regarding future dangerousness during the sentencing phase. As a noted psychiatrist
indicated, in the former, the examiner's role is neutral, while testifying in the latter, he is
204
acting as an agent for the state2.
In addition, despite Grigson's damning prognosis that
Smith's sociopathic condition would worsen, a 2005 study reported that Smith has been a
model prisoner for the past twenty years. Smith obtained a college degree while

196 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 456 (1981).
197 Id at 456-57.
198 Id
199 Id. at 457-59; In Texas, capital cases are statutorily bifurcated into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase, Id. at
457, and the applicable statute at the time of Mr. Smith's trial was Article 37.071(a) of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. (West 1980), Id. at 458.
200 Id. at 467. Although the State had been ordered to disclose the name
of all the witnesses it planned to use at

both stages of the trial, it did not provide Grigson's name. Id. at 459.
201 Id. at 459-60.
202 Id. at
460.
203 Id. at 473. As noted by Dr. Paul Appelbaum, the Supreme Court's ruling
that Smith should have been given
his 5 h Amendment rights is in accord with the American Psychiatric Association's Annotation on ethics in
psychiatry: "The Psychiatrists must fully describe the nature and purpose and lack of confidentiality of the
examination to the examinee at the beginning of the examination." Paul S. Appelbaum, PsychiatristsRole in the
Death Penalty, 32 n. 11 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 761, 761 (1981).
204

Appelbaum, supra note 203, at 761.
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205

incarcerated, trained other prisoners on computers, and worked as a clerk in the prison.
Although Smith's rehabilitation in prison shows the glaring inaccuracy of Grigson's
predictions, one of the most damaging decisions regarding future dangerousness is the
206
One scholar has correctly argued that
Supreme Court's holding in Barefoot v. Estelle2.
Estelle is "egregiously wrong-headed by current standards for relevance" with an "effect
on capital sentencing proceedings [that] has been pernicious and pervasive, undermining
basic rule-of-law precepts.

B. THE DANGER OF
GOING BAREFOOT: SUPREME COURT'S "WRONG ONLYMOST OF THE
208
TIME STANDARD,

'

In 1978, during the capital murder trial of Thomas A. Barefoot, Dr. James
Grigson served as an expert witness for the State of Texas yet again, this time along with
Dr. John Holbrook.20 9 When asked to testify as to the future dangerousness of the
defendant, both psychiatrists were given a lengthy hypothetical based on Barefoot's prior
convictions, his bad reputation in his community, and the events surrounding the murder
for which he was on trial.210 However, neither Holbrook, nor Grigson ever requested the
opportunity to examine Barefoot.2 1
Dr. Grigson told the jury that he had examined "between thirty and forty
thousand individuals..." and that he would be able to "give a medical opinion within
reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the psychological or psychiatric makeup of an
individual." 2 12 Grigson also stated that based on the hypothetical, Barefoot could be
diagnosed as having a sociopathic personality disorder 2 13 and that "that there was a 'one
hundred percent and absolute' chance that Barefoot would commit further acts of criminal
,214
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
After only an hour of
215
deliberation, Barefoot's jury sentenced him to death.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed Barefoot's case and upheld the use of
216
future dangerousness in capital cases. The American Psychiatric Association (APA)the nation's largest organization of psychiatrists-filed an amicus curiaebrief on behalf of

Deadly Speculation, supra note 2, at 29; see also Holloway v. State, 613 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981). Grigson testified in this case without ever examining Holloway and based his review on the offense report
and interviews with people who knew Holloway. Id. Holloway was sentenced to death, but this conviction was
ultimately reversed in 1981. Id. at 503.
206 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 938
(1983).
205

207

Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future DangerousnessTestimony and Intellectual

Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 353, 359 (2003).
Subheading borrowed from Paul S. Appelbaum, Death, The Expert Witness, and the Dangers of Going
Barefoot, 34 n. 11 HOSP. AND CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 1003, 1004 (Nov. 1983).
208

209

Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884 (1983).

210

Id. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

211

Id. at 917.

Id at 918. Grigson also stated "that this skill was "particular to the field of psychiatry and not to the average
layman." Id.
21 Id. at 919. Grigson also stated that on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was "above ten," in the "most severe
category" of sociopaths, and stated that there was no cure for the condition. Id.
212

214

Id.

215

Id.
Id. at 896 (majority opinion).

216
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Barefoot, 217 in which it unequivocally stated its position against the use of psychiatric
testimony to predict a defendant's future dangerousness:

-

Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning
the long-term future dangerousness of a defendant in a capital case, at
least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in this
area. Although psychiatric assessments may permit short term
predictions of violent or assaultive behavior, medical knowledge has
simply not advanced to the point where long-term predictions - the type
of testimony at issue in this case - may be made with even reasonable
accuracy. The large body of research in this area indicates that, even
under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-termfuture
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases . .
Contrary to the claims of the prosecution psychiatrists who testified in
this case, psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness
even under the best of conditions and on the basis of complete medical
data - are of fundamentally low reliability. Although a likelihood of
future violent behavior may be assigned to a given individual solely on
the basis of statistical 'base rates' and other information of an actuarial
nature, psychiatric determinations in this area have little or no
independent validity. We believe, therefore, that diagnoses of
'sociopathy' or 'antisocial personality disorder,' and predictions of
future behavior characterized as 'medical opinions,' serve only to distort
the fact-finding process. Because the prejudicial impact of such
assertedly 'medical' testimony far outweighs its probative value, it
218
should be barred altogether in capital cases.
(emphasis added)
The APA further argued that "[a]t a minimum, psychiatrists should not be
allowed to offer medical opinions concerning the likelihood of long-term future
dangerousness unless they have: 1) conducted an in-depth psychiatric examination of the
defendant"219 and 2) indicated that "hypothetical questions.. fail to provide sufficient
information to make the diagnosis."220 The questions posed to Holbrook and Grigson, the
APA argued, contained no information that would have allowed the psychiatrists to rule
221
out other mental disorders, or to offer alternative explanations for Barefoot's behavior.
Finally, the APA asserted that the "inadequate procedures used in this case allow a
psychiatrist to masquerade his personal preferences as 'medical' views, without providing
,222
a meaningful basis for rebutting his conclusions."
However despite this argument, the
U.S. Supreme Court made an astonishing statement that revealed its profound disregard

217

Brief for American Psychiatric Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 1, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880 (1982) (No. 82-6080).
218

Id. at 3-4.

219

Id. at 6.

220

Id. at 7. For additional arguments rejecting the use of hypotheticals in these cases, see also Appelbaum, supra

note 208, at 1003; Paul S. Appelbaum, Hypotheticals, PsychiatricTestimony, and the Death Sentence, 12 BULL.

AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &L., 169, 171 (1984) (arguing that hypotheticals as the "sole source of evidence for a
psychiatric opinion...raises enormous problems of the validity of expert judgments").
221 Brief for the Defendant, supra note 217, at 7 ("Dr. Holbrook and Dr. Grigson presumably
assumed that
petitioner had no history of delusions or hallucinations - symptoms that might have suggested the alternative
diagnosis of schizophrenia - simply because the hypothetical questions contained no information in that
regard.").
222 Id at 9
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for organized psychiatry, encouraging prosecutors to continue leveling death penalties on
the precarious edifice of speculation. The court noted: "Neither petitioner nor the
Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time."2 23 Thomas Barefoot was executed on October 3 0th

1984. 224
In 1985, three years after the APA issued its opinion on future dangerousness,
225
Grigson testified in the capital murder case of Stephen Ray Nethery2.
At the trial,
Grigson testified that:
he was competent to give his opinion based upon a hypothetical
question because of his medical and psychiatric training, and his
experience in examining murder and capital murder defendants over the
past sixteen years. When asked if he could cite any medical authority or
research that states that a psychiatrist is competent to testify based solely
on a hypothetical question, Grigson said he was probably the best
authority in that area. He then cited two articles which he said stated that
the best indication of future acts of violence are a history of prior acts of
violence in the past.
Grigson admitted being familiar with the brief filed by the
American Psychiatric Association, in a Supreme Court case, involving
his testimony, Estelle v. Smith... in which the association said that
making a prediction of future violent behavior is beyond psychiatry and
verges on quackery. . . Grigson also stated that he was 100% accurate in
his predictions of future violence and that he based his answers... on the
facts given in the hypothetical. 226
227

Mr. Nethery was found guilty and sentenced to death2.
On appeal, he argued
that the state failed to qualify the psychiatric witnesses as experts in predicting future
dangerousness, and the predictions were too speculative and lacking in scientific basis.22 8
229
Stephen Ray Nethery was executed on May 27, 1994.
In 1985, Dr. Grigson also testified in the capital case of Baby Ray Bennett, who
230
was convicted and sentenced to death.
In a scathing dissent, Judge Teague referring to
him by the then well-earned epithet of "Dr. Death," said:
It seems to me that when Dr. Grigson testifies at the punishment stage of
a capital murder trial he appears to the average lay juror, and the
uninformed juror, to be the second coming of the Almighty.
After having read many records of capital murder cases in
which Dr. Grigson testified at the punishment stage of the trial, I have
concluded that, as a general proposition, when Dr. Grigson speaks to a
lay jury, or an uninformed jury, about a person who he characterizes as a
223

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983).

224 TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., supra note 44.
225 Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 708-09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985).
226

227
228

Id.
Id. at 691.

Id. at 708.

229 TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., supra note 44.
230

Bennett v. State, 766. S.W.2d 227, 227-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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"severe" sociopath, which a defendant who has been convicted of
capital murder always is in the eyes of Dr. Grigson, the defendant
should stop what he is then doing and commence writing out his last
will and testament-because he will in all probability soon be ordered
by the trial judge to suffer a premature death.23
In 1995, the APA expelled Grigson from its ranks because he had violated its
code of ethics by "arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without first having examined the
individuals in question, and for indicating, while testifying in court as an expert witness,
that he could predict with 100 percent certainty that the individuals would engage in future
violent acts." 232 Grigson, who had been certified to testify in over 150 cases, stated that the
expulsion would not affect his license to practice.2 33
Unfortunately, despite the conclusions made by the APA in Barefoot, and
continued criticism from members of the psychiatric profession, Texas continues to
proffer predictions of future dangerousness. However, in the last two decades, the legal
landscape of expert admissibility has evolved considerably, with tectonic changes
occurring in the 1990's. As one scholar has noted, the courts' "foray"234 into the realm of
expert admissibility was inevitable given the society's growing dependence on
235
technology.
Complex technological and scientific evidence has become the centerpiece
of much litigation, forcing the gates of admissibility to be more meticulously guarded by
the gatekeepers.
C. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF EXPERT ADMISSIBILITY: THE DAUBERTKELLYAND

NENNO STANDARDS
In 1993, the Supreme Court rejected the Frye "general acceptance" standard for
admissibility236 in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., which enumerated a
237
In Daubert, the parties were
two-prong test for the admissibility of expert testimony2.
reduced to a veritable battle of experts, both sides proffering testimony by wellcredentialed experts.23 The U.S. Supreme Court held that Frye's"general acceptance" test
was not a prerequisite for the admission of scientific evidence and was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.2 39 Moreover, under FRE 104, the Court stated that trial judges

Id. at 232. Baby Ray Bennett was sentenced to death. After serving ten years on death row, his sentence was
commuted to life. By 2004, Bennet was a trustee in prison, disciplined for only four minor infractions, and had
not lost a single day of good-time credits in 17 years. Deadly Speculation, supra note 2, at xiv.
232 Laura Beil, Groups Expel PsychiatristKnown for Murder Cases, DALL. MORNING NEWS July 26, 1995, at
21A.
233 Id.
234 Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade ofDaubert Wrought, 95 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S59 (2005).
235 Id.
236 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding
that as long as there is a consensus among
those in the field, an expert's testimony would be allowed because expert admissibility turns on "general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs"). However, critics of the Frye standard state that it merely
looks at the number of followers rather than the validity of the theory; it does not account for determination of
the relevant field, and this standard has a propensity to lead to "self-validating experts." Berger, supra note 234,
at S60. For a thorough analysis of the Dauberttrilogy and its impact on scientific testimony, see Berger, supra
note 234.
237 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 587, 592-93 (1993).
238 Id at 582-83.
239 Id. at 587. Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff's evidence
failed to meet Frye's general acceptance standard because it "had not been published or subjected to peer
review " Id. at 584
231
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act as gatekeepers2 40 to ensure that "any and all scientific testimony . . is not only relevant
but reliable" in order to be admissible.2 4 ' On December 1, 2000 in response to Daubert,
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended. FRE 701, 702, and 703 were
all modified to incorporate the principles established in the Dauberttrilogy and
242
subsequent line of cases.
In Texas, one year prior to the Daubert decision, in Kelly v. State243 the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals had pronounced Frye's general acceptance test already dead
and enunciated its own reliability factors, which were eerily similar to Daubert's.
Acknowledging that the court had used the Frye standard in previous occasions,
the court stated that it had never explicitly adopted it, 244 and proceeded to conclude that
the Frye test was no longer part of Texas law.245 The Court held that Texas Rule of
Criminal Evidence 702 incorporated the analyses in rules 402 and 403, mandating a
finding that the evidence was relevant and reliable,2 46 and stated that the requirements of
R. 702 do not apply specifically or exclusively to novel scientific evidence.247 To be
considered reliable, evidence from a scientific theory had to satisfy three criteria: "1) the
underlying scientific theory must be valid; 2) the technique applying the theory must be
valid; and 3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in
248
question."
The court outlined seven factors that could potentially affect the trial court's
determination of reliability:

Id. at 589. The Court established four "general" yet nonexclusive factors the gatekeepers could consider: 1)
whether the theory can and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) technique's known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether there has been widespread
acceptance of the technique. Id. at 593-94.
241 Id. at 589. In addition, gatekeepers must assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue." Id. at 592-93.
242 The post-Daubertmodifications were as follows: In Rule 701, Opinion Testimony
By Lay Witnesses, the
following language was added: "and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702." FED. R. EVID. 701. Rule 702 was amended "to eliminate the risk that the reliability
requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay
witness clothing." FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's notes (2000 Amendment). Specifically Rule 702,
Testimony by Expert Witnesses was amended to include the following, "(b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702. The following language was
added to Rule 703: "An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the
facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if
their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."
FED. R. EVID. 703.
243 824 S.W.2d 568, 572-73 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992).
244 Id. at 572 ("Although this Court has never explicitly adopted the Frye
test, on several occasions we have used
a general acceptance test when reviewing lower court decisions regarding the admission of scientific evidence.
See Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Reed v. State, 644 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983); Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973). In all those cases, however, the trials were held before the promulgation of the Texas Rules of
Criminal Evidence.").
245 Id.
246 Id. (stating explicitly in footnote 11 that 702 incorporates
402 and 403).
247 Id.
240

248 Id at 573
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(1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community [;] . . (2) the
qualification of the expert(s) testifying; (3) the existence of literature
supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique;
(4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of
other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with
which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to
the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied
the technique on the occasion in question.2 49
The Daubertand Kelly tests, while useful in guiding the gatekeepers with respect
to scientific testimony, presented problems for non-scientific expert testimony or the "soft
sciences." In 1998, inNenno v. State,2 50 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly
stated that the "flexible" Daubertfactors "do not necessarily apply outside the hard
science context; instead, methods of proving reliability will vary, depending upon the field
,251
of expertise."
When addressing fields of study . . that are based primarily upon
experience and training as opposed to the scientific method..., the
appropriate questions are: (1) whether the field of expertise is a
legitimate one; (2) whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony
is within the scope of that field; and (3) whether the expert's testimony
properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the
field.252
253

Although some courts have held it to be inapplicable,
the Kelly and Daubert
tests remain the standards of admissibility of scientific and non-scientific testimony .254
However, it seems that courts require less scrutiny of prosecution expert witnesses in
criminal cases.2 55

Id.
970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
251 Id. at 561 (citing numerous federal cases
in the court's analysis).
252 Id. The Court further explained: "These questions are merely an appropriately
tailored translation of the Kelly
test to areas outside of hard science. And, hard science methods of validation, such as assessing the potential rate
of error or subjecting a theory to peer review, may often be inappropriate for testing the reliability of fields of
expertise outside the hard sciences." Id.
253 See Green v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Facility, 993 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding
that evidence
of fact learned in capacity as treating doctor should have been admitted, even if proper to exclude causation
testimony of doctor); Harris v. Belue, 974 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding the Robinson test factors
inapplicable to the logical deduction employed by the medical expert witnesses, and further inapplicable because
objection to the reliability of the proffered testimony did not come until after the case had rested, which did not
allow the trial court's discretion as a "gatekeeper"); Frohne v. State, 928 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App. 1996) (deciding
inapplicability of Kelly in light of the expert testimony was not based on a novel scientific test or theory, but on
her consultations).
254 See Russeau v. State, 171 S.W. 3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Roberts v. State,
220 S.W. 3d 521, 529-30
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). See also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 579-80 (Tex. 2006) and Walker
v. Thomasson Lumbar Co., 203 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. App. 2006) (concluding that the non-exclusive list of six
Robinson test factors should be utilized when determining the reliability of an expert witness involving scientific
knowledge); Doyle Wilson Homebuilder, Inc. v. Pickens, 996 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App. 1999) (utilizing the
"reliability" and "relevancy" requirements of Robinson to determine the scientific reliability of the plaintiff's
expert witness testimony); Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (finding
psychologist's testimony on reliability of eyewitness identifications excludable where defendant failed to show
that said proffered expert testimony was scientifically reliable).
255 Berger, supra note
234 at S63.
249
250
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Arguably, the decade of the 90s forced judges to be more cautious and guarded to
prevent unreliable testimony from slipping through the gates. But in Texas, despite this
safety net, unreliable predictions of future dangerousness continued undeterred. This begs
many questions, but one interesting theory posited by a recent study is that when a judge
gives the green light to expert testimony, even unreliable and junk science is "imbue[d] . .
with underserved credibility" in the eyes of the jury, tipping the scale in favor of the party
256
offering the evidence2.
This theory is amply supported by the litany of cases that follow.
D. POST-GRIGSON PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS - ARE THE
GATEKEEPERS EFFECTIVELY GUARDING THE GATES OF ADMISSIBILITY?

death2.

257

In 1994, Miguel Angel Flores was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
In this case, Dr. Clay Griffith offered his expert opinion on Flores's future

dangerousness without examining Flores or his psychiatric records.258 As Dr. Grigson
before him, Griffith based his conclusion on the facts of the case and Flores's conduct
during trial. In his concurrence, Judge Emilio Garza made some scathing observations
regarding this type of "expert" testimony:
Such testimony lacking objective scientific testing or personal
examination defies scientific rigor and cannot be described as expert
testimony. It is simply subjective testimony without any scientific
validity by one who holds a medical degree. Given the paucity, indeed
N. J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact ofJudges'Admissibility Decisions on
the PersuasivenessofExpert Testimony, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 1, 13 (2009) ("Ironically, a landmark
256

Supreme Court decision motivated in large part by a desire to shield jurors from "junk science" could serve to
heighten the impact of false or misleading scientific evidence when judges allow it through the courtroom gates.
If a judge's decision to admit evidence endows that evidence with additional weight, and if that phenomenon is
exaceibated by a Daubert ethos, then the burden onjudges to make the correct gatekeeping decision is that much
greater.").
257 Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456 (5th
Cir. 2000).
258 Id. at 458. At the time of Flores, Dr. Griffith had examined over
8,000 people charged with criminal offenses
and had testified in at least 146 capital murder trials. Id. at 462. In a footnote Judge Garza noted as follows:
A brief search of the cases reveals that, in those cases which have produced published
opinions, Dr. Griffith has testified "yes" to the second special issue on twenty-two
occasions, and "no" on zero occasions. See Millerv. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 287 (5th
Cir.2000); Barber v. Johnson, 145 F.3d 234, 235 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1998); Moody v.

Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1998); Ex Parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 190
(Tex.Crim.App.1996); Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 156 (Tex.Crim.App.1996);
Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d
360, 373, rehg granted 1994 WL 18209, appeal after new trial 910 S.W.2d 145, 146

(Tex.App.Eastland 1995, pet. refd); Clarkv. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 697
(Tex.Crim.App.1994) (en banc); Ex Parte Barber, 879 S.W.2d 889, 891
(Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (en banc); McBride v. State, 862 S.W.2d 600, 607
(Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (en banc); Joinerv. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 707
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (en banc); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 762
(Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (en banc); Beathardv. State, 767 S.W.2d 423, 435
(Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (en banc); Fearancev. State, 771 S.W.2d 486, 512
(Tex.Crim.App.1988) (enbanc); Hollandv. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 323
(Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 118 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) (en
banc); Gardnerv. State, 733 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (en banc); Mays v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 950 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (en banc); Nethery v. State, 692
S.W.2d 686, 709 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (en banc); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 408
(Tex.Crim.App.1984) (enbanc); Holloway v. State, 691 S.W.2d 608, 616
(Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (en banc), vacated 475 U.S. 1105, 106 S.Ct. 1508, 89 L.Ed.2d 908
(1986); Ex PartePadgett, 673 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex.App.Dallas 1984), affd 717 S.W.2d
55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).
Id. at 462 n 6
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the complete lack of mitigating evidence presented in this case, Dr.
Griffith's testimony virtually compelled the jury's answer to the second
special issue. In short, the truly troubling facet of this case is the sole
evidence upon which the jury found Flores to be a future danger: the
259
testimony of a doctor who had never met the defendant.
The scientific community virtually unanimously agrees that psychiatric
testimony on future dangerousness is, to put it bluntly, unreliable and
unscientific. It is as true today as it was in 1983 that '[n]either the Court
nor the State of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific source
contradicting the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are wrong more often
than they are right.' . . As those in the field have often noted, nothing
within the training of a psychiatrist makes him or her particularly able to
predict whether a particular individual will be a continuing threat to
society. . . The inadequacy of the science underlying Dr. Griffith's
testimony becomes strikingly apparent when considered relative to
scientific evidence generally admissible at trial.26 0
In the last decades, Texas's predictions of future dangerousness and its
parameters have evolved but not shifted. In fact, in a recent appeal, a death row defendant
argued in his appellate brief that the use of psychological testimony by the State
demonstrated that "a so-called expert can be found to say anything."261 The brief referred
to the State's mental health witness as having "no question at all about his godlike ability
to see into the future and to see into another's soul."262 The brief referred to him as the
"new Doctor Death, one who can determine the future with absolute accuracy, even
without testing and without considering Robert's behavior when incarcerated."263
Perhaps the most notorious forensic psychiatrist of the last two decades is Dr.
Richard E. Coons who in 2008 testified that he had practiced forensic psychiatry for
thirty-one years, evaluated the competence or sanity of between 8,000 to 10,000 people,
performed 150 "future dangerousness" evaluations, and testified in fifty trials as an
264
Dr. Coons testified in the 2008 retrial of Billie Wayne Coble, where a
expert2.
unanimous Court of Criminal Appeals was finally forced to admit that his testimony was
inadmissible because it failed to meet the requirements of Rule 702 and the scientific
265
admissibility criteria established in landmark cases, such as Daubert, Kelly, and Nenno.
However, to fully understand the lethal consequences of future dangerousness as it
intersects with junk science and poor judicial gatekeeping, a quick plunge through the
rabbit hole of the Court of Criminal Appeals' capital opinions leading to Coble is
imperative.
E. DEATH AND THE EXPERT WITNESS: DR. RICHARD E. COONS'S WINDING ROAD TO

COBLE

Id. at 458.
Id. at 463-64.
261 Brief for Appellant at 19, Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (No. 75.051), 2006 WL
3751270 at *19.
262 Id. at
*20.
263 Id. at
*27.
264 Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 270 (Tex
Crim. App. 2010).
265 Id at 277-80
259
260
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In 1978, David Lee Powell was charged with capital murder and sentenced to
death.
Dr. Richard E. Coons was appointed by the court to examine David Lee Powell
to establish his competency to stand trial and sanity at the time the crime was
267
committed2.
After meeting with Mr. Powell on four different occasions, Dr. Coons
testified at trial that "there was no indication that appellant had been insane" on the date of
the offense. Dr. Coons "specifically disclaimed having observed any evidence that
appellant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia." 26 Over defendant's objection, Dr.
Coons then testified at the punishment hearing that in his opinion there was a "high"
probability that Powell "would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society."269 Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling on Estelle v.
270
Smith, Powell appealed, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his death
sentence. The court distinguished Smith by holding that Powell had waived his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights because he introduced the testimony on the issue of insanity at
the guilt-innocence stage of the trial.271 In 1989,272 reviewing the Powell case for a second
273
the United States Supreme Court again reversed the judgment of the Court of
time,
Criminal Appeals, holding that its decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
rulings in Satterwhite 274 and Estelle v. Smith:275
In deciding that petitioner waived his right to object to the Coons and
Parker testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals in its initial opinion
concentrated almost exclusively on petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim
to the exclusion of his separate contention that counsel should have been
informed that he was to be examined on the issue of future
dangerousness. Moreover, even after we remanded for further
consideration in light of Satterwhite, a case that was premised
exclusively on the Sixth Amendment, the Court failed to give any
further attention to the Sixth Amendment claim. Because the evidence
of future dangerousness was taken in deprivation of petitioner's right to
the assistance of counsel, and because there is no basis for concluding
that petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment rights, we now hold that
Smith and Satterwhite control and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals.276

266
267

Powell v. State, 742 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Id. at 355.

Id.
Id. at 356.
270 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981).
271 Powell, 742 S.W.2d at 357. The Court relied on a loose reading ofBattie
v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.
1981), which Judge Onion in dissent aptly refuted through his own analysis of Estelle v. Smith. Id. at 361
(Onion, J., dissenting).
272 Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989).
273 After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and
death sentence in 1989, Powell filed a
petition for writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further
consideration. Powell v. Texas, 487 U.S. 1230 (1988). On remand, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again
reaffirmed Powell's death sentence. Powell v. State, 767 S.W.2d 759 (1989).
274 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S.
249 (1988).
275 Estelle, 251 U.S.
at 454.
276 Powell 492 US
at 686
268
269
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In 1991, Texas retried Powell, and Dr. Coons testified again.
The defendant was once
again convicted and sentenced to death a second time. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affinned the conviction in 1994.278 David Lee Powell was executed on June 15, 2010.279
In 1992 Dr. Coons testified on the issue of future dangerousness for the state at
the punishment phase of John Avalos Alba's capital trial.280 The prosecutor posed a
lengthy hypothetical question and asked Dr. Coons to opine as to Alba's future
dangerousness.281 Before Dr. Coons responded, the defense objected and requested a voir
28"2
dire hearing pursuant to Texas Rule of Crim. Evid. 705(b)2.
The trial court refused to
28,3
284
hold the hearing and Dr. Coons testified2.
Alba was convicted and sentenced to death.284
In 1995, on appeal, Alba argued that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to
conduct a voir dire examination of Dr. Coons outside the presence of the jury, as provided
28,5
by 705(b)2.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death
sentence holding that, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the rule, the trial court did
not err in denying the voir dire hearing because the hypothetical question satisfied the
purpose of the rule by putting before the jury the facts and data upon which Dr. Coons
opined2.
Both Judge Baird and Judge Clinton took issue with the plurality's cavalier
reading of the statute2.
Judge Clinton's dissent went much further, chastising the
plurality not only for its flawed analysis, but its dismissive holding that even if the trial
court's denial was an error, it was harmless2.
Judge Clinton's dissent echoed his dissent
in FloreS28 9 where he questioned the admissibility of future dangerousness. Here, he stated
that the court's denial of voir dire was particularly egregious given the nature of future
dangerousness:
But just because the law tolerates admission of expert testimony of the
kind at issue here does not mean appellant should not be permitted, as
part of the discovery that Rule 705(b) contemplates, to adduce not just
the factual, but also the psychiatric, basis for the expert's opinion. Under
705(b) an opponent of psychiatric expert testimony ought to be allowed

Powell v. State, 897 S.W.2d 309 (1994). Appellant argued that the trial court violated Texas law by
appointing Dr. Coons to examine him, even though Dr. Coons had testified at this trial fourteen years earlier "At
a pretrial hearing, appellant asserted that Coons was not a disinterested party because he had testified at
appellant's first trial. The trial judge declined to appoint another psychiatrist and ordered counsel not to interfere
with Coon's examination." Id. at 314. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "the fact that Coons testified
against appellant fourteen years ago does not alone establish that he was or is biased against appellant. Some
evidence of bias is required." Id.
278 Id. at 309. Although the death sentence was vacated in 1994, on
March 6, 1999, after a third punishment trial,
Powell was again sentenced to death. Powell v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
277

279

TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., supra note 44.

Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
Id.
282 Id. The Texas Rules of Evidence provided as follows: "Voir Dire. Prior
to the expert giving his opinion or
disclosing the underlying facts or data, a party against whom the opinion is offered shall, upon request, be
permitted to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is
based. This examination shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury." TEx. R. EVID. 705(b).
283 Alba, 905 S.W.2d at 588.
284 Id at 583.
285 Id. at
588.
280
281

Id.
Id. at 590 (Baird, J., concurring); Id. at 591 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 591 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting).
289 Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 714, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Clinton,
J., dissenting); See also supra notes
257-60 (discussing the federal opinion in the Florescase).
286
287

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2014

45

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

40

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

to inquire precisely what it is about an accused's past conduct that
would lead a forensic psychiatrist to conclude he will continue to
commit violent acts in the future.29 0
Although Alba's death sentence was later vacated by the 5th Circuit in 2000291
292
due to Walter Quijano's racially-charged testimony,
he was tried a second time on
punishment in 2003, and again, was sentenced to death. After a number of unsuccessful
appeals, 293 John Avalos Alba was executed on May 25, 2010.294
In 1993, Dr. Coons testified in the capital murder trial of Edward Louis Lagrone,
who was convicted and sentenced to death.295 In his 1997 appeal, Lagrone challenged Dr.
Coons's testimony on future dangerousness in a prison context. A unanimous court found
the challenge "untenable."296 Affirming the conviction, the Court held that:
the trial court was able to rely on Dr. Coons' [sic] professional
qualifications-Dr. Coons is a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry
who has a law degree and extensive professional experience as a an
expert witness in both capital and non-capital cases-to justify the
admission of the contested future dangerousness testimony. These
qualifications provided the trial court with a more than adequate basis
for admitting Dr. Coons' [sic] testimony.29 7
291

Edward Louis Lagrone was executed on February 11, 2004.

'

In 1998, Dr. Coons testified in the punishment phase of the capital murder trial of
Brittany Marlowe Holberg. Dr. Coons testified that, based on her record, there was a
"significant probability that [she] would commit criminal acts of violence in the future." 29 9
Although Holberg raised fifty points of error in her 2000 appeal, she did not challenge Dr.
Coons's qualifications as an expert. Instead, Holdberg argued that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's affirmative finding to the punishment issue regarding her
future dangerousness. 30 0 Dr. Coons's evidence in support of a "yes" finding on the issue of
future dangerousness contributed to the court finding that the evidence, taken as a whole,
was sufficient to support the jury's finding of future dangerousness. 30

A/ba, 905 S.W.2d at 592 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Alba v. Johnson, 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir 2000).
292 Id. at 208. On June 9, 2000, Attorney General John Comyn identified the Alba case as one of Quijano's
tainted cases: "After a thorough audit of cases in our office, we have identified eight more cases in which
testimony was offered by Dr. Quijano that race should be a factor for the jury to consider in determination about
290
291

the sentence in a capital murder trial." Office ofthe Attorney General News Release Archive, TEx. ATTY GEN.,

https://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/newspubs/newsarchive/2000/20000609death.htm (last visited June 5,
2014).
293 See, e.g., Exparte Alba, 256 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
294

TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., supra note 44.

295

Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Id. at 616.

2 96

297

Id.
298 Tx. DEP'T CRIM. JUST., supra note
44.
299

Holberg v. State, 38 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

300

Id.

301

Id
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The composition of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has remained relatively
stable over the last few years, which raises the question: what happened in the Court in
ensuing years which caused at least five justices to rule that Dr. Coons's testimony is
unreliable? Despite the APA's scathing rebuke of Dr. Grigson's unscientific predictions in
its 1982 amicus curiae brief, widespread judicial efforts to curtail "junk science" in the
courtroom have proven fruitless. Even after Texas's embarrassing debacle with Dr.
Quijano's racially -charged predictions, Dr. Coons's dubious methodology reigned
supreme and unchanged for at least three decades. Part of the explanation may lie with the
Court itself, which has earned scathing criticism; one 1998 case was so unfairly decided
that one of its own justices said it made the court a "national laughingstock." 302 Referring
to the same case, a Texas journalist reported how the national media characterized our
highest court of criminal appeals:
The CCA, the national media reported, was a powerful group of nine
conservative Republicans. Though they were public officials, elected in
staggered six-year terms, theirs was a "stealth court," shrouded in
secrecy, whose sometimes outrageous decisions often came with no
explanation. The court handled only criminal appeals (the Texas
Supreme Court took care of civil matters), and the judges were mostly
ex-prosecutors whose main goal seemed to be to satisfy the state's
appetite for execution; the court reversed only 3 percent of the death
penalty convictions that came before it, less than any other state high
court. It even had a group of staff lawyers called the Death Squad who
303
worked on nothing but death penalty cases.
Arguably, this may not be an accurate description of the current court. Still, what
the following Texas Court of Criminal opinions reveal is disturbing on many levels: at
best, sheer inattentiveness to capital cases by members of the Court; at worst, a total
disregard for precedent. This indifference resulting in unexplainable judicial
contradictions highlights Texas's endemic fault lines leading directly to the death
chamber.
PART IV. THE FUTILITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW: THE ROAD TO COBLE RIDDLED WITH
JUDICIAL CONTRADICTION
In 2004, when George Rivas appealed his death sentence to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, the Court was composed of Presiding Judge, Sharon Keller, and Associate
Judges Johnson, Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, Cochran, and Meyers.304
Rivas argued that Dr. Coons's predictions of future dangerousness in the punishment stage
of his 2001 capital case was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because it did
not meet the requirements for scientific reliability established in Kelly v. State and Nenno
v. State.305 Dr. Coons based his opinion on Rivas's future dangerousness on statements
302

Michael Hall, And Justicefor Some, TEX. MONTHLY (November 2004),

http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/and-justice-some ("For a long time the court was ridiculed for its tolerance
of careless trial attorneys, such as the infamous cases in which it upheld death sentences even though the
attorneys were known to have fallen asleep during trial. Horror stories such as these led the legislature in 2001 to
pass the Fair Defense Act, setting standards for court-appointed trial lawyers and procedures for appointing
them.").
303 Id.
304

Rivas v. State, No. 74,143 (Tex. Crim. App. June 23, 2004) (unpublished).

305 Id. See generally supra notes 243-49 (discussing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992));

supra notes 250-52 (discussing Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
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made by Rivas, police and autopsy reports, witness statements, and psychiatric evaluations
306
In response to a
previously conducted by other psychiatrists who examined Rivas3.
question posed by the defense outside the hearing of the jury, Dr. Coons testified:
(1) that he himself had not examined appellant, (2) that he had not
consulted with other experts in the field regarding his opinion, (3) that
he was unaware of any literature or studies regarding predictions of
future dangerousness in capital cases, and (4) that he himself had never
performed any follow-up study to determine the accuracy of his own
predictions, and thus did not know the rate of error.30 7
The defense objected to the admissibility of Dr. Coons's testimony, but the State
argued that Dr. Coons, who had testified in similar capital cases, was qualified to offer his
opinion. 308 Dr. Coons told the jury that he had "extensive qualifications as a practicing
psychiatrist," and that he had "evaluated thousands of criminal defendants for issues such
as competency to stand trial, sanity at the time of the offense, and the risk of future
dangerousness." 309 His criteria in making future dangerousness assessments, he told the
jury relied on several factors:
First, he determined whether the defendant had an 'active mental
illness.' He looked at the defendant's history of violence, his attitude
about violence, and at the facts of the offense in question. Then he
looked at the defendant's personality and behavior patterns during his
life so far. He considered whether the defendant appeared to have a
conscience to help him control his behavior. And lastly, he looked at the
future society of the defendant ( i.e., whether that person would be on
310
death row or in general population).
Based on a lengthy hypothetical posed by the prosecutor grounded on facts
established in Rivas's trial, Dr. Coons opined "that the person described in the
hypothetical would probably commit criminal acts of violence in the future, which would
constitute a continuing threat to society."311
The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the Nenno and Kelly factors and
recognized that "the proponent of scientific evidence bears the burden of showing that the
proffered evidence is relevant and reliable." 31 2 However, the court stated that the "trial
court's acceptance of the reliability of psychiatric testimony on this subject without
requiring the state to present extrinsic evidence of that reliability is not unusual." 313 It
further stated that the U.S. Supreme Court in Barefoot held such evidence not to be per se
inadmissible. Further, since that time predictions of future dangerousness had been widely
used in the Court of Criminal Appeals.3 14 The Court compared the holding in Barefoot,
stating that Dr. Coons's testimony was much more restrained than Dr. Grigson's 100%
306

Rivas, No. 74,143.

307

Id.

308 Id.
309

Id.

310 Id.
311 Id.
312

Id. (citing Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d, 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

313 Id.
314

Id
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certainty predictions. Further the court stated that Dr. Coons's statements "regarding an
individual's propensity to commit violent acts in the future were based on common-sense
principles (for example, individuals with a long history of violence tend to continue to
commit acts of violence)."3 15 Accordingly, a unanimous court overruled Rivas's points of
error, and affinned the trial court's judgment.3 16 George Rivas was executed on February
29, 2012. 317
Just two years later, however, Judge Womack who had no quarrel with the
validity of future dangerousness testimony in Rivas, filed a dissenting opinion in Raphael
Deon Holiday's appeal. 3 18 In Holiday, the forensic psychiatrist who testified as to
Holiday's future dangerousness, was not Dr. Coons, but Dr. Edward B. Gripon. Dr.
Gripon, on cross exam, explained that he based his predictions on the
"clinical/demographic approach"-which looks at the presence of mental illness and
accounts for other factors, such as education level, family support, and age. 3 19 Dr. Gripon
stated "that most actuarial studies show that most people fall below the probability of
being a future danger." 320 "He agreed that the position of the American Psychiatric
Association was that psychiatrists are not better qualified than anyone else to make
predictions about future danger in capital cases." 321 "Gripon stated that he had not done
any studies to determine if his predictions were reliable because 'it is proven to be
impossible to date to do any kind of study that will either validate or invalidate that
issue. "322
In overruling Holiday's point of error, Judges Keasler, Keller, Meyers, Price,
Hervey, Holcomb, Cochran, and Johnson held that:
the trial court was within the zone of reasonable disagreement in holding
that the State had met its burden of establishing Gripon's qualifications
and the reliability of his testimony. As aboard certified psychiatrist with
years of experience and specializing in forensic psychology, Gripon was
shown to be qualified. While making predictions of future behavior is
controversial among psychiatrists, forensic psychiatry is a legitimate and
recognized field by the American Psychiatric Association. Gripon
testified that his method of assessing future-dangerousness was
323
considered valid
Judge Womack's dissenting opinion took no issue with forensic psychiatry as a
recognized field of medicine or with Dr. Gripon as an experienced practitioner, but he
made a frontal challenge to the validity of dangerousness predictions. 324 Citing to Dr.
Gripon's own statement regarding the impossibility of validating the reliability of future

315 Id.
316 Id.

Tx. DEP' T CRIM. JUST., supra note 44.
3 Holiday v. State, Nos. AP-74446, AP-74447, AP-74448, 2006 WL 288661,
at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8,
317

2006) (Womack, J., dissenting).
319 Holiday v. State, Nos. AP-74,446, AP-74,447, AP-74,448, (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006) (unpublished).
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Holiday v. State, Nos. AP-74446, 2006 WL 288661,
at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006) (Womack, J.,
dissenting).
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dangerousness, he stated: "If it cannot be validated, it's not science. Not even soft science.
,,325
It may be soft, as many things are, but it's not science.

'

Judge Womack's dissent unambiguously stated that while he would allow "Dr.
Gripon's opinions on medical or psychiatric issues-diagnoses or treatments that have
been validated," he would exclude his testimony on future dangerousness because
11
,326
"predicting dangerousness is not medicine or psychiatry."
Then, he acknowledged that
though the Court has received this testimony in a number of death penalty cases, (citing to
Court of Criminal Appeals decisions between 1978 and 1991), he argued these opinions
were rendered before "[Kelly] led the way in raising the requirements for the admission of
expert opinion." 327 Today, he stated, these so called "experts" would not pass muster and
should be excluded. 328 Forcefully, he added: "When he [Dr.Gripon] said his predictions
were immune from being proved right or wrong, he should have been shown to a seat next
to the others whose 'expert' opinions have been admitted in the past, but should be
,329
excluded today."
Yet, that was the precise challenge made by Rivas in 2004 when he
argued that Dr. Coons's testimony "was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702
because it failed to meet the requirements for scientific reliability, as defined in [Kelly and
Nenno] .,,330 Furthermore, while the Rivas Court spent a great deal of time discussing both
the Kelly and Nenno factors, Judge Womack sided with the majority and expressed no
concerns regarding the validity of predictions of future dangerousness. 33
332

Holiday was decided on February 8, 2006.
Just four months later, on June 28,
the Court rendered its opinion in the capital murder appeal of Guy Len Allen, who made a
very similar challenge to Dr. Coons's testimony based on the Kelly factors. 333 While the
Court overruled the points of error and affirmed the death sentence,3 34 Judge Womack
authored a short, but forceful concurrence, joined by Judges Meyers, Johnson, and
Cochran, which suggests that only two months later, members of the Court that affirmed
Holiday's sentence, suddenly took notice of the concerns regarding the validity of future
dangerousness predictions.3 35 In Allen, Judge Womack simply asked:
How have earlier predictions turned out? . . Why doesn't somebody ask
an expert witness, has he (or any other "expert") bothered to look at the
records? If he has, how did the predictions turn out? If no one has
looked, why not? Isn't science the careful and systematic study of
observations, and tests of the conclusions that are based on the
336
observations?

Id.
Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Rivas v. State, No. 74,143 (Tex. Crim. App. June 23, 2004) (unpublished).
325
326

331 Id.
332

Holiday v. State, Nos. AP-74,446, AP-74,447, AP-74,448 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006) (unpublished).
Allen v. State, No. AP-74951, 2006 WL 1751227, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2006).

334

Id. at *1.

3 Id. at *7 (Womack, J., concurring).
336

Id at *7-8
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In a concurrence reminiscent of Judges Odom and Robert's dissent in Jurek
thirty-one years earlier,337 Judge Johnson filed a concurrence joined by Judge Price that
highlighted the "difficulty with asking witnesses to testify about the probability that a
given defendant will be a danger in the future." 338
If we want to know the probability that an individual will engage in a
certain behavior within a given time frame, the only probability that can
be accurately and truthfully stated must assume a person who is like the
members of the reference group on which the estimate of probability is
based. By its very nature, probability cannot, and does not, exist based
on one observation of a group of one, nor can it be used to predict the
behavior of a given individual. It is misleading to purport to be able to
state a probability that a given individual will act in a given way in the
339
future.

'

Then, referring to Dr. Grigson's prediction in Barefoot, she said: "Dr. Grigson
may have been committing the common mistake of conflating probability and possibility.
Probability does not exist without large numbers of observation of a defined reference
group." 340 Although four out of nine judges expressed reservations with Dr. Coons's
testimony, none of these judges would have held the evidence inadmissible, and none
voted to reverse the death sentence.3 4
In 2008, just two years after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Allen, Noah
34 2
Espada challenged Dr. Coons's testimony in the punishment phase of his capital trial.
His arguments, in point of error two, echoed those made by many capital defendants
before him that Dr. Coons's testimony did not satisfy Rule 702's requirement for
admissibility.3 43 Specifically he argued that:
Coons: (1) 'never authored a paper on the subject of future
dangerousness'; (2) 'had no 'hard core data' to support his opinion'; (3)
had . . no research to confirm the error rate of his previous predictions of
future dangerousness.' and (4) '[was] [u]nable to cite any established
body of scientific work on the prediction of future dangerousness.'344
Espada's arguments were based on a number of assertions made by Dr. Coons at
a hearing outside the presence of the jury, where he testified, among other things that:
he did not know his rate of error, . . his opinion regarding a defendant's
future dangerousness was ultimately based on his professional training
and experience, ... his methodology was not based on any specific
scientific study, ... [and] it is impossible to conduct accurate scientific

1 Jurek v. State, 552 S.W.2d 934, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J., dissenting) ("What did the Legislature
mean when it provided that a man's life or death shall rest upon whether there exists a 'probability' that he will
perform certain acts in the future? Did it mean, as the words read, is there a probability, some probability, any
probability?"); See also supra note 85.

Allen v. State, No. AP-74951, 2006 WL 1751227, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. June 28, 2006).
33 Id.
338

340

Id. at *9 n.1.

341

Id. at *7-8 (Womack, J., concurring); Id. at 8-9 (Johnson, J., concurring).
Espada v. State, AP-75, 219, 2008 WL 4809235, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2008).

342

343

Id. at *8.

344 Id
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research regarding capital defendants' future dangerousness because
345
such defendants 'go to death row.'
In overruling the point of error and affirming his conviction and death sentence,
the Court of Criminal Appeals citing to Nenno stated:
On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in its admission of Coons's testimony. Given the arguments,
information, and evidence before the trial court at the time it ruled, the
trial court could have reasonably concluded that psychiatry was a
legitimate field of expertise, that predicting future dangerousness was
within the scope of psychiatry, and that Coons's testimony would
properly rely upon the principles involved in psychiatry. Coons testified
that he was an experienced psychiatrist, that psychiatrists are called
upon to make predictions of future dangerousness "all the time," and
that they do so utilizing such factors as he set forth. Appellant offered
no evidence to rebut Coons's testimony. The fact that Coons did not
know his rate of error is not dispositive. We overrule point of error
two.

346

Inexplicably, Judge Price, who just two years prior in Allen, had joined Judge
Johnson in her concerns with the issue of "probability," joined the majority opinion here
in finding no error in Dr. Coons's testimony.34 However, four judges did not join the
majority in its opinion. Judges Meyers and Cochran, who had joined in Womack's
concurrence in Allen asking the pivotal question: "How have the earlier predictions turned
out?" concurred with the Court's result on point of error two, but did not join in the

Id. The full testimony before the jury was as follows:
(1) he was a board-certified psychiatrist with thirty-one years of experience in forensic
psychiatry; (2) in the course of his career, he had "evaluated" more than 7,000 persons
charged with crimes; (3) taking various factors into account, he could oftentimes
formulate an opinion regarding a defendant's future dangerousness; (4) he did not know
his rate of error; (5) his opinion regarding a defendant's future dangerousness was
ultimately based on his professional training and experience; (6) among the factors he
considered were the defendant's personality, the defendant's history of violence, the
defendant's attitude toward violence, the nature of the crime in question, the defendant's
"behavior patterns" during his lifetime, the defendant's physical abilities, whether the
defendant has expressed remorse, whether the defendant has a conscience to help him
control his behavior, and the defendant's probable future location (prison); (7) other
professionals used the same factors in assessing future dangerousness; (8) his
methodology was not based on any specific scientific study; (9) it is impossible to
conduct accurate scientific research regarding capital defendants' future dangerousness
because such defendants "go to death row"; (10) it is impossible to "get the same level of
hard data reliability [about future dangerousness] that you can [get] in [the] hard
sciences"; (11) he had attended many professional seminars concerning future
dangerousness but had written no papers on that subject; (12) he had read much about,
and had consulted many other professionals about, future dangerousness; (13)
"psychiatrists are called upon to make judgments about people's [future] dangerousness
all the time," e.g., before "commit[ting] somebody [involuntarily to a mental institution],
we're asked to determine whether they're likely to be dangerous to themselves or others";
(14) psychiatrists "rely on history to make predictions about the future"; and (15)
psychiatrists "can reach conclusions [about future dangerousness], and do [so] all the
time, about people who are charged with crimes."
Id. at *9.
346 Id. (citation omitted).
345

347 Id at *16
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Court's opinion on that point of error.34 8 On the other hand, Judge Womack filed a punchy
dissenting opinion, which Judge Johnson joined: 349
The Court's opinion says that the fact that the psychiatrist 'did not know
his rate of error is not dispositive.'
The fact that there seems to be no evidence at all, anywhere, of
the reliability of these predictions of future dangerousness should be
dispositive. 'Now the ordinary rules of evidence require that evidence be
reliable in order to be admissible. Reliability in the context of scientific
evidence requires scientific validity. It is doubtful that testimony about
future dangerousness could withstand Daubertanalysis.' We apply that
analysis to psychiatrists' and psychologists' predictions of future
dangerousness.
The expert in this case said that the predictions could not be
tested because the defendants "go to death row." First, not all of them
do; some are sentenced to life in prison. Second, those who do go to
death row spend years in prison before they are put to death. It wouldn't
be very hard to research how many persons convicted of capital murder
committed acts of violence after being sentenced. It must always be
remembered that the capital murderer who is not sentenced to death will
be sentenced to prison for life without parole. So the relevant question is
whether they will commit violent acts in prison.
Our laws permit people with communicable diseases to be
quarantined. The laws are based on scientific research that has shown
that, without quarantining, the diseases will be spread. Before we accept
an opinion that a capital murderer will be dangerous even in prison,
there should be some research to show that this behavior can be
predicted.3 50
But perhaps even more egregious and inexplicable than Judge Price's
contradictory indifference to Dr. Coons's testimony in Espada is Judge Womack's
position in Ramey v. State,35 1just three months after delivering his forceful dissent in
Espada.
Ramey challenged Dr. Coons's testimony at the punishment phase of his trial on
the grounds that his qualifications were insufficient to satisfy the Daubert, Kelly, and
352
Robinson criteria for expert admissibility3.
Judge Womack delivered the opinion for a
unanimous court affirming Ramey's conviction and death sentence.353 In a brief,
innocuous, and formulaic recitation of the facts and legal authorities, Judge Womack
wrote:
The evidence was that Dr. Coons held both a law degree and a
medical degree, served in the United States Army Medical Corps, and
was a consultant for the Brook Army Medical Center. He was certified
by the Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, trained in neurology and
348
349
351
35
352

1

Id. at *19.
Id. at *20 (Womack, J., dissenting).
Id. at *20 (citations omitted).
Ramey v. State, No. AP-75678, 2009 WL 335276 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2009).
Id. at *14.
Id at *1
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psychiatry, and had been in private practice since 1975. Dr. Coons had
evaluated approximately 8,000 people for competency to stand trial, and
had consulted on 150 capital cases for either the prosecution or the
defense.
In evaluating the appellant for the special issue on future
dangerousness, Dr. Coons examined "twenty pounds of printed material
and quite a number of CDs regarding statements" as well as offense
reports, pictures, and educational records. While he did not personally
interview the appellant, the Rules do not require an expert to complete
personal interviews in order to make such determinations. Rule of
Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by, reviewed by, or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding Dr. Coons qualified as an expert witness with respect to future
dangerousness. 354
On the heels of Judge Womack's impassioned dissent in Espada, the unanimous
approval of Judges Meyers, Price, and Johnson evinces a disturbing lack of meaningful
appellate review and an intolerable gross indifference in capital cases.
In 2010, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on Coble v. State, a case that has
become a lightning rod for expert admissibility in Texas.3 55 Dr. Coons had testified as to
Coble's future dangerousness both at Coble's 1990 trial, as well as his retrial in 2008, at
which he testified that Coble "would still be a future danger even though [he] did not have
,356
a single disciplinary report for the eighteen years that he had been on death row."
Predictably, as other capital defendants before him, Coble argued that Dr. Coons's
testimony was inadmissible under Rule 7023.
Here, however, in sheer contrast with
Ramey's five paragraphs, the Court 358 spent over twenty pages meticulously examining
Dr. Coons's methodology and thoughtfully exploring the evolution of expert admissibility
since Barefoot. The court concluded "that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of
showing the scientific reliability of Dr. Coons's methodology for predicting future
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence during the Daubert/Kelly gatekeeping
hearing in this particular case." 35 9
Notably, neither Dr. Coons's testimony, nor Coble's direct challenge were
distinctively different from the previous capital cases where the Court summarily affirmed
the death sentences. Which begs the question: what caused the Court to radically shift and
pointedly ask: "the issue . . is whether [Dr. Coons'] future dangerousness testimony is

Id. at *14-15 (quoting TEx. R. EVID. 703).
1 Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

354

356

Id. at 264.

1 Id. at 270.
35' Three members of the Court, Presiding Judge Keller, and Associate
Judges Meyers and Keasler did not
concur in the Court's opinion that Dr. Coons' testimony was inadmissible. Id. at 300-01 (Keller, P.J.,
concurring).

1 Id. at 279 (majority opinion).
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based upon the scientific principles of forensic psychiaty?"360 Suddenly, the same
qualifications and methodology admissible by the Court in myriad cases since Barefoot,
but most notably in 2009 in Ramey, were inexplicably inadmissible. Certainly, the
arguments that caused the shift were neither novel nor new. Almost thirty years prior, the
APA had offered uncontroverted reasons as to why these predictions were unreliable.
Subsequently, appellants in countless capital cases had cited scientific studies
corroborating the invalidity of future dangerousness since Barefoot-all of which fell
upon deaf ears. This renders the Coble Court's epiphany, regarding Dr. Coons's
methodology, hollow:
From this record, we cannot tell what principles of forensic psychiatry
Dr. Coons might have relied upon because he cited no books, articles,
journals, or even other forensic psychiatrists who practice in this area.
There is no objective source material in this record to substantiate Dr.
Coons' methodology as one that is appropriate in the practice of forensic
psychiatry. He asserted that his testimony properly relied upon and
utilized the principles involved in the field of psychiatry, but this is
simply the ipse dixit of the witness. Dr. Coons agreed that his
methodology is idiosyncratic and one that he has developed and used on
his own for the past twenty to thirty years. Although there is a
significant body of literature concerning the empirical accuracy of
clinical predictions versus actuarial and risk assessment predictions, Dr.
Coons did not cite or rely upon any of these studies and was unfamiliar
with the journal articles given to him by the prosecution.
Dr. Coons stated that he relies upon a specific set of factors:
history of violence, attitude toward violence, the crime itself, personality
and general behavior, conscience, and where the person will be (i.e., the
free community, prison, or death row). These factors sound like
common-sense ones that the jury would consider on its own, but are
they ones that the forensic psychiatric community accepts as valid?
Have these factors been empirically validated as appropriate ones by
forensic psychiatrists? And have the predictions based upon those
factors been verified as accurate over time? Some of Dr. Coons' factors
have great intuitive appeal to jurors and judges, but are they actually
accurate predictors of future behavior? Dr. Coons forthrightly stated that
"he does it his way" with his own methodology and has never gone back
to see whether his prior predictions of future dangerousness have, in
fact, been accurate. Although he had interviewed appellant before the
first trial in 1990, Dr. Coons had lost his notes of that interview in a
flood and apparently had no independent memory of that interview. He
relied entirely upon the documentary materials given to him by the
prosecution, including his 1989 report. Dr. Coons, therefore, did not
perform any psychiatric assessment of appellant after his eighteen years
of nonviolent behavior on death row, nor did he refer to any
psychological testing that might have occurred in that time frame. 361
Relying on the precedent of Barefoot, the court rejected Coble's argument that
this type of testimony "fails to meet the heightened reliability requirement of the Eighth

360
361

Id. at 277.
Id at 277-79
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Amendment."362 Predictably, it held that the error in admitting Dr. Coons's testimony did
not affect Coble's substantial rights to a fair sentencing trial, and it overruled Coble's
points of error, and affirmed the death sentence.363 Five members of the court-Judges
Cochran, Price, Womack, and Johnson-who in Allen appeared to scrutinize Dr. Coons's
testimony under a more stringent standard-joined the majority. Judge Holcomb changed
his view from Allen to Coble, as did Judge Meyers. Judge Meyers, who had previously
joined Judge Womack in questioning Dr. Coons's testimony in Allen, and who had
previously refused to join the Court on this issue in Espada,joined Presiding Judge Keller
and Judge Keasler's concurrence. Here, they argued the trial court did not err in admitting
Dr. Coons's testimony because his testimony shows that:
[F]orensic psychiatry is a legitimate field, that predicting future
dangerousness is within the scope of that field, and that using education
and experience to assess future dangerousness is a proper application of
the principles involved in the field. Notably, appellant has presented no
evidence to the contrary. The Court faults Dr. Coons for failing to cite
"books, articles, journals, or even other forensic psychiatrists who
practice in this area" to substantiate his methodology, while
acknowledging that Dr. Coons is "a genuine forensic psychiatrist with a
lengthy medical career." But appellant did not introduce any "books,
articles, journals, or even other forensic psychiatrists" to testify that,
contrary to Dr. Coons' testimony, Dr. Coons' experience-based method
of evaluating future dangerousness is inappropriate. 364
In the last two months of 2011, following Coble, the Court ruled in three
additional cases where Dr. Coons testified: Gobert,365 Devoe,366 and Brewer. 367 In each
case, a unanimous Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. In Gobert, the
Court was forced to acknowledge that Dr. Coons's testimony was inadmissible, but it
concluded that given "appellant's life-long penchant for violence," 36 and other factual
369
circumstances, Dr. Coons's testimony was harmless.
In Devoe, the appellant argued that the evidence at the punishment stage of the
trial was insufficient to prove his future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. His
argument focused on the weight that the Court should give to his "pristine" behavioral
record while incarcerated.370 Citing to the Keeton factors, 37 ' the court examined the facts
of the case and the testimony at the penalty phase, and stated that "while good behavior in
prison is a factor to consider, it did not preclude a finding of future dangerousness."372 The
court concluded "that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's affirmative

362

Id. at 270.

363

Id. at 287.

Id. at 300 (Keller, J., concurring).
Gobert v. State, No. AP-76345, 2011 WL 5881601 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2011).
366 Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011).
367 Brewer v. State, No. AP-76378, 2011 WL 5881612 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2011).
361 Gobert, 2011 WL 5881601,
at *7.
364
365

369 Id.

370 Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 461.

Id at 461-62.
372 Id at 468
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finding on the future dangerousness issue, and we defer to the jury's conclusion that the
373
mitigating evidence was not sufficient to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment."
In Brewer, decided the same date as Gobert, the Court found that appellant failed
to preserve error for appeal. 374 However, the arguments for non-preservation are
surprisingly unpersuasive in light of the facts. At trial, appellant filed a motion which,
although he titled motion in limine, explicitly asked that such expert predictions be
excluded since they "do not meet the standards for reliability articulated in the rules of
evidence or the common law."3 75 The motion specifically stated:
Such predictions are unreliable due to (a) their overwhelming rate of
error; (b) their lack of acceptance in the relevant scientific community,
(c) the inconsistent, ad hoc and standardless manner in which they are
formed, (d) the absence of a proper and adequately reliable data source
upon which to base them. Any testimony the State seeks to admit
incorporating such predictions does not satisfy the reliability
requirements of Tex. R. Evid. 702, and must be excluded.376
The trial court denied the motion, but at trial when the State sought to present the
testimony of Dr. Coons, the defense asked for a Tex. R. Evid. 702 and 705 hearing, which
the court granted.37 7 At this Daubert hearing, Dr. Coons testified, among other things, that
he "believes his assessments can be made without examining the prisoner, if enough data
can be gleaned from sources. He did not know, though, if any specific standards on
predictions of future dangerousness had been generally accepted by the scientific
community." 37 8 On cross, "he stated that he did not know the error rate on his style of risk
assessments, but in any event he finds the literature on this topic almost meaningless due
to poor data on the 'huge amount' of unreported prisonviolence." 3 79 The trial judge stated:
"I'm going to hold that Dr. Coons is qualified and that the field -the psychiatric field of
future dangerousness is a valid scientific theory and that - that the technique he used to
apply it was valid, and that it was applied validly here in this Brewer case."38
The Court held that the record was insufficient to show that the trial judge
understood the motion to be a Daubertmotion rather than a motion in limine. However,
even assuming the judge understood it to be a Daubert motion, Brewer failed to preserve
error for appeal because his motion did not specifically refer to Dr. Coons but, instead was
a general attack on the admissibility of expert testimony on future dangerousness. 38 ' The
Court appeared to go a great distance to support its non-preservation argument:
Appellant's motion did not refer to Dr. Coons but generally castigated
psychiatric and psychological expert testimony on future dangerousness
as not meeting the applicable standards of reliability and relevance
under Rule 702 and as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. With respect
3 Id.
374 Brewer v. State, No. AP-76378, 2011 WL 5881612, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2011).
3 Brief for Appellant at 15, Brewer v. State AP-76378 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), 2011 WL 1299685 at *15.
376 Id.

3 Id.
378

Id. at *15-16.

3 Id. at *16.
380 Brewer v. State, No. AP-76378, 2011 WL 5881612, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2011).
381

Id at *6
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to the reliability claim under Rule 702, the motion was in essence an
attack under the second prong of Nenno-whether future-dangerousness
predictions are properly within the scope of the fields of psychiatry and
psychology. Although we have held Dr. Coons' methodology to be
unreliable under Rule 702, we did so solely on the basis of the third
prong of Nenno-whether Dr. Coons' testimony properly applied the
principles in his field. There are other psychiatrists and psychologists
that use methodologies for assessing future dangerousness that differ
radically from the methodology employed by Dr. Coons. The motion's
attack under the second prong of Nenno did not place the trial court on
notice of appellant's current complaint relating to the third prong of
Nenno. Indeed, it seems difficult to envision how an attack under the
third prong could be made as a general matter, without reference to a
specific expert witness's anticipated testimony. The broad-based attack
on all psychiatric and psychological testimony on future dangerousness
in the motion in limine simply did not preserve a contention that Dr.
Coons' methodology in particular was unreliable, and appellant does not
now, in his brief, attempt to argue that all psychiatric and psychological
assessments of future dangerousness are inadmissible. 382
In addition, the Court found that Brewer did not lodge an objection to the reliability of Dr.
Coons's testimony at the Dauberthearing.38 3
Texas's contemporaneous objection rule is governed by Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33.1(a), which requires that in order to preserve a complaint for appellate
review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely
objection which stated the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity, unless
those grounds are apparent, and that the trial court ruled or refused to rule on the
objection. 384 Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides: "In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context." 385
Arguably, Brewer's motion, though concededly mislabeled, was sufficiently specific to
put the trial judge on notice of his complaint regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony, so that its denial by the trial judge would have preserved error. Thus, the failure
to object was not fatal because the specific ground of objection was apparent from the
context as required by Rule 103. In addition, any doubts as to whether Brewer was
challenging expert admissibility evaporated after Dr. Coons's testimony at the Daubert
hearing, and the judge's decision to allow him to testify.
After Coble, the Court's concerted effort to deny Brewer relief based on nonpreservation error appears contrived. In an earlier case, the Court stated:
It follows that the trial judge's role in the admission and exclusion of
evidence is generally not called into play unless a dispute develops
between the parties concerning the proper application of an evidentiary
rule. And because, absent any such dispute, our system generally
expects him not to interfere with the presentation of evidence, it likewise
382

Id.

383

Id. at *7.
TEx. R. App. P. 33.1.
38 TFx R EVD. 103(a)(L1
384
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does not fault him for refusing to interfere when a party fails to make the
basis for his objection known. Beyond this, there are no technical
considerations or form of words to be used. Straightforward
communication in plain English will always suffice.
The standards of procedural default, therefore, are not to be
implemented by splitting hairs in the appellate courts. As regards
specificity, all a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on
appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks
himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to
understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to
do something about it. Of course, when it seems from context that a
party failed effectively to communicate his desire, then reviewing courts
should not hesitate to hold that appellate complaints arising from the
event have been lost. But otherwise, they should reach the merits of
those complaints without requiring that the parties read some special
script to make their wishes known. 386

The Brewer ruling of non-preservation heralded the Court's decision in its denial
of Ramey's writ of habeas corpus a year later. After the Court's unanimous decision in
2009 affirmed Ramey's conviction and death sentence,38 7 he filed a habeas petition in
March 2011.388 In light of Coble, in April 2011, the Court ordered Ramey's application to
be set on the following issues: "Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Dr.
Richard Coons with regards to the future dangerousness of applicant because Coons'
,,3g9
testimony violates the Eight Amendment and applicant's rights to due process.
On November 7, 2012, in a perfunctory and dismissive one-page opinion, the
Court denied relief: "Habeas corpus is available only for jurisdictional defects and
violations of constitutional or fundamental rights; a claim alleging the violation of a rule
of evidence is not cognizable on habeas corpus. Coble was a direct appeal case, and it's
holding was based upon a rule of evidence. Consequently, the holding in Coble does not
give rise to a claim that is cognizable on habaeas corpus." 390 Resting Dr. Coons's
admissibility on the precedent of Barefoot v. Estelle, the court rejected Ramey's
contention that the testimony violated the heightened reliability requirement of the Eighth
Amendment. 391 The opinion delivered by Presiding Judge Keller was joined by Price,
Keasler, Hervey, Cochran, and Alcala. Judges Womack and Johnson concurred. Judge
Meyers filed a five-page dissenting opinion. In a footnote, the dissent minced no words in
frontally attacking the majority's contrived denial:
It seems apparent that the majority is going to great lengths to prevent
Applicant from bringing forth his claim by unsubstantiated claims of
non-preservation and cognizability. I have seen previous 11.071 writs
with only a fraction of the amount of preservation evidence that this writ
contains where we have not rejected the claim based on preservation or
cognizability. This also seems particularly peculiar in light of this
Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Ramey v. State, No. AP-75678, 2009 WL 335276, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2009).
... Exparte Ramey, No. AP-76533, 2011 WL 1288284, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 6,2011).
386
387

389 Id.

390 Exparte Ramey, 382 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
391 Id
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Court's previous scrutiny of Dr. Coons' methodology in Coble. Also, as
our dissenting opinion further shows, the harm created by his testimony
was clearly established in this case using the same analysis this Court
392
used in Coble.
The dissent underscored the majority's hasty and shoddy conclusion that the
allegations failed to raise a habeas claim: "If the majority would have taken the time to
research the record, it would have discovered that Applicant's claim was raised, but not
addressed by this Court on direct appeal. Therefore, the majority's entire analysis is based
on a false premise." 393 Then, it challenged the majority's conclusion regarding the issue of
non-preservation:
The majority alleges that the issue of reliability was not preserved at
trial. . . [E]ven if it had not been preserved at trial, the fact that it wasn't
preserved should have been addressed in the direct appeal opinion.
Instead this Court completely avoided the issue. In effect, this claim has
not been raised and rejected on direct appeal and the failure of this Court
to properly address the argument on direct appeal violated Applicant's
due process rights. We made a mistake, and now we have the
394
opportunity and obligation to correct it.
After a lengthy examination of the legal principles governing expert admissibility
and scrutinizing the requirements of Daubert, Kelly, and Nenno, the dissent concluded that
Dr. Coons's testimony failed to meet the third Nenno standard, and that the prosecution
did not satisfy its burden to show scientific reliability.395 Further, the dissent held that the
396
error affected Applicant's substantial right to a fair sentencing hearing.
Arguably, the review of a litany of cases where defendants have been convicted
of vicious and indefensible crimes is a cumbrous task. However, so long as the death
penalty is condoned in Texas, the Constitution requires meaningful appellate review - one
39 7
that fulfills "its basic historic function of correcting error in the trial court proceeding,"
because "what separates the executioner from the murderer is the legal process by which
the state ascertains and condemns those guilty of heinous crimes. If that process is flawed
because it allows evidence without any scientific validity to push the jury toward
condemning the accused, the legitimacy of our legal process is threatened." 398
CONCLUSION

If the contradictions, errors and missteps-intentional or otherwise-of appellate
review are insufficient to convince the Texas Legislature that future dangerousness is
hopelessly flawed, perhaps the legislature will heed the advice and recommendations of
the mental health professionals in reassessing its merit. Since 1983 when the APA
denounced predictions of future dangerousness in Barefoot, both the U.S. Supreme Court,
and presumably, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have demanded greater scrutiny on
Id. at 400 n.3 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 398.
392

394

Id. at 399-400.

9

' ' Id. at 403.
396

Id. at 405.

1 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 988 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39' Flores v Johnson 210 F 3d 456 469-70 (5th Cir 2000)
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the validity and merit of expert testimony. However, as this article reveals, unreliable
testimony continues to escape the evidentiary net to bypass the putative safeguards of
judicial gatekeeping, and remain unchecked by appellate review.
In 2011 the American and the Texas Psychological Associations joined as Amici
Curiae in support of Coble's petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.3 99 Once again, the brief
urged the Court to grant the petition "because the integrity of the legal system and the
mental health profession are undermined if unscientific, unreliable, but purportedly expert
testimony about future dangerousness is deemed constitutionally admissible in capital
sentencing."4 00 Predictably, citing to numerous studies, they argued that Dr. Coons's
"unstructured clinical" testimony cannot accurately assess future dangerousness. 40 ' The
American and Psychological Associations explained that in the last twenty years "mental
health professionals have made much progress in developing three risk-assessment
approaches that are based on scientific principles and can be reliable in assessing risk of
future dangerousness in appropriate cases." 402 However, pointing to the challenges of
developing these studies for capital offenders, they acknowledged that these more reliable
approaches have been developed outside that context.40 3
Despite the extensive evidence provided in their brief, at least three justices of
the Coble Court were not persuaded, which begs the question: if sophisticated and
experienced jurists can be swayed by the "aura of scientific infallibility that shrouds the
,404
evidence,"
what can be expected of capital jurors?
As of 2014, the death penalty exists in 32 states, the U.S. Government, and the
405
militaiy,
but during the last forty years the national landscape has changed considerably
as more states recognize that the administration of capital punishment is endemically
flawed. In the last eight years, six states have abolished it,406 and 1,394 exonerations
407
nationwide since 1989 continue to rattle confidence in its accuracy and fairness. 0

' Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass'n & Texas Psychological Ass'n in Support of Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Coble v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 3030 (2011) (No. 10-1271) 2011 WL 2002207 at *2
("[B]ecause the integrity of the legal system and the mental health profession are undermined if unscientific,
unreliable, but purportedly expert testimony about future dangerousness is deemed constitutionally admissible in
capital sentencing.").
400 Id.
401 Id. at *8. The brief explained: "This approach imposes no structure on
any of the four key decisions in the
assessment process: (1) determining which risk factors to consider; (2) determining how to measure them; (3)
combining the factors into a 'single overarching estimate of violence risk'; and (4) 'generating a final risk
estimate."' Id (Citing John Monahan, Ph.D., Structured Risk Assessment of Violence, in TExTBOOK OF
VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17, 20-21 (Robert I. Simon & Kenneth Tardiff eds., 2008))).

Id. at *14 ("These three methods- (1) actuarial assessment, (2) structured professional judgment, and (3) the
anamnestic approach - incorporate varying degrees of structure in one or more of the four steps of the risk
assessment process.").
403 Id. at *20.
404 The phrase is borrowed from Giannelli's now oft-cited phrase: "The major
danger of scientific evidence is its
potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to
accept it without critical scrutiny." Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissitiblity ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-CenturyLater, 80 COLUM. L. REV. i197, 1237 (1980).
402

405 States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER.,

http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited June 5, 2014).
406 Id. (listing New York and New Jersey, 2007; New Mexico, 2009;
Illinois, 2011; Connecticut, 2012; and,
Maryland, 2013).
407 Exonerations in 2013, NAT'L REGISTRY ExONERATIONS
(July 7, 2014),

http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations-in_2013_Report.pdf
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However, whether grounded on ignorance or indifference, Texas remains recalcitrant to
40
self-examine the considerable flaws of its "runaway criminal justice system."o
To be fair, in the last five years Texas has made some impressive inroads to
improve capital procedures, including, most recently, revamping criminal discovery in
response to the infamous Michael Morton case.40 9 In the same session, Texas passed SB
344, which allows for relief where a defendant is convicted of a crime based on scientific
evidence. 41 0 The "junk science" bill, as it is colloquially known, creates a new source of
habeas corpus relief, provided that the applicant can prove: (1) that exculpatory scientific
evidence is currently available; (2) that was not ascertainable through the exercise of
reasonable diligence by the applicant at the time of trial; and (3) the applicant would not
have been convicted, had the evidence been presented at trial.' While this new remedy
is available even to those applicants who have exhausted their prior writs,4 12 the sad truth
is that for many people who have already been executed, like Todd Willingham, this
reform is too little, too late. Furthermore Texas has established the Regional Public
Defender for Capital Cases, and the Office of Capital Writs, two offices to provide capital
representation in the state.413 And as recently reported, "For the sixth year in a row, Texas
Hall, supra note 302.
Michael Morton was convicted of the murder of his wife in 1987. After decades in prison, Morton's motion
for the State to turn over its sealed case file was granted. The file revealed that the prosecutor had withheld
exculpatory evidence, such as a bloody bandana and the identification of the actual killer by Morton's son. In
2011, Morton's innocence was proven and he was released from prison. See Know the Cases: Michael Morton,
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, (May 27, 2014), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/MichaelMorton.php. In
response to this highly publicized case, the 2013 session of the Texas Legislature amended TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 39.14 to provide for a more open discovery process in criminal cases. Michael Morton Act, 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws § 2, ch. 49 (S.B. 1611), eff. Jan. 1, 2014 (amending TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2013).
Generally, the amendment provides that:
(1) The State is required to turn over any evidence requested by the defense, save for
work product, within a reasonable time after the request;
(2) Should the State choose to withhold evidence or redact it in part, the court must,
upon request by the defendant, conduct a hearing to determine whether the State has
good cause in doing so;
(3) The State has a duty to "disclose . . any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating
document, item, or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state
that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the
punishment for the offense charged" at any time before, during, or after trial.
(4) The State must keep electronic records of items disclosed under the article; and
(5) Before accepting a guilty or nolo contendre plea, an inventory of items obtained
under these discovery provisions.
Id. There is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, so legislation such as this is much needed and
long overdue.
410 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. at. 11.073 (West 2013). This article was added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 4 10
(S.B. 344), § 1, eff Sept. 1, 2013.
408

409

411 See id.

TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. at. 11.07 § 4(a)(1) (West 2013) (a court may consider the merits of a "subsequent
application... after final disposition of an initial application," provided that "the application contains specific
facts establishing that . . the legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous
application...").
412

413 See About Us, REG'L PUB. DEFENDER FOR CAPITAL CASES, http://rpdo.org/about.php (last visited
June 5,

2014) ("The office represents only indigent defendants charged with a capital case where the death penalty is
sought at the trial level."); Maria Sprow, Murder Insurance, COUNTY MAG., 20 (Sept./Oct. 2008),
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tidc/pdf/MurderlnsuranceSprowCountyMagazineSeptOct2008.pdf (explaining not
only does the office have a mission to provide competent defense for its clients, but it also aims to help keep the
indigent defense budgets of smaller counties in check by aggregating the costs amongst the whole and providing
a consistent formula for fee calculation); OFF. CAPITAL WRITS, http://www.ocw.texas.gov/ (last visited June 5,
2014) ("[The office] is a capital post-conviction state agency charged with representing death sentenced persons
in state post-conviction habeas corpus and related proceedings."); Michael Graczyk, Year-Old State Office
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had fewer than 10 death sentences, a stark difference from 1999, when it recorded 48."44
But future dangerousness, the most widely challenged provision of the statute remains
intact.
Oregon is the only other state where future dangerousness is a special issue that
the jury must answer to render a verdict of death, but the effect of that provision is
significantly diminished by a glaring distinction: while Texas has executed 515
individuals since 1976; Oregon has executed 2.

'

In September 2013, the American Bar Association's Due Process Review Project
launched its Texas Capital Punishment Assessment Report - a comprehensive evaluation
416
of Texas's capital procedures, laws, and practices.
Among its key findings, it
recommended that Texas should restructure its capital punishment statute "to abandon
altogether the use of the 'future dangerousness."' 4 17 Hearkening back to the criticisms
leveled by the dissenters in Jurek, it argues that the lack of precise explanation of the key
terms in the future dangerousness provision, leaves juror to discern the meaning of terms
such as "probability," "criminal acts of violence," and "society," "so broadly that a death
sentence would be deemed warranted in virtually every capital murder case.",4 Second,
the reliance on unreliable testimony has a persuasive effect on the jury; 4 19 an argument
that is amply supported by numerous reputable psychiatric journals, and mental health
organizations .420 Finally, the fact that life without parole is the only sentencing alternative,
there is no longer a concern that capital defendants pose an imminent threat to society.4 2
This last point is significant. Recall the words of Justice Stevens in a recent
opinion:

Challenges Death Sentences, OFF. CAPITAL WRITS, http://www.ocw.texas.gov/news/year-old-state-office-

challenges-death-sentences.aspx (last visited June 5, 2014) ("Sen. Rodney Ellis...who sponsored the measure
creating the agency [said,] 'Considering the mistakes made in Texas to date, we should pay for this safety net
and pray it's adequate enough to get the job done right."') (alluding to the troubled history of death penalty
litigation in Texas).
414 See The Death Penalty in 2013: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 2 (Feb.
11, 2014),

http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/YearEnd2013.pdf
415 See FactsAbout the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 3 (June 2014),

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
416 EvaluatingFairnessand Accuracy in State Death Penalty Systems: The Texas CapitalPunishment
Assessment Report, A.B.A., 3 (Sept. 2013),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death-penaltymoratorium/txcompletereport.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter A.B.A., Assessment Report]. The ABA's Death
Penalty Due Process Review Project was established in the fall of 2001. Originally titled the Death Penalty
Moratorium Implementation Project, the project was created "[T]o conduct research and educate the public and
decision-makers on the operation of capital jurisdictions' death penalty laws and processes in order to promote
fairness and accuracy in death penalty systems, both in the United States and abroad. The Project encourages
legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, and state and local bar associations to adopt the ABA's Protocols on
the Fair Administration of the Death Penalty; provides technical assistance to state, federal, international, and
foreign stakeholders on death penalty issues; and collaborates with other individuals and organizations to
develop new initiatives to support reform of death penalty processes, including adoption of the ABA's 1997
resolution promoting a suspension of executions.". ABA Death PenaltyDue ProcessReview Project:About Us,

A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual_rights/projects/death_penalty_due_process
us.html. (last visited June 5, 2014).

review_project/about

417 A.B.A., Assessment Report, supra note 413, at
viii.
418 Id. at xxxix.
419 Id. at xxxix-xl.
420

421

See, e.g., Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 256.
A.B.A., Assessment Report, supra note 413, at xl-xli.
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While incapacitation may have been a legitimate rationale in 1976, the
recent rise in statutes providing for life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole demonstrates that incapacitation is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient justification for the death penalty. Moreover, a
recent poll indicates that support for the death penalty drops
significantly when life without the possibility of parole is presented as
an alternative option. And the available sociological evidence suggests
that juries are less likely to impose the death penalty when life without
parole is available as a sentence.4 22
Myriad opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court have consistently held that the
"Eighth Amendment insists upon 'reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."' 423 This article offers irrefutable proof that
future dangerousness is neither reliable, nor constitutional. Its continued use casts a pall in
the legitimacy of Texas's capital punishment. A system that inflicts the ultimate
punishment must be anchored to principles of fairness and justice in its rules and
procedures. Anything less will harbor a society denuded of the most basic of moral and
social values. The execution of innocent people and the unfair administration of death
affects all of us, for at the end: "It is tempting to pretend that [those] on death row share a
fate in no way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no echoes beyond
the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the
reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined... [T]he way in which we choose
424
those who will die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living."

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78-79 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 525 (2006).
424 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan was specifically
referring to minorities on death row. I have borrowed from the essence of this quote. Here's the actual quote: "It
is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in no way connected to our own, that our
treatment of them sounds no echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is ultimately
corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined. 'The destinies of the two races in this
country are indissolubly linked together,' . . and the way in which we choose those who will die reveals the
depth of moral commitment among the living." Id. (citation omitted).
422
423
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USING TECHNOLOGY THE FOUNDERS NEVER DREAMED OF:
CELL PHONES AS TRACKING DEVICES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

R. Craig Curtis*, Michael C. Gizzi & Michael l Kittleson4
Abstract
This paper considers the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding warrantless surveillance
by law enforcement using cell phone data to track the location of suspects and the
potential application of the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in United States v. Jones to
this behavior. The paper provides an overview of the Court's historic privacy
jurisprudence from Olmstead v. United States to Katz v. United States and of the recent
decisions in Jones and Floridav. Jardines. A dataset of federal and state cases in which
the use of cell phones to track suspects was at issue was constructed and analyzed. At this
point in time, there is no clear legal standard by which the courts can provide oversight
over law enforcement in this growing area of police practice. It is suggested that the
application of Justice Scalia's trespass standard will only make the problem worse and the
probable cause standard adopted in five states could easily be applied to all jurisdictions
without limiting police effectiveness while still providing protection for the privacy rights
of Americans.
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INTRODUCTION: IT'S 10 PM AND THE POLICE MAY ALREADY KNow WHERE YOUR
CHILDREN ARE

Back in the 1960s, some television stations would run a public service
announcement just before the late evening news. A sonorous voice would intone, "It's 10
pm. Do you know where your children are?"' The announcement was intended to remind
parents that there was a curfew in place, but now, in light of the fact that local and national
law enforcement agencies are already commonly tracking the locations of people without
a warrant and without individualized suspicion, these simple words from our nation's past
remind us that modem technology empowers the police to do amazing things that are quite
inconsistent with the notions of freedom and privacy that our founders likely had in mind
when they adopted the Fourth Amendment.
The revelation in the spring of 2013 that the National Security Agency was
gathering enormous amounts of data by routinely tracking cell phone and internet traffic
stunned many in our nation.2 A major lawsuit was filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union against the federal government based on the fact that members' phones were
flagged by the data mining algorithms employed. 3 The NSA program is just the tip of the
iceberg. Police agencies in major cities already have systems in place to automatically
track cars by license plate, creating databases of who was where and when.4 Many cities
have cameras,5 although few have gone as far as London in terms of the sheer number of
cameras or as far as New York in terms of centralized receipt and automated analysis of
the images from these cameras. 6
Each year, millions of requests are made by local police departments for data
about cell phone customers from service providers, often without a warrant. The police

' The origins of the phrase can be traced to the 1960s on the East coast. See, Kara Kovalchik, The Originof "It's
10PM Do You Know Where Your Children Are?" MENTAL FLOSS (June 17, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://mentalfloss.com/article/30945/origin-its- 10-pm-do-you-know-where-your-children-are.
2 Glenn

Greenwald, NSA CollectingPhone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5,

2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order;

Dana Priest, NSA

Growth FueledbyNeed to Target Terrorists,WASH. POST (July 21, 2013),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-growth-fueled-by-need-to-targetterrorists/2013/07/21/24c93cf4-f~bl-1 le2-bed3-b9b6fe264871 story.html.
ACLU File Lawsuit ChallengingConstitutionalityofNSA Phone Spying Program,AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION

(June 11, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-files-lawsuit-challenging-constitutionality-nsaphone-spying-program; See also, Klaymanv. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing a case in
which a private citizen sued the federal government seeking an injunction against the NSA's practices and
referencing other lawsuits requesting the same relief).
4 Catherine Crump, You Are Being Tracked: How License PlateReaders Are Being Used to RecordAmericans'

Movements, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 2 (July 2013), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreportopt-v05.pdf
Steve Henn, In More Cities A Camera On Every Corner, ParkAndSidewalk, NPR (June 20, 2013, 2:57 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/20/191603369/The-Business-Of-Surveillance-Cameras.
6 Rebecca

Rosen, London Riots, Big Brother Watches: CCTVCameras Blanket the UK, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9,

2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/london-riots-big-brother-watches-cctv-camerasblanket-the-uk/243356/; Robin Young & Jeremy Hobson, NYC's Web of Cameras Can Catch UnattendedBags,
HERE & Now (Apr. 24, 2013), http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/04/24/nyc-surveillance-cameras.
Ellen Nakashima, Cellphone CarriersReport Surge in SurveillanceRequests From Law Enforcement, WASH.

POST (July 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cellphone-carriers-report-surge-insurveillance-requests/2012/07/09/gJQAVk4PYWstory.html; Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records
Request, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digitalage/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-records-request; David Bresnahan, Gov't Tracking Cell Phones without
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have the ability to "ping" a phone to determine its location in real-time," or to pinpoint its
position through access to records of its use from the carrier.9 This last tool is often
referred to as cell site location information or CSLI.'o CSLI can be historical or
prospective. In the former, the police seek the past location of a cell phone user, either by
triangulating from the cell phone towers that the phone contacted in the course of
completing a call or sending a text, or from actual Global Positioning System (GPS) data
from the cell phone itself." Prospective, or real time, CSLI means that the police intend to
use the data to track the location of the suspect currently and in the future. Sixty days is a
common time period for such tracking. CSLI does not include the content of any
communication emanating from the phone.
Virtually all cell phones in existence have a GPS device included so that the
authorities can locate the phone in case of its use to call 911 in an emergency. "Smart"
phones are capable of a number of applications and uses that depend on the use of GPS
information and frequently communicate their location to cell towers. As such, such
devices may be very useful to the police if they want to track a suspect who is in
possession of a smart phone. While a few states do require, as a matter of state law, police
to obtain a warrant before gathering this kind of information,1 2 as of yet there is no clear
standard established in the federal courts to determine whether the warrantless use of this
technology is constitutionally permissible.
The nation is faced with practices that are highly attractive to and commonly
used by police, " but for which there is no legal standard for judicial oversight. Most
people are not aware of just how much data cell phone companies are storing and for how
long.' 4 This state of affairs should not be allowed to exist. The purpose of this paper is to
analyze the state of the law on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the context of the
use of data from hand held devices or the network of hardware by which they function to
locate a suspect. This is independent from the question of the warrantless search of a cell
phone or hand-held device incident to arrest, which the Court addressed in the 2014

Court Order, NEWS WITH VIEWS (Jan. 4, 2006, 1:00 AM),
http://www.newswithviews.com/BreakingNews/breaking40.htm.
' See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391-92 (D. Md. 2012). At the time of writing, the
Graham case was under appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, 4' Circuit. See also, State v. Earls, 70
A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
'o See Commonwealthv. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *1-2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
See cases cited infra Pans II, IV, and V for details on CSLI capabilities.
12 Maine and Montana have passed statutes mandating that police obtain a warrant before seeking to track a
suspect using his or her cell phone. Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 642 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.);
Montana, H.B. No. 603, 63d Reg. Sess. (2013), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2013/billhtml/HBO603.htm (last updated
Apr. 22, 2013). The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that a warrant is required to access locational data.
State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled similarly. Commonwealth
v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. 2013). Three trial courts in Massachusetts have ruled that police must obtain a
warrant before accessing CSLI. See Commonwealthv. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (2014); Commonwealthv.
Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012); Commonwealthv. Pitt, No.
2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012).
" Declan McCullagh, Cops to Congress: We NeedLogs ofAmeri cans' Text Messages, CNET (Dec. 3, 2012,
9:00 AM), http://news.cnet.con/8301-13578_3-57556704-38/cops-to-congress-we-need-logs-of-americans-textmessages/.
14 Allie Bohm, How Long Is Your Cell Phone Company HangingOn To Your Data?, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION
(Sept. 28, 2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/how-long-your-cell-phonecompany-hanging-your-data; Cell Phone Location Tracking PublicRecords Request, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION
(last visited July 29, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-locationtracking-public-records-request.
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Term.'" The approach used by the current Justices of the United States Supreme Court to
address issues of the use of modern electronic technology by the police will be critiqued,
an exhaustive analysis of lower federal court and state court decisions will be provided,
and a legal standard that would provide both protection of the privacy rights of citizens
and adequate guidance to the police and the lower courts will be suggested.
Part I of this paper will trace the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
concerning the use of new technologies to gather information about suspects, beginning
with Olmstead v. United States,16 continuing through Katz v. United States,'7 Smith v.
Maryland', United States v. Knotts," United States v. Karo,20 and Kyllo v. United
States.2 1Part II will lay out the types of cases that have been decided by the lower courts
as a way of educating the reader about common police uses of locational data. Part III will
provide a detailed analysis of the three most recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of
the use of technology by the police, United States v. JoneS22 and Floridav. Jardines,23 and
Riley v. California.24 Part IV will explain the origins of, and the conflict between, the
Scalia "trespass standard" and the Harlan "reasonable expectation of privacy standard."
Part V will provide an overview and analysis of the cases to date that have considered the
issue of when and under what standards may the police gain access to Cell Site Location
Information. Part VI will make the case for a probable cause standard that would apply to
all uses of locational data. The standard will provide clear guidance to the police, a clear
and easily applied set of criteria for courts to use, and greater protection to the ordinary
citizen than currently exists. In order to do so, the main point that must be addressed is the
definition of "property" in this context. There must be agreement on what data the
customer owns, what data are owned by the service provider, and when and how the
customer can use the courts to protect these rights. The Court must transcend the
traditional common law notion of property as being something tangible and capable of
being owned or possessed.
PART I: TRACING THE HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO LOCATE A SUSPECT

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of police use of communication
and/or surveillance technology is well known. The Court first was faced with the task of
applying essentially 18 th Century concepts to modem communication technology in
Olmsteadv. UnitedStates in 1928, where phone tapping was analogized to trespass.25
Later, in 1967, the Court changed course in Katz v. U.S. and held that courts should apply
26
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard in such cases. The doctrine was applied
5

' Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014). The sweeping language in Chief
Justice Roberts' majority opinion in that case is potentially relevant to the discussion of how cell phone tracking
cases may be decided and will be addressed in the Parts III, V, and VI of this paper.
16 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
"8442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
'9 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
20 468 U.S. 705, 706
(1984).
21 533 U.S. 27, 29
(2001).
22 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
23 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417
(2013).
24 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruledby
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
26 389 U.S. at 360-62 (1967) (Harlan,
J., Concurring).
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in several important cases during the time between 1967 and 2012, when U. S. v. Jones

was decided.
In Olmstead, the first major case where the Court ruled on the legality of using
technology to gather information on a suspect, government agents were investigating a
large-scale "bootlegging" operation in the city of Seattle. 2 7 Federal agents, without
seeking a warrant, tapped the office phone, and several home phones, of the bootleggers. 28
They placed the taps along existing phone wires without physical trespass on the office
spaces or homes of the conspirators. 2 9 After monitoring the taps for months, extensive
transcriptions of the conversations were compiled and introduced into evidence at the
trial.3 0 In holding that the wiretaps did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the majority
focused on the lack of physical trespass by the government agents.

'

The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone
messages as of mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid
what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure.
The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing, and that
only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants. 3
In doing so, the majority defined a search as an intrusion of a constitutionally protected
place.
"The [Fourth] Amendment itself shows the search is to be of material
things, the person, the house, his papers, his effects. The description of
the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that it must
2
specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." 3
The "trespass doctrine" placed the core value of Fourth Amendment protection on
constitutionally protected places. Thus, because the wiretap was done outside of the home,
there was no intrusion. The end result was that the Fourth Amendment was interpreted
quite narrowly and, as interpreted, was incapable of providing guidance regarding law
enforcement use of any electronic technologies, like telephones.
In dissent, Justice Brandeis foreshadowed the concerns that led the Court to
overrule Olmstead in 1967 in Katz v. United States.3 3 Justice Brandeis was very concerned

that the trespass standard would allow the government to intrude into the private affairs of
citizens in ways not yet developed.
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be
developed by which the government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.3 4

27

277 U.S. at 455-57.

28

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457.

29

30 Id.

3
32

Id. at 464.
id.

3 See id. at 471; See Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1967).
34 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.
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Brandeis also articulated a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. To him, the Amendment did more than just protect specific places. It served
as a core element of liberty.
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only
a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 35
Brandeis' view would remain in dissent for forty years, until the Court decided Katz v.
United States.

The facts in the Katz case are also simple. Mr. Katz was part of an illegal
gambling operation and was conducting that business by using a pay phone in California
to talk with his partners in crime in Boston and Miami. 36 The police were aware of this
and placed a listening device on the outside of the phone booth, where Katz would not see
it.37 This enabled them to listen to his side of the conversations, transcripts of which were
introduced at trial.38
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart took the position articulated by Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead and viewed the Fourth Amendment as a matter of privacy,
rather than trespass on private property. Stewart argued that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places, and declared that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public may be
constitutionally protected." 3 9 In doing so, Stewart explicitly acknowledged that the
rationale underlying the trespass doctrine had been eroded and "can no longer be regarded
as controlling." 4 0
It is Justice Harlan's concurrence that fleshed out the standard or test that the
Court has used to answer the question whether an activity constitutes a search: "My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. "41

1 Id. at 478.
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348
(1967).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40

41

at 351 (citation omitted).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In the instant case, Katz had a subjective expectation that the government would
not listen in on his phone conversations, and that expectation was one that society was
willing to recognize as reasonable.4 2 This two prong "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test has persisted to the present day, although Justice Scalia argued that it should be
eliminated during the oral argument of U.S. v. Jones 43 and he did not rely on it in either
the Jones orJardinesdecisions. Until 2012, it was commonly understood that Justice
Stewart's opinion in Katz over-ruled the trespass doctrine, but as we will see below,
Justice Scalia has revived it in his two majority opinions in Jones and Jardines.
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine was applied in several
important cases during the time since 1967. These cases, oft cited by the lower courts in
attempting to come to grips with challenges to the use of cell phone data, include the 1979
case of Smith v. Maryland,' the 1983 case of U. S v. Knotts,46 the 1984 case of U. S v.
Karo,4 7 and the 2001 case of Kyllo v. U. 548 With few exceptions, such as Kyllo, the Court
has generally ruled against individual privacy claims.
Most relevant to cell phone location surveillance are the Court's decisions in
Smith v. Maryland U.S. v. Knotts, and U.S. v. Karo. Smith involved the use of a pen
register device to capture the phone numbers called by the phone in question.o No warrant
was issued to justify the use of the device." The Court held that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the numbers one calls from a telephone on the basis that these
numbers are voluntarily provided by the user to the phone company which keeps the
records in the normal course of its business.52 This idea that such information is
voluntarily provided by the phone user and kept by the service provider for its own
legitimate business purposes plays a large role in the thinking of a number of judges faced
with the need to decide whether the Fourth Amendment protects cell phone subscribers
who do not wish for the authorities to use locational data stored by cell phone service
providers.5
For those judges who did attempt to wrestle with the Fourth Amendment's
meaning in the context of the use of CSLI, there are numerous citations to both U.S. v.
Knotts5 4 and U. S v. Karo." Both cases involved the placement of beepers on personal
property and the monitoring of those beepers to determine the location of the property. In
Knotts, the beeper was placed in a container of chloroform upon request by the police to

42

Id. at 360-361.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
44 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
45 442 U.S. 735, 738-41 (1979).
46 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (discussing privacy expectation with phones).
47 468 U.S. 705, 726 (1984).
48 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
49 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding defendants did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
5 442 U.S. at 737.
43

5' Id.
52

Id at 745-46.

See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611-12
(5th Cir. 2013).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, 934 F. Supp. 2d 341, 354-56 (D. Vt. 2013) (citing United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
5 See, e.g., Caraballo,934 F. Supp. 2d at 354-56 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
5
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the private company that sold the chemical to the defendants.56 The request had been made
because the police believed the defendants were making illegal drugs. 7 The police used
the beeper to follow the transport of the chemical to a remote cabin in the woods in
Wisconsin.' After three days of watching the cabin, the police obtained a search warrant
and found a drug lab in operation in the cabin.' 9 In refusing to suppress the evidence
derived from the use of the beeper, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the beeper served as
nothing more than an enhancement of the police ability to follow the car while it was on a
60
public thoroughfare. In essence, the Court ruled that one has no reasonable expectation
of privacy while on public streets because one can be observed by anyone, including the
police, who happen to be on the same street.
61

U. S v. Karo was decided during the next Term and also involved the use of a beeper.
Once again, the police suspected the defendants of using bulk chemicals to make illegal
drugs and had a beeper placed in a container of ether that the defendants were planning to
use to manufacture cocaine. 62 The Court, per Justice White, upheld the conviction, but did
hold that the monitoring of the beeper while the container was inside a private residence
would violate the Fourth Amendment.63 Taken together, Knotts and Karo stand for the

proposition that the government may use technology that enhances the senses to improve
their ability to conduct surveillance in public areas without any restrictions, but to use
such technology to search a private space, such as a home, would require a warrant based
on probable cause.
This distinction between the type of privacy protection that one has in the home
and the ones that one does not have when in a public space would be important in the
decision of the last of the major cases before the 2012 U. S. v. Jones case, Kyllo v. U. .64
In Kyllo the police were using a thermal imaging camera to scan the defendant's home
after becoming suspicious that he was growing marijuana.65 The police were looking for a
heat signature consistent with the use of grow lamps.6 6 In overturning this search, the
Court, per Justice Scalia, held that this was the type of intrusion into the home that was
forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. 67 Despite expressly stating that Fourth Amendment
analysis was no longer tied to any Common Law concept of trespass,68 and despite his
open acceptance of Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy standard,69 Justice
Scalia was adamant that the Fourth Amendment must protect the home from the use of
technology that allows the police to gather information that could not be gathered with the
unaided senses of the officers.70
460 U.S. at 277.
1 Id. at 278.
56

58 Id.

at 279.
Id. at 285.
61 468 U.S. 705, 708
(1984).
62 Id. at
708.
63 Id. at
716.
64 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 32-33 (2001).
65 Id. at
29.
59 Id.

60

66

id.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 32 ("We have since decoupled violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation of his property.").
69
Id at 33.
71 Id. at 34.
67
68
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PART II: WHAT KINDS OF CASES GIVE RISE TO CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF
LOCATIONAL DATA?

There are a small but growing number of federal and state court cases in which
criminal defendants are challenging the use of locational data obtained from cell phone
service providers. In the federal practice, these cases often have cumbersome sounding
names like In the Matter ofthe Application ofthe United States ofAmerica for an Order
7
Authorizing the Installationand Use ofa PenRegister and Trap and Trace Device.

Judges faced with deciding such cases do not have the benefit of clear guidance with
regard to the standard of review, so they tend to provide a recitation of existing cases in
their opinions. 7 2 Two important federal cases in this area are United States v. Graham,73
appeal of which is currently pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and In the Matter ofthe Application ofthe United States ofAmerica for an Order
Directinga Provider ofElectronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the

Government,74 decided in 2010 by the Third Circuit. Cases in state court have also
contributed to this area of jurisprudence and in three states courts have held that their state
constitutions provide greater protection for suspects than the Fourth Amendment.

The 2010 Third Circuit case originated when federal law enforcement officers,
investigating a suspected drug trafficker, asked a federal magistrate in Pennsylvania for an
order under section 2703(d) of the Stored Communication Act directing a cell phone
service provider to disclose CSLI data on the suspect. 76 The magistrate refused to grant the
request on the grounds that the statute did not authorize the seizure of information to be
used to track a suspect.77 The district court judge affirmed the magistrate's decision, but
the Third Circuit overturned it. The rationale for doing so hinged more on an
understanding of the Stored Communications Act than on an interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment itself. 7 The Court held that the statute itself does not mandate a finding of
probable cause, the usual standard for determining whether to issue a warrant, but that a
federal magistrate, in his or her discretion, could use that standard in determining whether
to grant the warrant. In doing so, they largely avoided the Fourth Amendment issue.
United States v. Graham stems from a criminal charge against two men involved
in a string of burglaries in Baltimore, Maryland, in 2011. so The two defendants were
arrested for burglarizing two fast food restaurants."' Their cell phones were seized and

7 E.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) to Disclose
Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2012).
72 See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939,
950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
7 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012), appealfiled, No. 12-4659, (4th Cir. 2012), available at
http://docketsjustia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca4/12-4659.
74 620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
7 State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642-44 (N.J. 2013); Commonwealthv. Rushing, A.3d 939, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2013); Commonwealthv. Wyatt, 2012 WL 4815307 at *6-8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
76 In re the Application of the United States Order Directing a Provider
of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d. Cir 2010) (citing In re the Application of the United States for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 58889 (W.D. Pa. 2008)).
77
Id. at 308.
71

Seeid. at 315.

79 id.

s 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385-87 (D. Md. 2012).
1
Id. at 385-386.
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searched and the police became convinced that these two men were responsible for a
series of burglaries that preceded the incidents for which they were arrested.8 2 The police
sought a total of 221 days of CSLI data, under the aegis of the Stored Communications
Act.8 3 This request was granted and Sprint/Nextel complied with the order." The
defendants objected, among other things, to the long length of time that the police sought
to track their movements.' The trial court likened the records from the cell phone
provider to any other business record, essentially using the doctrine laid out in Smith v.
Maryland, which held that there is no expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one
dialed. 86 In doing so, the court tied the analysis to a personal property concept more
appropriately suited to paper documents, citing a series of other federal trial court
decisions. 7 Once the court decided to treat cell phone records as ordinary business
records, it was easy for it to rule in favor of the police. In essence, the decision to treat the
locational data as a business record allowed the court to avoid the Fourth Amendment
issue and rely solely on the lower statutory standard of "specific and articulable facts" that
is provided in the Stored Communications Act.88
In contrast to the cases in the federal courts, courts in three states, including one
state supreme court, have made clear statements that their state constitutions provide
greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment when it comes to the use of cell
phones to track suspects. The first of these cases is Pennsylvania v. Rushing. After
responding to the scene of a horrific multiple murder, the police learned that the suspect
was still at large and had professed the intention to commit further violence. They sought
and received a court order to "ping" the suspect's cell phone, and using the data along
with the GPS unit in the phone itself, were able to locate and apprehend the suspect
without his committing any further acts of violence.90 The judge granted the order based
on the "specific and articulable facts" standard stated in the then applicable version of the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. 9 ' The suspect argued for exclusion of evidence based on the
theory that the order to "ping" his cell phone should only have been issued if there was
probable cause. 92 Pennsylvania Superior Court Justice Bowles' opinion in the case is very
detailed and carefully crafted because "[t]he ... issue Appellant levels on appeal presents
a matter of first impression in this Commonwealth, although the federal courts have
addressed the question with conflicting results." 93 The court ruled that, under
Pennsylvania law, the standard of review to be followed in considering a request for
locational data is probable cause. This reasoning was based in part on Pennsylvania
statutes, but the court stated that the Pennsylvania constitution creates greater protections
for privacy than the Fourth Amendment.9' As such, under Pennsylvania law, citizens have

82

Id. at 386.

8

Id. at 387.

84 id.
85

Id.

86

Id. at 389; Smithy. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
Graham,846 F. Supp. 2d at 389.

1

" 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009 sess.).
89 Conunonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
90 Id.
91
92

Id. at 954.
Id. at 947.

93 Id. at 954.
94

Id. at 963.

95 Id. at 954.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained in their cell phone records. 96It
was also made clear that the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances,
which existed in this case, was sufficient to justify a warrantless search of cell phone
records for locational data.9 7 The opinion is very thorough in terms of addressing the
details of how triangulation is used to locate suspect as well as providing citations to, and
explanations of, many federal and state cases and statutes.
The second state court case, State v. Earls," arose in New Jersey. In that case, the
Middletown Township Police were investigating a string of burglaries and had located one
of the conspirators who had provided useful evidence. 99 This informant was believed to be
at risk of harm from her partner in crime and the police, knowing the cell phone number of
the suspect and knowing that he was using a cell phone from T-Mobile, asked T-Mobile to
provide locational data, which they did.' 00 No warrant was ever sought.' 0 ' The New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Article 1, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey State
Constitution gives a person a protected privacy interest in the location of his or her cell
phone.1 0 2 This means that the police must seek a warrant from a neutral magistrate based
on probable cause before they can obtain locational data from a cell phone provider. As
with the decision in Pennsylvania v. Rushing, the New Jersey Supreme Court was careful
to fully analyze the Fourth Amendment issue and yet base their decision squarely in state
law. Also, in agreement with the Pennsylvania courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
careful to protect the interests of law enforcement by stating that probable cause and
exigent circumstances would be sufficient to justify a warrantless search, i.e., a direct
appeal to a cell phone company for data.' 03 Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited
its decision to prospective effect only, meaning that older cases with similar fact patterns
would not be revisited or re-opened. o0
In the State of Massachusetts, five cases have dealt with issues of the use of
CSLI. Three ruled in favor of the defendant and two in favor of the state. Commonwealth
v. Wyatt and Commonwealth v. Augustine ruled explicitly that the Massachusetts

constitution provides for greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment in such
cases and that the police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to access CSLI.'0 o
In contrast, Commonwealth v. Pitt ruled that the Fourth Amendment itself requires a
warrant based on a showing or probable cause before the police may use a cell phone to
locate a suspect.1 06 Commonwealth v. Princiottaruled that that since the phone in question
0 7
was not the suspect's phone, he lacked standing to challenge data from that account.
Similarly, Commonwealth v. Willis, held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge
the use of CSLI since it was her who had called 911 and the evidence in question
concerned the location of her phone when she made that call.o Of the cases wherein there
96

97

Id. at 963.

Id. at 965-66.

A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013).
Id. at 633.
100 Id.

98 70
99

101 Id. at 634.
102 Id. at 644.
103 See id.
104 Id. at
645.
105 See Commonwealthv. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (Mass. 2014); See also Commonwealthv.
Wyatt, No.
2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012).
106 No. NOCV2010-00061, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 39, at *31 (Feb. 23, 2012).
107 31 Mass. L. Rptr. 68, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2013).
1os No. SUCR2012-10180, 2013 Mass. Super. LEXIS 114, at *6 (Mar. 8,2013).
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was a clear privacy issue raised by the facts, the Massachusetts courts have ruled that this
privacy issue must be resolved in favor of a warrant requirement for the use of CSLI.' 09
In Florida, where the case of Tracey v. State is, at the time of this writing,
pending before the Florida Supreme Court, the lower courts have ruled that there is no
expectation of privacy when the search only concerns the location of a suspect while he is
on the public roads. "o In that case, the sheriff's deputy who applied for the order to access
CSLI relied solely on an unsupported statement from a federal agent."' The appellate
court held that granting the order violated the state statutes that authorize access to CSLI,
but the lower court held that exclusion of evidence is not an available remedy under those
statutes.11 2 The opinion contained language that indicated that the court was sympathetic
to the notion that cell phone users do not voluntarily and knowingly convey locational
data when they possess a cell phone." 3 That the facts involve an overreach by the police
could be meaningful when the Florida Supreme Court makes its decision.
In each of these cases, the authorities wanted to obtain information from a cell
phone service provider to find the location of a suspect. In none of these instances was
there probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant. In most of the cases, the
state relied on statutory provisions that purport to allow a court to issue a subpoena to a
cell phone service provider based on less than a probable cause standard. In some cases,
the authorities simply requested data from the cell phone service providers and the request
was granted without any court supervision at all." 4 These cases also show the different
approaches taken by state courts, many of which base their decisions on state
constitutional provisions, and federal courts, that tend to apply the Fourth Amendment or
applicable statutes.
PART III: UNITED STATES V. JONES AND FLORIDA V. JARDINES, AND RILEY V.
CALIFORNIA

Until the 2012 decision in U. S. v. Jones,"' the legal standard for adjudicating
claims of violations of the Fourth Amendment was clear, if not particularly predictable in
terms of outcome when applied to actual cases. Justice Harlan's famous two-prong test
was uniformly applied, even by Justice Scalia himself, to determine whether a search was
valid.116 Jones sent ripples throughout the legal and law enforcement community, not only
because it placed limits on a technological tool that was coming into widespread use, but
because the outcome was unanimous, and all nine justices agreed that a warrant was

109

See, e.g., Pitt, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 39, at *31.

110 Tracey v. Florida, 69 So. 3d 992, 993, 999-1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), appealdocketed, No. SC 11-2254,
2013 Fla. LEXIS 215 (Fla. Jan. 28, 2013).
Id. at 993.
112 Id. at 999-1000.
See id. at 996 ("We acknowledge that a compelling argument can be made that CSLI falls within a legitimate
expectation of privacy."); See also id. ("Technology evolves faster than the law can keep up, extending the
search capabilities of law enforcement and transforming our concept of privacy.").
114 See U.S. v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 346 (D. Vt. 2013), for an example of when a court order made
mention of a Sprint corporate procedure for requests for emergency release of such information; In other cases, it
is clear that there was no court order, or none was offered by the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d
630, 633 (N.J. 2013); Peoplev. Fernandez, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1931, at *6-7 (Mar. 16, 2011);
Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 299 (Ga. 2010).
11 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
116 Kyllov. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001).
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needed, even though the justices were divided as to why." 7 To legal scholars the case
raised numerous questions due to Justice Scalia's attempt to return to the long-discarded
trespass doctrine while distancing the decision from the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard."" Justice Sotomayor's concurrence is also important in that she criticized the
third party doctrine that results from the application of Smith v. Maryland" to CSLI cases
and she seemingly embraced the mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment.1 2 0
The facts of the Jones case are fairly well known, even if the actual path of the
case traced through the court system was convoluted and lengthy.12' The police in the
District of Columbia obtained a warrant that would allow them to place a GPS Device on
a car being used by Jones.1 2 2 The warrant allowed for the device to be placed within a ten
day window. 123 It was placed on day 11, and the attachment of the device occurred in
Maryland in a public parking lot.124 Thus, the Court treated the case as if the placement of
the GPS was warrantless. 12 Twenty-eight days of data were gathered and these data were
used at trial to convict Jones of conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs.1 2 6
Five of the Justices, led by Justice Scalia, seized on the fact that the device was
placed on the car without a valid warrant.1 2 7 In Scalia's opinion, this action constituted a
trespass at common law and this was sufficient to taint the placement of the device and all
evidence subsequently derived from the use of the device. 12 The other four Justices who
signed the majority opinion agreed that the placement of the device was tainted, but could
not all agree on Justice Scalia's trespass rationale. Justice Sotomayor agreed that the
warrantless placement of the GPS device was enough to invalidate the search, and joined
the majority on that basis, but wrote separately to reject Scalia's new trespass standard.129
In her concurrence, Sotomayor applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to hold

" The Court determined that it need not address the government's contention that Jones had no reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore there was no search "because Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do not rise
or fall with the Katz formulation." See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. Justice Sotomayor discusses the test that she
would apply to cases of GPS monitoring given "some of the unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the
Katz analysis [which] will require particular attention." Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring). Justice Alito
states that he would analyze the issue by asking whether the long-term monitoring of the moments of the vehicle
that Jones drove violated his reasonable expectations of privacy. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., Concurring).
..See id. at 950-52.
l9 See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring) ("[Third party doctrine] is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks."); See also Smithy. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
120 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., Concurring); See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory ofthe Fourth
Amendment, Ill MICH. L. REV. 311, 327-28 (2012); See, also Commonwealth v. Augustine, Criminal Action 1110748, 2013 WL 5612574, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Apr. 3, 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 244 (2014), wherein the lower court expressly adopted the mosaic
theory.
121 There were two trials. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The first ended in a hung jury. Id. There was an appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 949. The Supreme Court vacated
Jones' conviction. United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 204 (D.D.C. 2012). Proceedings on remand
included a hearing on a motion to suppress 120 days of CSLI. See Jones 908 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
122 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
123

id.

124

id.

Id. at 949 (setting out procedural posture).
See id. at 948-49.
127 Id. at
949.
125
126

128 See id.
129

Id. at 954-57.
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'

that tracking the whereabouts of a person over time was not a reasonable search. 3 0 For
her, and for the four Justices who signed Justice Alito's concurring opinion, the proper test
is the reasonable expectation of privacy test.' 3
Justice Sotomayor also wrote that it is perhaps time to reconsider the third party
doctrine of Smith v. Maryland, arguing that it is "ill suited to the digital age" 3 2 and
expressly mentioned the fact that cell phone users routinely and automatically convey
information to their providers in the course of using the phone.' 3 3 This item of dicta is
especially significant when attempting to decide petitions for court order to release CSLJ.
Some commentators interpreting the Jones decision have argued that taken together, the
Sotomayor and Alito concurring opinions create something called the "mosaic" theory of
the Fourth Amendment. '14 This approach involves taking the entire set of official
behaviors in a holistic way, as opposed to examining each action taken by the government
in a sequential way.1" This type of reasoning has potential for application to cell phone
tracking cases since it seemingly would allow for the context in which cell phone data are
gathered to be considered free from the constraints of the third party doctrine.
Despite the lack of five votes for his new, and old, trespass standard, it was also
applied to decide the case of Floridav. Jardines.136Police suspected Joelis Jardines of
keeping illegal drugs inside his home and brought a K-9 unit to the defendant's front
porch.17 After the drug-sniffing dog indicated to officers that there were narcotics inside
the house, they obtained a warrant using that information as part of the presentation to the
judge. 3 8 Upon execution of the warrant, officers seized marijuana plants from inside the
home. "9 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the officers brought the
drug-sniffing dog physically onto the defendant's porch, they were invading the province
of his home and consequently searching it.1 40 But the court did not explain why it should
make a difference, for Fourth Amendment purposes, that the drug-sniffing dog had to be
on the defendant's porch in order to smell the plants as opposed to detecting them from
the street. Scalia's application of the trespass doctrine was particularly interesting, given
the similarities in Jardinesto the Kyllo thermal vision imaging case from a decade earlier,
where Scalia's majority opinion relied on the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
home to disallow warrantless thermal imaging of the home.
The development of a new trespass doctrine, in effect, resurrecting Olmstead, while at the
same time leaving the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard in place, has
injected confusion and uncertainty to the Fourth Amendment. The ruling in Riley v.
California, issued in June of 2014, did little to resolve this confusion.14' The opinion
actually decided two cases in which the police had seized a cellular phone from a suspect

13

132

Id. at 956.
Id. at 956-57, 64.
Id. at 957.

'33

Id.

134

Kerr, supra note 120, at 313-14.
Id. at 314.
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
Id. at 1413.

135
136

137

138 Id.
139
40

1

141

Id.

Id. at 1417-18.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
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as part of a search incident to arrest.1 4 2 In both cases, the police had proceeded to search
the contents of the phone and used that evidence against the defendants in their trials.1 43
The opinion in the Riley case was written by Chief Justice Roberts, with only a special
concurrence by Justice Alito preventing a unanimous Court. The opinion shows that the
justices have educated themselves about cell phone technology, something that was long
overdue given the famous reluctance of the justices to embrace information technology.1 44
The court in several places expressly stated that cellular phones are fundamentally
different than other types of personal property that is commonly discovered in a search
incident to arrest because of the comprehensive nature of the information stored on these
devices:
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a
broad array of private information never found in a home in any form-unless
the phone is.
Additionally, the Court made it clear that cell phones can store all sorts of
sensitive personal information as well as provide access to information stored in browser
histories or stored in the cloud.
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical
records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively
different. An Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be
found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual's
private interests or concerns-perhaps a search for certain symptoms of
disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. 146
Lastly, concerning locations, the Court was quick to note that cell phones do allow the
police to discover where a person has been with great detail.
Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart
phones and can reconstruct someone's specific movements down to the
minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.
Because of the concern for the huge amount of private data that can be accessed
whenever the police seize a cellular phone, the Court held that the police must obtain a
warrant before searching the information on the phone. The court even went so far as to
suggest strategies for protecting evidence by securing the phone against remote wiping or
data encryption.14 It should be noted that the opinion in Riley did not apply Justice
The second case was United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2013), cert granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014).
The Riley case involved as smart phone, and images and video from the phone were used as evidence. The
phone in Wurie was an older flip phone, which was used to determine the location of the suspect's home and to
justify a warrant to search that home.
144 Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits that JusticesHaven't QuitefiguredOut E-Mail Yet, (August 20, 2013,
3:33 pm), Future Tense,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2013/08/20/elena kagan supremecourtjustices haven t-gotten to-e
mail usepaper memos.html (last visited, June 24, 2014).
14' 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at 20-21 (June 25, 2014).
146 Id. at *19.
147 Id. at *19-20.
148 Id. at *12-14.
142
143
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Scalia's trespass doctrine. The case was decided based on analysis of the two prongs,
officer safety and preventing destruction of evidence, laid out in Chimel v. California.19

PART IV: DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING AND MIXING THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE OF JONES
AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST FROM KATZ

Both standards used by the Supreme Court thus far in determining whether a
search or seizure has taken place, the trespass standard and the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard, have flaws, especially the former. Applying them to the modern world
creates problems and complications they were not designed to address. The trespass
doctrine cannot coherently address situations created by today's technology, and despite
decades of jurisprudence, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard remains
malleable and difficult for law enforcement to use. Applying the trespass doctrine is
becoming increasingly arbitrary, as shown in the two drug sniffing dog cases that have
been decided recently, Floridav. Jardinesioand Illinois v. Caballes.1' Further
complicating this area of jurisprudence is an emerging patchwork of state constitutional
provisions mimicking the Fourth Amendment, yet often providing a higher level of
protection of individual rights.15 2 All of these factors further muddy the water for law
enforcement officers, judges, and ordinary citizens trying to determine what constitutes a
violation of the rights of a suspect.
The trespass doctrine has its roots in originalism, an approach to constitutional
analysis that seeks to understand what the Constitution meant at the time the provision in
question was written when construing its meaning today.' 5 3 According to originalists like
Justice Scalia, the Fourth Amendment was only meant to protect physical spaces.'1 4 Hence
a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated unless the government has
physically trespassed onto the suspect's property. This was the rationale for deciding not
to suppress evidence obtained from listening devices attached to the phone lines of
suspects in Olmstead v, United States.'"' The Court held that no search or seizure took
place because there was no physical entry into the suspect's homes or office.16 This
outcome foreshadowed the problems the trespass doctrine would encounter in the future.
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, was quite specific - even prophetic - in wondering what new
technological developments would mean in this area of the law. 5 7
As Justice Brandeis suggested, the application of the trespass doctrine is ill-suited
for modern technological problems that complicate Fourth Amendment issues.'"" Physical
149 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
151 133 S. Ct. at 1413.

1'' 543 U.S. 405, 406-407 (2005).
152 See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 954-55 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2013); See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d
630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
'5 See United States v. Jones, 123 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (describing the relationship between trespass and
the Fourth Amendment); See Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism,48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 578 (2011) (describing the constitutional interpretation
method of Originalism).
54
1 See Jones, 123 S. Ct. at 949-50; See Richard H. Seamon, Kyllov. UnitedStates andthe PartialAscendanceof
Justice Scalia 's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1018 (2001).
'55 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
156 Id. at 466.
'5 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
151 See id.
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intrusion is often unnecessary for law enforcement to track suspects. Tracking a suspect
by pinging a cell phone or by obtaining CSLI from a cell phone service provider gives law
enforcement the ability to record the suspect's movements over a period of time, and in
private spaces, but without any physical intrusion on the suspect's person, property, or
home. Situations like these seem to run contrary to Justice Scalia's announced purpose of
"preserv[ing] ... that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted,"'" 9 before the government had the ability to gather such
extensive information about its citizens without physically searching them or their effects.
The inadequacy of the trespass doctrine to grapple with modern technology can
lead to arbitrary results. This discrepancy is illustrated in Floridav. Jardines.16 0 Surely the
act of sending the dog to investigate the defendant's home in the first place was of more
consequence than how far away it was when it inhaled. And Jardinesonly demonstrates
the complexities of applying the trespass doctrine to search and seizure cases without the
complications added by modem technology. Imagine the difficulty in applying the
trespass doctrine to a similar situation where, instead of a dog, piece of equipment such as
a drone, or a satellite is sent to investigate a suspect. We already know, from Californiav.
Cirallo, and Floridav. Riley, that over flights by manned aircraft in search of marijuana
growing activities do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as they occur in
commercial air space.161 We also know that the use of a thermal imaging device is not
allowed on the grounds that it is a type of technology not in general use by the public.162
Would the suspect care more about whether the drone was in public air space, or the
availability of a device to the general public, or the fact that his every move inside the
privacy of his own home is being recorded? The trespass doctrine could allow such
intrusions, which is why it is ill-equipped to answer such questions. There is simply no
viable reason why a home should be constitutionally protected from a dog or a thermal
imaging camera, but not a drone.163
The combination of a trespass doctrine with the reasonable expectation of privacy
standardl64 provides another layer of complications. Jones revived the trespass doctrine
despite the fact that it was replaced in Katz with the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard.16 In Jones, Justice Scalia explained that "the Katz reasonable expectation of
1 66
privacy test has been added to, not substitutedfor, the common law trespassory test."

But the two can often conflict. How to define a reasonable expectation of privacy is
largely dependent upon judges and juries, which are in turn influenced by societal norms.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001)).
See 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (describing an application of the trespass doctrine).
161 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
162 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34-35 (2001).
163 Further complicating the application of the trespass doctrine are cases like
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005), that Jones did not overrule but seemingly add wrinkles to the doctrine's application. There the defendant
was stopped for speeding and officers had a drug-sniffing dog inspect his car without any indication of the
presence of narcotics. Id. at 406. There was in fact marijuana in the car, but the Court held that the inspection
was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in contraband. Id. at 408-09. The Court reasoned that only where such inspections have the capability to detect
lawful activity is the Fourth Amendment implicated, and the drug-sniffing dog could only detect contraband. Id.
at 409. Although the search in Jardinesarguably had such capability, as the officers could have peered into a
window from the defendant's porch, at minimum, Caballesobscures the trespass doctrine and makes its
application even more difficult.
164 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, 953.
165 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
(declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places).
166 132 S. Ct.
at 952.
'59
160
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The invasions of privacy that are considered reasonable can change with the times and
indeed, with changes in technology. As applied in Katz, the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard depends on the difference between "what a person knowingly exposes to
the public," which is not given Fourth Amendment protection, versus "what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public," which may be protected.167
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard evolves over time. It is also quite
subjective. What one set of justices views as reasonable may change as the Court's
membership changes and as the common uses to which a technology is put changes over
time. Thus, Justice Sotomayor's concerns about re-thinking what is a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding phone calls and bank records. The trespass doctrine, on
the other hand, is not so malleable. The definition of "physical invasion" does not change
with a suspect's desire to preserve her privacy. The trespass doctrine is essentially stuck in
the past: government actions that were considered physical invasions in the founding era
are still viewed as such today. This tension was revealed in Katz itself, where the Court
declared that a search had taken place when law enforcement eavesdropped on calls the
defendant made from a phone booth.168 Today, a well-placed camera or listening device
need not even be physically near a phone booth to record the defendant's conversation.
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, such listening would violate the
suspect's expectation of privacy. But under the trespass doctrine, such a search could be
considered legitimate because the government did not physically intrude into the phone
booth. The Jones majority does not adequately address this dilemma or explain how to
apply the two tests together when each points to a different outcome.

'

It should be acknowledged that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
does not provide a spotless alternative. That standard, espoused in Katz,169 was strongly
calculated to rebut the holding in Olmstead that the Fourth Amendment protects only
places.1 70 Instead of being based on a physical/non-physical distinction, the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard changes with society, and the defendant's, expectations.' 7
Precisely because of its ability to change with societal expectations, it is inconsistent in
application. Different judges and juries come to different conclusions about what is
reasonable, which will likely produce conflicting precedents on a regular basis.1 7 2 In
addition, such uncertainty provides imperfect guidance for law enforcement officers who
must apply the doctrine in real time and should (ideally) be able to reasonably predict the
outcome of doing so. When a faulty search might lead to the acquittal of a guilty party,
such foreseeability is extremely important.
A further complication is that the privacy expectations of cell phone users are
unclear. While the data on how Americans feel about the National Security Agency's
interceptions of cell phone and internet traffic data are mixed,1 7 3 to apply a trespass
167

389 U.S. at 351.

68

' Id. at 353.

69

Id. at 351.

170 Id.

at 351-54 (declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places).
'' See id. ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.").
172 The changes in the precision by which triangulation location can be accomplished using CSLI have caused
changes in the way that such cases are judged. CompareIn re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure
of Telecomms. Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), with In re Application of the U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
17' Majority say NSA tracking ofphone records "acceptable"- Washington Post-PewResearch Center poll,
WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.conpage/2010-
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standard is to rule that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in any data generated
by the use of a cellular phone and stored in the databases of the service provider. The
trespass standard does not construe such data as important since no trespass on any
property or effect of the suspect need occur for the police to access those data. In fact, it is
not clear at all that a suspect would have any protected interest at all in data held by the
cell service provider. While there has been no case explicitly on the issue of who owns
such data, the opinion in New York v. Harris reports that the trial court in that case ruled
that the defendant had no standing to challenge a subpoena directed to Twitter that ordered
the production of tweets written by the defendant and stored in Twitter's database. 74
Thus, the use of a trespass standard effectively allows the police to access any data that the
service provider elects to turn over to them, without any protection of the rights of the
user.
Further complicating modern search and seizure jurisprudence are state
constitutional and statutory provisions noted above that mirror the Fourth Amendment yet
provide more extensive protections for individuals.' 75 If the current muddled standards
continue, federal courts risk seeing this area of federal jurisprudence fade into irrelevancy
as state supreme courts create their own standards that are more protective of individual
privacy and would render Fourth Amendment protections redundant. Pennsylvania v.
Rushingl76 is a prime example. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored Jones and
adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy standard alone when interpreting Article I,
Section 8 of its own constitution. 7 7 The court also disregarded the "specific and
articulable facts" standard used by federal courts in determining when the government can
overcome a reasonable expectation of privacy and trace a suspect's location in real time. 78
Instead, the court adopted a probable cause standard. ' As noted above, the Earls court
had a similar holding limited to the New Jersey Constitution. 1so The danger with
continuing on with the unclear standard from Jones is that state courts will take their cues
2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/10/National-Politics/Polling/release_242.xml; 59% Oppose Government's Secret
Collecting ofPhone Records, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (June 9, 2013),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publiccontent/politics/general_politics/june_2013/59_opposegovernments
secret collecting of phonerecords; Doug Mataconis, InitialPolls Seemingly In Conflict On Public Opinion Of
NSA Surveillance Programs, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (June 11, 2013),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/initial-polls-seemiingly-in-conflict-on-public-opiniion-of-nsa-surveillanceprograms/; Most disapprove of gov'tphone snooping of ordinaryAmericans, CBS NEWS (June 11, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588748/most-disapprove-of-govt-phone-snooping-of-ordinaryamericans/.
174 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (Crim. Ct. 2012); See, for example, United States v. Meregildo, 883
F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), in which the court held that admission of Facebook material listed as
private by defendant, but provided by Facebook friends of the defendant, was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
'75 Maine and Montana have passed statutes mandating that police obtain a warrant before seeking to track a
suspect using his or her cell phone. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 642 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); H.B. No.
603, 63d Reg. Sess. (2013), availableat http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2013/billhtml/HBO603.htm (last updated Apr. 22,
2013).
176 Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
17 id.
I71 Id
179 id.

at 961.

" State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); See, also, the discussion in five lower court cases from
Massachusetts: Commonwealthv. Augustine, No. 11-10748, 2013 WL 5612574, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 3,
2013), vacated, 467 Mass. 230 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealthv. Princiotta, No. 2009-00965, 2013 WL 1363901,
at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2013); Commonwealthv Willis, No. SUCR2012-10180, 2013 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 114, at *5-6 (Mar. 8, 2013); Commonwealthv. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012); Commonwealthv. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb.
23, 2012).
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from Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, developing their own standards and
taking this section of search and seizure jurisprudence out of the hands of federal courts.
This scenario would create yet another area of law where the rules change as one crosses
state lines, an unacceptable state of affairs when often a suspect being tracked is in one
state, the police tracking him are in another, and the data monitoring his movements are in
a third state. In order to maintain uniformity and promote predictability, federal courts
must adopt a clear standard that is more effective than the Jones rule.
PART V. AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE CASES INVOLVING POLICE USE OF
CSLI TO TRACK A SUSPECT

In order to fully explore the current state of the law with regard to police use of
CSLI to track a suspect, it is necessary to find as many trial and appellate court cases as
possible. The process used to do so is tedious, but the best available. The 2010 case In the
Matter of the Application of the United States ofAmerica for an Order Directing a
Provider ofElectronic CommunicationService to Disclose Records to the Government'8

was shepardized as a starting point. On January 7, 2014, that processed yielded 133 hits,
56 of which were trial court orders or appellate opinions that had cited this case. All of
those orders and opinions were read and content analyzed, and any earlier cases that were
cited in those orders and opinions were noted and included in the data. Trial court orders
that were subsequently addressed by appellate courts were listed only under the auspices
of the appellate court opinion to avoid double listing of cases. As a check to make sure
that all possible cases were identified, a search on Lexis was conducted using the search
term "CSLI." That search yielded 45 case hits, 11 of which were not in the data base
already and involved the police using a cell phone to track the location of a criminal
suspect. Reading those cases yielded one more case that had not been found through
earlier efforts.
Ultimately, a database of 82 court cases in which the government's use of CSLI
was at issue was compiled.18 2 The earliest case was decided in 2004.183 Of the 82 cases,
only sixteen came from state courts, and only eight came from the United States Courts of
Appeals. No United States Supreme Court case has addressed this issue and, at the time of
this writing, no petition for certiorari has been granted. One case has been appealed to the
state supreme court of Florida.8 4
In addition to case name and citation, the level of court, whether the case arose in
the state or federal systems, whether the trial court suppressed the data or refused to grant
the order, the length of time of the surveillance, information about the basis for the search,
and the rationale of the decision was recorded. Whether the order or opinion cited to U. S.
v. Jones and Katz v. U. S., the type of crime in question, and whether the request was for
historical CSLI, real time CSLI, or a ping were recorded as well.
It should be noted that most of the motions to suppress were not granted. 26 of
the 82 cases, or 32 percent ultimately resulted in suppression of the evidence, which
means that the government was able to use the evidence in 68 percent of the cases. It did
"' 620 F.3d 304, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2010). This case was chosen because it was, at the time, the first United States
Court of Appeals decision known to the authors on this issue.
182

See infra Appendix A.

U.S. v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), appealdocketed, No. SCl1-2254, 2013 Fla. LEXIS
215 (Jan. 28, 2013).
183

184

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol4/iss1/6

86

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue

USING TECHNOLOGY THE FOUNDERS NEVER DREAMED OF

20141

81

not matter much whether the issue was before a state or a federal court, as the government
was successful in 11 of the 16, or 69 percent, of state cases and in 45 of the 66, or 68
percent, of cases heard in federal courts. Table 1 shows the number of cases and who won
by type of jurisdiction.
Table 1: Number of Cases by Who Won and Type of Jurisdiction
Defendant Won

State Won

Total

21
(32%)

45
(68%)

66
(80%)
16
(20%)

Federal Courts
State Courts

5

11

(31%)
26
(32%)

(69%)
56
(68%)

82
(100%)

There also was no clear pattern based on the time the case was heard, but it
should be noted that defendants were more successful in cases heard in 2005 (86%), 2006
( 6 0%), and 2010 (44%) than in other years. It should also be noted that the government

was successful in more than 80 percent of cases decided after 2010. Table 2 shows the
distribution of cases by year.
The pattern of results is fairly clear. Criminal defendants challenging the use of
CSLI were often successful in the earliest cases to be brought, but not in the most recent
cases. All of the early cases came from federal courts and no clear geographic pattern
appears. Defendants were successful in The District of Columbia,'1 5 Indiana,186
Maryland,'8 7 and Wisconsin.'s Some defendants were successful and some were not in
New York'" and Texas.' 90 Defendants were not successful in Louisiana,' 9 ' Ohio,1 9 2 and

&

115 In re Applications of the United States for Orders Authorizing the
Disclosure of Cell Cite Info., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43736, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); In re the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.D.C. 2005).
186 In re the Application of the United States for an
Order: Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register,
No. 1:06-MC-6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45643, at *14-15 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006).
In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 457
(D. Md. 2006); In re the Application of the United States for Orders Authorizing Installation & Use of Pen
Registers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (D. Md. 2006); In re the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005).
In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site
Info., No. 06-MISC-004 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006).
189 Compare In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a
Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), andIn re the Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap & Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585)111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2006), with In re Application of United
States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
190 Compare In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005), and In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1)
Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 836-37 (S.D. Tex.
2006), with In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
191 In re the Application of United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register
Trap & Trace Device, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682-83 (W.D. La. 2006).
192 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2004).
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West Virginia.' 93 In those early cases in which the evidence was allowed to be used, often
the judges cited the lack of precision of the data,' 94 the lack of standing of the
defendant,195 or the fact that the defendant's location was only tracked while he was on
public streets.196
97
Table 2: Cases by Year Decided

Defendant Won

State Won

Total

2004

0
(0%)

1
(100%)

1

2005

6
(86%)
6
(60%)
1
(25%)
1
(33%)
1
(20%)
4
(44%)
2
(20%)
2
(13%)
3
(13%)

1
(14%)
4
(40%)
3
(75%)
2
(67%)
4
(80%)
5
(56%)
8
(80%)
13
(87%)
15
(83%)

7

26
(32%)

56
(68%)

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

10
4
3

9
10
15
18
82
(100%)

One thing that does appear in cases decided before 2009 are rulings on an
apparently concerted effort by the Justice Department to craft arguments that no warrant is
required in order for the government to access CSLI. The notion was that the Stored
Communications Act,"" together with the Pen Register Statute'99 and the
193 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register
with Caller Identification Device, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D.W. Va. 2006).
194 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States or an Order, 411 F.
Supp. 2d at 680.
195 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register,
415 F. Supp. 2d at 664-66.
196 Forest, 355 F.3d
at 950-51.
197 While the limits of the Chi-Square statistic do not allow for the calculation of an accurate measurement of the
probability that the distribution of cells occurred randomly when so many cells have very small numbers of
cases, the authors did collapse the year variable into three categories - 2004 to 2006, 2007 to 2010, and 2011 to
2013, and ran a chi-Square analysis of that contingency table. The result was statistically significant at the .001
level. We are convinced that the differences by year were not random. There is a strong association between time
and outcomes.
198 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2712 (West 2014).
'99 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-3127 (West 2014).
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Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 2 0 0 would justify access to pretty
much any type of cell phone data. Most courts rejected this "hybrid theory," 2 0 1 although
two courts in New York did not.2 02 The tone of one DC judge's order was notable in
admonishing the prosecutors, "I am afraid that I find the government's chimerical
approach unavailing. Indeed, and to keep the animal metaphor going, it reminds one of the
wag who said a camel is a horse planned by a committee."2 03
Many of these judges in early cases were convinced by arguments that the use of
CSLI is the same as the use of a tracking device such as was used in the Karo and Knotts
cases.204 This argument lost its potency as more of these kinds of cases made their way
through the courts, but no obvious reason has emerged from our analysis for why this
changed. It is entirely possible that as judges have become more familiar with such cases,
they have changed the way that they perceive the culpability of criminals who use their
cellular phones in the pursuit of their criminal goals, resulting in more denials of motions
to suppress. It is also plausible that judges have come to believe that cell phone users are
aware of the data collection that occurs with their use and accept this reality when making
decisions about what expectations of privacy are reasonable. Regardless of the reason, the
trend in this area of the law in federal court is in favor of the state.
Given the comments made by Justices Sotomayor and Alito in their concurring
opinions in U. S. v. Jones that the long term tracking of the suspect was of constitutional
significance, the question of whether the length of the surveillance in question is well
worth an investigation. 205 In the 43 cases for which this information was known, the
average length of surveillance for the twelve cases in which the defendant was successful
in getting evidence suppressed was 44 days. For the 31 cases for which this information
was known and in which the defendant was not successful in getting the evidence
suppressed, the average length of time of the surveillance was 66 days. If the courts are
concerned that long term surveillance is a violation of the privacy of suspects, one would

47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2014).
See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen
Register and/or Trap & Trace for Mobile IdentificationNo. (585)111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y.
2006); In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re the
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller
Identification Sys. On Tel. Nos. [Sealed] & [Sealed], 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005).
202 In re: Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain
Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re an Application of the United States for an Order
Re-Authorizing (1) The Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device with Prospective Cell-Site Info., No. M08-533, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
203 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info.,
407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.D.C. 2005).
204 See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a
Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 837; See, e.g., In re the Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register &/or Trap & Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585) 111-1111, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
205 In his opinion in U. S v. Graham, Judge Bennett, in referring to his interpretation
of the opinions in U.S. v.
Jones, said, "Accordingly, it appears as though a five justice majority is willing to accept the principle that
government surveillance over time can implicate an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy." 846 F. Supp.
2d 384, 394-404 (D. Md. 2012) (referencing 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)); See, also, In re an Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., No. Il-MC-0113, 2011 U. S. Dist.
LEXIS 15457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (explaining that length of time of continuous monitoring is key in
determining whether probable cause is required to justify the release of CSLI.)
200
201
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hypothesize that longer periods of continuous surveillance would result in the courts being
20 6
more reluctant to approve the search. This hypothesis is not supported by this analysis.
One point that is worth mentioning is how these lower courts have responded to
the decision in U. S. v. Jones. Interestingly, the trespass standard that Justice Scalia
advocated has been of virtually no import to the lower court judges deciding these
cases. 2 0 7 U.S. Magistrate Judge Orenstein (S.D.N.Y.), well known and often cited for his
early opinions in this area of the law, explicitly argued that cell phone tracking cases
needed to be re-examined after the DC Circuit issued its decision in UnitedStates v.
Maynard, the case that would become United States v. Jones. The factors that were of the
most import to these re-examinations of the cell phone tracking jurisprudence were: 1) the
idea that use of the phone to track a person over an extended period of time was of greater
constitutional significance than a ping or tracking over a brief time period; and 2) the
distinction between historical and real time, or prospective, CSLI.208 Several cases arising
in New York, Massachusetts, and Texas did address the issue of tracking over time,209 but
no consensus has emerged regarding the length of time that triggers the treatment of cell
phone CSLI in the same way as the installation of a GPS tracking device.2 10
Several of the cases in the data made specific points about the distinction
between historical CSLI and real time CSLI. For example, in U. S v. Moreno-Navarez,
the judge stated, "This Court joins the Third and Fifth Circuits, as well as the majority of
the courts to address this issue . . . in concluding that there is no 'reasonable expectation
of privacy' in historical cell site data."211 In U. S. v. Graham, the court went to great
lengths to argue that the instant case was very different that the facts in U. S. v. Jones2 12
and that historical CSLI can be handled differently than real time CSLI or a tracking
device.2 By contrast, some courts have ruled that where the police intend to use a cell
phone to track the location of suspect using the global positioning function of the phone or
if they intend to use CSLI to triangulate the location of a suspect, then that is the same as
the use of a dedicated tracking device such as was used in U. S. v. Jones.214 At least one
A difference of means test was conducted and the difference between the two means was not statistically
significant.
207 Jones was only cited by 24 of the 36 of the cases
in the database that were decided after January of 2012,
when the decision in Jones was issued. Some criminal defendants attempted to get new hearings on suppression
motions in the aftermath of the Jones decision. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, No. 09-153-02, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188445, at *2 (D.D.C. 2012).
208 In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell
Site Info., 736 F
Supp 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y 2010).
209 See, e.g., id. at 578-79 (58 days); See, e.g., In re an Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing
the Release of Historical Cell Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (113 days); See, e.g., In re an
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 2011 U. S.
Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *6 (21 days); See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to
Title 18, U.S.C. § 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2012)
(210 days); See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827,
840 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (60 days).
210 It should be noted that on remand, Antoine Jones's motion to suppress 120 days of CSLI evidence was not
granted. United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 216 (D.D.C. 2012). The court refused to decide the issue on
the merits, citing to the Good Faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule. Id. at 215.
211 No. 13-CR-0841-BEN, 2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *4-6
(S.D. Cal. 2013).
212 United Statesv. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945 (2012).
213 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 394-404
(D. Md. 2012).
214 See, e.g., In re the Application of the United States for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register
Trap & Trace Device, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579-80 (W.D. Tex. 2010); In re the Application of the United States
for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Info., No. 06-MICS-004, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73324, at *13-16 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
&
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federal court has ruled that access to prospective, or "real time" CSLI always requires a
warrant,2 15 and one court expressly stated that citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their movements. 216
Table 3 shows the cross-tabulation of the type of information sought by the government
with the outcome of the motion to suppress.
2 17
Table 3: Success of Motion to Suppress by Type of Information Requested

Historical CSLI

Defendant Won
7

State Won
27

(21%)

(79%)

Real time CSLI

18

19

(49%)

(51%)

Total
34
37
1

25

46

71

(35%)

(65%)

(100%)

X2

= 6.115, p<.05*

The differences are statistically significant. In the aggregate, judges are more
reluctant to grant access to real time CSLI than historical CSLI data. The reasons for this
seem fairly clear. Access to locational data wherein the suspect is in a private space can be
protected by a judge via redacting those parts of the CSLI records when the order is
initially granted. By contrast, an order for real time or prospective CSLI inherently grants
access to the suspect's location for the entire time of the order, regardless of whether the
suspect is in a private space or not. Some courts have used the terms like "intimate
portrait" to describe the consequences of granting the government complete access to a
person's location during a given time period. 218 Regardless, the key difference seems to be
the ability to protect against access to a person's location when he or she is in a private
space.
But the quantitative analysis does not reveal the full story of this area of the law.
As with all analysis of case opinion data, sometimes the quantitative analysis leaves out
important parts of the story. In this case, there are several interesting points. For example,
there were a number of cases in which the court considered the application of the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to cell phone tracking cases.219 Because the police
often had little idea what was allowed and what the legal standards are in this area of the
law, once they had relied in good faith on a court order, the courts often allowed the
evidence to be admitted, even when they had doubts about the validity of the search. 22 0
In re the Application of the United States for an Order Relating to Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940
(N.D. Ill. 2009).
216 See In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing
Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2008) vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
217 For purposes of computing the Chi-Square statistic, cases in which only
a ping was involved were omitted and
cases in which both historical and real time CSLI were sought we treated as requests for real time CSLI.
218 See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010); See also, In re an Application of the
United States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (depicting the tracking motion of an individual as an "intimate picture" of his movements).
219 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-26 (1984).
220 See United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2013); See United States v. Espudo, 954 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1043-44 (S.D. Cal. 2013); See United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 793 (E.D. Mich.
2013); See People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S. 2d 868, 879-80 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 2013).
215
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Additionally, some courts simply used the concept of good faith to avoid deciding the
Fourth Amendment issue.22
A key split of authority in this area of the law has to do with the impact of Smith
v. Maryland 2 2 2 The holding in that case was that suspects have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily provided to third parties, such as phone service
providers, that is not considered content. 2 23 Thus, phone numbers dialed and cell towers
contacted are not subject to any limits in terms of police use. A number of judges have
declared that cell phone users have no privacy interests in the numbers they dial, the
location of the cell towers that their phones contact, or in historical cell site location
information. 224 All of these judges have relied heavily on the Smith v. Maryland
225
opinion. Many rely heavily on the idea that these location data have been voluntarily
given to the service provider who keeps them as a business record and that the defendant
226
has no standing to argue for the exclusion of the evidence.
The decision in Riley v. California2 2 7 may shed some light on this issue. The
Court dismissed the claim that accessing the call logs stored on a cell phone is no different
22 8
than using a pen register as was done in Smith v. Maryland.
Coupled with the Court's
detailed description of the qualitative difference between a cell phone and other types of
personal possessions, the third party doctrine is potentially weakened by the decision.
Earlier cases had held that cell phone service subscribers did not have full
knowledge of the extent to which they were providing data to the cell phone service
229
provider. More recently, a trial court judge in Texas held that the changes in the
technology are such that the courts should rethink the issue of reasonable expectation of
privacy in the context of cell phone usage.230 The issue boils down to two real questions:
221 See, for example, United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 214 (D.D.C.
2012), which was a subsequent
proceeding to the famous case of the same name; See also United States v. Muniz, H-12-221, 2013 WL 391161,
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2013).
222 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
223 Id at 744-46.
224 See, e.g., United Statesv. Moreno-Nevarez, No. 13-CR-0841-BEN,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *3-5

&

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., In Re Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610-11 (5th Cir. 2013); See, e.g., United States v. Madison, No. 11.60285-CRROSENBAUM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105527, at *22-27 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012); See, e.g., United Statesv.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (D. Md. 2012) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., State v. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488,
509-10 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (historical CSLI & numbers dialed); See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR
86, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453, at *7-8 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (cell towers); See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 25
So. 3d 632, 634-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (historical CSLI); See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No.
1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622, at *24-28 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008) (cell towers
historical CSLI).
225 See cases cited Supra note 224 excluding Moreno-Nevarez.
226 United Statesv. Ruby, No. 12-1073, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *17-18 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013). The
most unexamined statement of this point found in these cases was made in UnitedStates v. Gordon, No. 09-15302, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188445, at *4-5 (examining the reasonable expectation of privacy when voluntarily
revealing information to a third party).
227 Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
_, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212 (June 25, 2014).
228 Id, slip op.
at *24.
229 See, for example, Judge Orenstein's oft cited opinion in the case
of In re an Application ofthe U.S. for an
Order(1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & TraceDevice, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322-23
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Unlike dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not 'voluntarily conveyed' by the user to the
phone company. As we have seen, it is transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely
independent of the user's input, control, or knowledge.").
230 See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp.
2d 827, 845-46 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
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1) just how much do cell phone users really know about the data they are providing to the
government via their cell phones; and, 2) just how much choice does anyone have if they
want to stay connected with the rest of the world. The answer to that second issue has as
much to do with what subjective expectations of privacy we have in a world that is
increasingly interconnected by all sorts of hand held devices that are capable of
communicating with the internet and with the rest of the world. It is the issue that Justice
Sotomayor raised in her concurrence in Jones, when she said "I for one doubt that people
would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of
every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year." 231 Chief Justice
Roberts expressly addressed the potential for invasion of privacy with regard to browser
232
history in his opinion in Riley v. California.
He wrote fairly extensively about the
pervasiveness of cell phones in Americans' lives. 233 He also cited Justice Sotomayor's
opinion in Jones favorably on the issue of location information.234
In the absences of any clear standard on this issue, federal courts turn to the good
faith doctrine235 to avoid the issue or find enough facts to rule in favor of the government
based on the absence of any search of a public space236 or they rely on the third party
doctrine to argue that the suspect has no expectation of privacy in records maintained by
the cell phone service provider. 23 7 One state trial court has held that warrantless use of
238
CSLI by the police was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. One state supreme
court,239 one state appellate court,240 and two state trial courts in Massachusetts,241 have
decided that their state constitutions provide enough protection to mandate that police
establish probable cause before using a cell phone to track a suspect. Other state courts
have ruled that the suspect did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while
242
traveling on public streets. One state appellate court has held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. 2 4 3
How you fare as a criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence of your
location gained from a warrantless search of your cell phone records depends on where
you are. Admittedly, there does not seem to be any clear pattern based on region or
political culture of the state. Defendants in Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
or Pennsylvania enjoy greater privacy rights. 244 Defendants in state courts in California,245

231
232
233

United Statesv. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at *19 (June 25, 2014).
id.

Id., slip op. at *20.
It should be noted that some of these courts have expressed doubts about the validity of the searches in
question. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 783 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 773, 781 (6th Cir.
2012) (giving an example of how some judges
have ruled that the CSLI did not cover any time in which the suspect was in a private space and that thus there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy).
237 See, e.g., U. S. v. Ruby, 2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *15 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Contra, State v.
Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (showing that the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected the third
party doctrine).
238 Commonwealthv. Pitt, No. NOCV2010-00061, 2012 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 39, at *19 (Feb. 23, 2012).
239 Earls, 70 A.3d
at 644.
240 Commonwealthv. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939,
954-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)
241 Commonwealthv. Wyatt, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 248, at
*28 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2012);
Commonwealthv. Augustine, 2013 Mass. Super. LEXIS 116, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013).
242 See, e.g., Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); See also, People v. Hall, 86 A.D.3d
450, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
243 Louisianav. Marinello, 49 So. 3d 488, 510
(La. Ct. App. 2010)
244 See cases cited supra
note 12.
234
235
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Florida,246 Georgia,247 Louisiana,24 8 Nevada,249 or New York,250 have not fared as well,
depending on the facts of their cases. In the federal courts, judges in the Eastern District of
Michigan 251' and the Northern District of Illinois 25 2 have ruled in favor of defendants, but
not so in Georgia, 253 Maryland, 25 4 or Ohio. 25 5 In the Southern District of California it may
depend on whether you are trying to suppress historical or real time CSLI.256 The Third257
and Fifth 258 Circuits have expressly ruled that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in historical CSLI, although there are some judges in Texas that are more
sympathetic. 25 9 In federal court in New York, it may depend on the judge you get.260
People v. Fernandez, No. B214476, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1931, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar 16, 2011).
Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Mitchell v. Florida, 25 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
247 Devega v.State, 689 S.E.2d 293,
301 (Ga. 2010).
245
246

248

Marinello, 49 So. 3d at 490.

Zuniga v. State, No 58267, 2012 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1626, at *5-6 (Nev. Nov. 29, 2012). Please note that
this is an unpublished opinion which, according to the header, has no precedential value.
250 People v. Hall, 86 A.D.3d 450, 451-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); People
v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 881
249

(N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2013).
251 United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759,
764 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
252 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Relating to
Target Phone 2, 733 F. Supp. 2d 939, 939
(N.D. Ill. 2009).
253 United Statesv. Booker, No. 1:11-cr-00255-TWT-RGV, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188404, at *3 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008).
254 United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d
384, 385 (D. Md. 2012).
255 United States v. Dye, No. 1: 10CR221, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287, at *25 -26 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011).
256 See United Statesv. Moreno-Navarez, No. 13-CR-0841-BEN, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143900, at *4-5 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (denying motion to suppress the warrantless search of historical CSLI); United States v.
Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034-1045 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a motion to suppress the warrantless search
of CSLI data by holding that, although a warrant to obtain real-time CSLI data must be supported by probable
cause, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case); United States v. Ruby, No.
12CRIO73 WQH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18997, at *18-21 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (denying motionto
suppress evidence obtained with a warrant for historical cell phone records); United States v. Reyes, No.
09CR2487-MMA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134866, at *7-11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (denying the defendant's
argument that if his attorney had moved to suppress the historical CSLI, it was reasonably likely that the court
would have granted the motion).
257 In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2010).
258 In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 608-15
(5th Cir. 2013). The
Tenth Circuit has not directly ruled, but has stated in dicta that a ping is a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has ruled
that tracking a suspect through his pay-as-you-go cell phone while on public roads, but not while the suspect was
in any private places, was not a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 771, 777-81
(6th Cir. 2012).
259 See, e.g., In re the Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d
827, 840-45 (S.D.
Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
260 Compare, e.g., In re the Application of the United S. for Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d
578, 578-79, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (requiring the government to obtain a warrant before acquiring an order
for CSLI), with In re Smarphone Geolocation Data Application, 13-MJ-242, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62605, at
*12-22 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013) (holding that a warrant can issue if the government has probable cause to
believe that geolocation data would aid in a defendant's apprehension, and defendant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy if they agreed with their carrier that their geolocation information could be provided
without consent), and United States v. Gilliam, No. 11 Crim. 1083, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130248, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (denying motion to suppress CSLI evidence because the Stored Communications Act
permits disclosure in emergency situations), and In re Application of United States for Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., No. Il-MC-0113, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457, at *3-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (granting an
order for CSLI data without a warrant because the records requested were from different phones in short
durations of time, instead of one long period), andIn re Application of Order Re-Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009) ("[T]he
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Federal courts in Utah and New York have allowed warrantless access to CSLI under the
exigent circumstances provisions of the Stored Communications Act. 2 6 ' The Good Faith
argument fades in usefulness over time because more and more cases are being decided in
the federal districts and the authorities are more and more aware of the evolving legal
arguments. This is not an acceptable state of affairs on such an important issue. The
legitimacy of the courts is at stake.
PART VI: A CLEAR LEGAL STANDARD THAT PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND
INFORMS THE POLICE WHAT THEY CAN AND CANNOT DO

It is very clear that the current state of affairs is undesirable. The police are not
sure what they can and cannot do. Judges faced with requests to grant orders directing cell
phone service providers to release CSLI data, or with motions to suppress evidence, are
not sure what the legal standard is, but have a wealth of conflicting precedents to follow.
The federal courts have been highly likely to grant access to such information in the last
three years based largely on the notion that everyone knows that they are giving locational
data to their cell phone provider, but there is an argument to be made that the continued
practice of allowing, as most federal courts do, access to historical CSLI virtually on
demand goes against the grain of our history with regard to privacy. Do we really, as a
society, want to make giving the government permission to track our movements on
demand a condition for the use of a cell phone? It is not at all clear that doing so is in
accord with public opinion. Chief Justice Roberts' extensive section on the pervasiveness
of cell phones and the unique and sensitive nature of the information that can be accessed
if one controls a person's cell phone in Riley v. California262is encouraging for advocates
of digital freedom, but the legal standard for determining when and on what basis the
police may obtain access to CSLI is still unclear. Within a day of the ruling, the news
media reported that the authorities in Chicago, Illinois, were contemplating what the
ruling means for their current warrantless use of cell site simulators to track the locations
of the cell phones of suspects.2 63
This is not the case in five states. By statute in Maine and Montana, and by court
decision in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the courts know that such
orders may only issue based on probable cause and that exclusion of evidence in the
appropriate remedy. There is no confusion in these jurisdictions. They do not have to
distinguish between historical CSLI, real time CSLI, and locational pings, all of which can
plausibly be adjudicated based on differing standards in the current practice outside of
those five states.
Additionally, the issue of who owns data generated by the use of a cell phone
needs to be addressed. If the courts simply argue that all historical CSLI is a business
record maintained and owned by the service provider, the cell phone user is left with little
or no recourse. Abuses of government authority under the various statutes that might be
used do not have a remedy. Several courts have expressly held that the remedy for

government may obtain prospective cell-site information without a showing of probable cause under the 'hybrid
theory,' a combination of the authority of the Pen Register Statute and the Stored Communications Act.").
261 United Statesv. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013); Gilliam, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130248,
at *5.
262 573 U.S. _,
Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. § III(B)(1) at *17-21 (June 25, 2014)..
263 Stacy St. Clair and Jeremy Gorner, CourtRuling May Affect Cell Tracking
by Chicago Police, Chicago
Tribune (June 25, 2014, 10:22 pm), (last visited, June 27, 2014) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ctchicago-cell-side-met-20 140626,0,4653045.story.
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violation of the Stored Communications Act does not include exclusion of evidence. 2 6 4
Moreover, cell phone users do not routinely scan the minutiae of their contract with the
provider to find the buried provision relating to who owns the data or whether the service
provider will release said data to law enforcement or any other third party.265 What this
approach leaves is a system in which the government can access CSLI on virtually any
cell phone user on a showing of less than probable cause. One has to question the values
implicit in a doctrine of law that permits the government to snoop on private citizens with
little or no oversight by the courts. 266 While the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
standard has problems, a clear statement that Americans have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phone records, something that Justice Bowes did say in his opinion in
Pennsylvania v. Rushing,267 would be much more consistent with core Fourth Amendment
values.
One might argue that requiring a warrant and limiting the application of Smith v.
Marylandwould potentially leave people in danger. In cases like Pennsylvania v. Rushing
where an innocent person was in great danger of harm if the armed and murderous suspect
could not be located and apprehended quickly, it makes sense to allow cell phone service
providers to offer such access to the police immediately. The courts in both Pennsylvania
and New Jersey have made it abundantly clear that the public safety exception, as laid out
in New York v. Quarles,2681 would allow for the admission of such evidence based on
probable cause and exigent circumstances, and two federal courts have allowed the use of
269
CSLI under an exigent circumstances rationale. In the majority opinion in Riley v.
California, Chief Justice Roberts was clear in stating that the Smith v. Maryland precedent
would not be binding on the issue of accessing call logs stored on a cell phone,270 but also
271
included a section on exigent circumstances.
Perhaps the most compelling argument for a clear standard to be established is
the need for the courts to come to terms with the set of expectations that Americans have
with regard to the nature of data generated by cell phones and with the impact that cellular
phone technology has on our democracy. It is very hard in today's world to exist without a
cell phone and getting harder to actually own anything other than a smart phone, which
poses greater privacy risks than a traditional flip phone. A decision to continue to adhere
to the third party records doctrine of Smith v. Maryland272 means that the government has
the ability to track the location of virtually everyone over the age of 12 in the country with
almost no legal recourse on the part of the person being tracked. The sweeping opinion in
Riley v. Californiais not inconsistent with this point of view.

E.g., United States v. Booker, No. 1:11-cr-00255-TWT-RGV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188404, at *47-48
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2012); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111622, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2008).
265 But see U.S. v. Carabello, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 348-49 (D. Vt. 2013), in which the court cited to service
provider Sprint's terms and conditions and privacy policy regarding when they would release locational data in
emergency circumstances, as a factor in favor of ruling for the government.
266 See, e.g., Steven J. Schulhofe. More Essential than Ever: The FourthAmendment in the
Twenty-First
Century. New York: Oxford University Press 2012.
267 71 A.3d 939, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
268 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1984) (finding a "public safety" exception to the requirement
that police read Miranda rights to a suspect).
269 See cases cited supra note 261.
270 573 U.S.
_, Nos. 13-132 and 13-212, slip op. at 24 (June 25, 2014).
271 Id. at *26-27.
272 See 442 U.S. 735, 742-43
(1979).
264
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We are not enamored of arguments that purport to decipher the collective intent
of the founders, but it is hard to imagine that a nation founded on the principles of liberty
and freedom would countenance a society in which the pre-condition for participation in
the social and business life of the nation is to give to the government the ability to track
your location at all times. We are certain that the trespass standard that Justice Scalia
would apply to such rulings is poorly adapted to the task, inconsistent with the line of
cases that have been decided since 1967, and would result in the loss of freedom for
Americans since it would result in the government gaining the ability to track the locations
of anyone with a cell phone with little or no judicial supervision.
We are also not unsympathetic to the potential for conservative commentators to
argue that we are simply proposing another way for activist judges to further a liberal
agenda. It is true that one could argue that this is a policy matter that should be handled
by the Congress. A statutory standard like that enacted in Maine and Montana would
certainly accomplish the same goal of predictability and protection of rights without
unduly hampering the ability of the police to enforce the criminal laws. Given the current
state of affairs in the U. S. Congress, it seems unlikely that any such legislation will result
any time soon. In addition, a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution is preferable
because it will have more staying power in that shifts in the political winds would not
change how the standard is applied.27 3 Subsequent Congresses would be unable to repeal
such a decision. In the meantime, however, the courts will be faced with an increasing
number of these cases and judges must decide them as best they can.

' Justice Alito, in section II of his concurring opinion in Riley v. California, makes the opposite argument, that
the privacy of cell phone data is a matter potentially well suited to action by Congress.
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Appendix A
List of Cell Phone Tracking Cases

274

US v. Forest

2004

355 F.3d 942; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
1139; 2004 FED App. 0032P (6th Cir.)

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States for an Order (1)
Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace
Device and (2) Authorizing Release
of Subscriber Information and/or
Cell Site Information

2005

396 F. Supp. 2d294; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27480 (ED NY)

In Re Application of the United
States of America for an Order for

2005

405 F. Supp. 2d 435; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33754 (SD NY)

2005

396 F. Supp. 2d 747; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24497 (SD TEX)

2005

402 F. Supp. 2d 597; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29883 (MD 2005)

Disclosure of Telecommunications
Records and Authorizing the Use of
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace

In Re Application for Pen Register
and Trap/Trace Device with Cell

Site Location Authority
In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and a
Caller Identification System on
Telephone Numbers [sealed] and
[sealed] and the Production of Real
Time Cell Site Information

Table created with the findings from the research described supraPart V
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In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

2005

407 F. Supp. 2d 132; 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34616 (DDC)

2005

415 F. Supp. 2d 211; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7653 (WD NY)

2005

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43736 (DC)

2006

411 F. Supp. 2d 678; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3392 (WD LA)

2006

460 F. Supp. 2d 448; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76822 (SD NY 2006)

93

Order Authorizing the Release of
Prospective Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and/or
Trap and Trace for Mobile
Identification Number (585) 111-

1111 and the Disclosure of
Subscriber and Activity Information
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703

In the Matter of Applications of the

United States of America for Orders
Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell
Cite Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States for an Order: (1)

Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; and (2) Authorizing Release
of Subscriber Information and/or
Cell Site Information

In re: Application of the United
States for an Order for Prospective

Cell Site Location Information on a
Certain Cellular Telephone
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the United States of America for an
order: (1) Authorizing the
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2006

433 F. Supp. 2d 804; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40856 (SD TEX)

2006

439 F. Supp. 2d 456; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59845 (MD)

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73324 (ED WI)

2006

441 F. Supp. 2d 816; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56332 (SD TEX)

Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device,
and (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber and Other Information

In the Matter of the Application for
an Order Authorizing the Installation

and Use of a Pen Register and
Directing the Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records for the
Cellular Phone Assigned the
Number [SEALED]

In the Matter of the Application of

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing (1) Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap
and Trace Device or Process, (2)
Access to Customer Records, and (3)
Cell Phone Tracking
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In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing the Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure
of Location Based Services; In the
Matter of the Application of the
United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing the Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Location of Cell Site
Origination and/or Termination

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45643 (ND
Indiana)

In re Application of the United

2006

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11747 (SD NY)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for
Orders Authorizing the Installation
and Use of Pen Registers and Caller
Identification Devices on Telephone
Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed]

2006

416 F. Supp. 2d 390; 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7345 (MD)

In the Matter of the Application of

2006

415 F. Supp. 2d 663; 2006 U.S. Dist.

States for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Information on a
Certain Cellular Telephone

the united States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and use of a Pen Register with Caller
Identification Device and Cell Site
Location Authority on a Certain
Cellular Telephone
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In re Application of the United
States of America for Orders
Pursuant to Title 18, United States

[Vol. 4

2007

509 F. Supp. 2d 76; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68339 (Mass 2007)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register Device, a
Trap and Trace Device, and for
Geographic Location Information.

2007

497 F. Supp. 2d 301; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52009 (Puerto Rico 2007)

In re Application for an Order
Authorizing the Extension and Use

2007

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11692 (ED Cal
2007)

2007

622 F. Supp. 2d 411; 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77635 (SD TEX)

2008

632 F. Supp. 2d 202; 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97359 (ED NY)

U. S. v. Suarez-Blanca

2008

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

2008

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622 (ND GA
2008)
534 F. Supp. 2d 585; 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13733 (2008 WD PA)

Code, Section 2703(d)

of a Pen Register Device, etc.

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the

Installation and use of a Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Device, and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber
and Other Information

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Authorizing the Use of Two
Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Devices

Order Directing a Provider of
Electronic Communication Service
to Disclose Records to the
Government

U. S. v. Jenious

2009

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132385 (Ed WI)
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2009

733 F. Supp. 2d 939; 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130713 (ND IL)

U.S. v. Navas

2009

640 F. Supp. 2d 256; 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37464 (SD NY)

In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an
order Re-authorizing (1) The Use of
a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace
Device with Prospective Cell Site
Information; (2) The Release of
historical Cell Site and Subscriber

2009

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55739 (ED NY)

Mitchell v. State of Florida

2009

25 So.3d 632 (2009)

In re US for an Order Directing

2010

620 F3d 304 (3rd cir PA)

2010

736 F. Supp. 2d 578; 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88781 (ED NY)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Relating to Target Phone 2

Information; and (3) Authorizing the

Release of Subscriber Information,
Including Tower/Sector & Msc
Records

Provider of Elec. Commun. To
Disclose Records to the Govt
In the Matter of an Application of
the United States of America for an

Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell Site Information

In re Application of the United

2010

States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data

747 F. Supp. 2d 827; 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 115529 (SD TX)

U. S. v. Benford

2010

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29453 (ND
Indiana, 2010)

In the Matter of the Application of
the United States of America for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device; (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure
of Location Based Services

2010

727 F. Supp. 2d 571; 2010 U.S Dist
LEXIS 77319 (WD TEX 2010)
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2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103385
(KANSAS 2010)
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123188 (MD FL
Fort Myers Division 2010)

U. S. v. Redd

2010

Mitchelly. Vogel

2010

Louisiana v. Marinello

2010

Devega v. The State.

2010

U. S. v. Dye

2011

49 So. 3d 488; 2010 La. App. LEXIS
1331
286 Ga. 448; 689 S.E.2d 293; 2010 Ga.
LEXIS 107; 2010 Fulton County D. Rep.
248; 49 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 635
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47287 (ED OH)

In the Matter of an Application of

2011

809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (ED NY)

2011

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156744 (DC)

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell Site Information

In the Matter of the Application of

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Historical Cell Site Information for
Telephone Number [text redacted by
the court]

In the Matter of an Application of

2011

In Re In the Matter of an Application

849 F. Supp. 2d 526; 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 85638 (Md)

the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Information of a Specified
Wireless Telephone

2011

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457 (ED NY)

2011

444 Fed Appx 517, 2011 U. S. App
LEXIS 18957 (3rd Cir NJ 2011)

of the United States of America for
an Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell-Site Information

U. S. v. Powell
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INTRODUCTION

Charles Dickens penned his famous words "are there no prisons?" in 1843's A
Christmas Carol, as a part of a dialogue between Ebenezer Scrooge and two gentlemen
soliciting donations for the poor.' Two years prior to the release ofA Christmas Carol,
Dorothea Dix began a crusade to reform the treatment of mentally ill inmates after

* Robert Rigg is a professor of law and the director of the Criminal Defense Program at Drake University Law
School. I want to thank my research assistants Ashley Sparks, Meredith Lamberti, and Austin Mouw for their
assistance with this article.
'CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 13 (W. Heinemann ed., Windmill Press 1962) (1843). ("'At this
festive season of the year, Mr. Scrooge,' said the gentleman, taking up a pen, 'it is more than usually desirable
that we should make some slight provision for the Poor and Destitute, who suffer greatly at the present time.
Many thousands are in want of common necessaries; hundreds of thousands are in want of common comforts,
sir."' Scrooge asked, "'Are there no prisons?"' The gentleman replied, "'Plenty of prisons."' With relief, Scrooge
said, "'Oh! I was afraid, from what you said at first, that something had occurred to stop them in their useful
course "')
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witnessing firsthand the abhorrent care those individuals received. 2 Dix's efforts resulted
in the establishment of new hospitals as well as the reorganization and restructuring of
existing hospitals. 3 Dix's observations of "prisoners, chained in dark enclosed spaces,
4
lying in their own filth, without adequate clothing, and abused physically and sexually"
5
motivated her to bring a legal fight. By the end of Dix's efforts in 1880, she had helped
establish a total of 32 mental hospitals. Although 170 years have elapsed since Dix began
her efforts to reform the treatment of mentally ill inmates, not much has changed-and the
public perception of mental illness is still fraught with misunderstanding and fear at best
and disbelief and derision at worst.
The inadequate treatment of inmates with mental illness has continued into
current times. In 1995, a lawsuit filed on behalf of inmates in the California correction
system made its way through the federal court system and to the Supreme Court, which
resulted in the 2011 decision Brown v. Plata. In Brown, the Court found:

2 DorotheaDix,

DICTIONARY UNITARIAN & UNIVERSALIST BIOGRAPHY (January 3, 2003),
http://uudb.org/articles/dorotheadix.html ("In March, 1841, a ministerial student, frustrated with his efforts to
teach a Sunday class for women incarcerated in the East Cambridge jail, thought that a woman might better do
the task. He approached Dix for advice. She decided to teach the class herself What she encountered in the jail
shocked her and changed her life. The jail was unheated. Those incarcerated were not segregated; hardened
criminals, feeble-minded children and the mentally ill all occupied the same quarters. Dix secured a court order
to provide heat and to make other improvements.").
Vasantha Reddi, DorotheaLynde Dix (1802-1887), TRUTH ABOUT NURSING,

http://www.truthaboutnursing.org/press/pioneers/dix.html (last updated August 26, 2005) ("[B]etween 1843 to
1880-the main years that [Dix] spent advocating for the mentally ill-the number of hospitals for the mentally
ill increased almost ten-fold, from 13 to 123. 'Where new institutions were not required, she fostered the
reorganization, enlargement, and restaffing-with well-trained, intelligent personnel-of already existing
hospitals.' This achievement indicates that her work led to vast improvements in the fledgling profession of
nursing. Her efforts eventually resulted in the founding of special facilities for the insane and destitute in the
United States, Canada, and at least 13 European countries. . .") (footnotes omitted).
4 id.

5id.
6id.
Paul Krassner, Behind the Infamous Twinkie Defense, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2008, 02:26 PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-krassner/behind-the-infamous-twink_b_148474.html. The "Twinkie
Defense" is an expression derived from the 1979 trial of Dan White. On November 27, 1978, White assassinated
Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. Id. At his trial, psychiatrist Martin Blinder testified that
White had been depressed at the time of the crime, and he pointed to several behavioral changes indicating
White's depression. Id. "Dale Metcalf, a former member of Ken Kesey's Merry Pranksters who had become a
lawyer, told me how he happened to be playing chess with Steven Scherr, a member of White's legal team.
Metcalf had just read OrthomolecularNutrition by Abram Hoffer. He questioned Scherr about White's diet and
learned that, while under stress, White would consume candy bars and soft drinks. Metcalf recommended the
book to Scherr, suggesting the author as an expert witness. For, in his book, Hoffer revealed a personal vendetta
against doughnuts, and White had once eaten five doughnuts in a row. On the witness stand, psychiatrist Martin
Blinder stated that, on the night before the murders, while White was 'getting depressed about the fact he would
not be reappointed, he just sat there in front of the TV set, binging on Twinkies."' Id. As such, the defense
convinced the jury that White's capacity for rational thought had been diminished at the time of the crime. Id.
The jurors concluded that White was not capable of the premeditation required for murder, and instead, the jury
convicted him of voluntary manslaughter. Id. Public protests over the verdict led to the White Night Riots. See
Paul R. Lynd, JurorSexual Orientation:the Fair Cross- Section Requirement, Privacy, Challengesfor Cause,
andPeremptories,46 UCLAL. REV. 231, 233-34 (Oct. 1998); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING

CRIMINAL LAW § 25.04[A] (Frank R. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) (stating that the acquittal of John Hinkley
caused a national reassessment of the insanity defense, reversing the trend in favor of the American Law
Institute's broadened definition of insanity, and prompting a return to the M'Naghten test); id.§ 25.06[B] (noting
that after the Hinkley acquittal, some state legislatures and courts eliminated the insanity defense).
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011).
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Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive
minimal, adequate care. Because of a shortage of treatment beds,
suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth
sized cages without toilets. A psychiatric expert reported observing an
inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing
in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison
officials explained they had "no place to put him." Other inmates
awaiting care may be held for months in administrative segregation,
where they endure harsh and isolated conditions and receive only
limited mental health services. Wait times for mental health care range
as high as 12 months. In 2006, the suicide rate in California's prisons
was nearly 80% higher than the national average for prison populations;
and a court-appointed Special Master found that 72.1% of suicides
involved "some measure of inadequate assessment, treatment, or
intervention, and were therefore most probably foreseeable and/or
preventable."
The report found that the rate of suicides involving inadequate
assessment, treatment, or intervention had risen to 82% and concluded
that "[t]hese numbers clearly indicate no improvement in this area
during the past several years, and possibly signal a trend of ongoing
deterioration."9
Mental health issues have an enormous impact on the criminal justice system. 10
Mental difficulties usually become apparent upon initial contact with law enforcement,
which may lead to arrest, and tragically at times, death." Individuals with mental health
9 Id. at 1924-25, n.2. (citations omitted).
0

' See Inmate Mental Health, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/IDOJ.shtml

(last visited June 27, 2014) [hereinafter Inmate Mental Health]. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
is part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. This survey indicates "that the rate of mental health problems differ by the type of correctional facility.
In this study a mental health problem was defined as receiving a clinical diagnosis or treatment by a mental
health professional. Inmates in local jails had the highest prevalence of mental problems, with nearly two thirds
of jail inmates (64.2 percent) satisfying the criteria for a mental health problem currently or in the previous year.'
Id.
Inmates with 12-month

Mental Health Problem
100
90

50

20

*State
Pason

Federal
Paison

Local
Jail

Abigail S. Tucker, et al., Responding to Persons with Mental Illness, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Oct.

2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/october-20 11/responding-topersons-with-mental-illness.
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problems do not respond to the normal criminal justice remedies. Thus, sentencing judges
2
are faced with a no-win scenario: short-term incarceration does little good;1 probation is
3
often allowed, but usually unsuccessful;1 and long-term incarceration with the state's
corrections department has equally abysmal results. 1 The prospects for individuals
paroled after incarceration are horrendous.' 5 The prognosis for effective treatment-as
documented by the National Institute for Health and U.S. Department of Justice-is
disheartening.16 Many individuals who are cycled through the criminal justice system have
little hope of being successfully treated and maintaining a stable lifestyle for any extended
period of time.' 7 These results should not surprise those who work in the criminal justice
system.

PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 174463, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf; see also
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH HUM. SERVS,
INTERVENTIONS FOR ADULTS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS WHO ARE INVOLVED WITH THE CRIMINAL
12

JUSTICE SYSTEM (Sep. 13, 2012), http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/406/1259/SMI-in-CJ2 0 120 9 3
System ResearchProtocol_
1 .pdf.
See DITTON, supra note 12.
14 See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, supra note 12.
1"

15 Id.

16 Inmate Mental Health, supra note 10. This survey indicates that less than one-half of inmates with a mental

health issue have ever received treatment. One-third or fewer received mental health treatment after
incarceration. However, these rates differ depending upon the type of correctional facility. Id.

See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
17

Table 1. Recent history and symptoms of mental health problems among prison and jail inmates
Percent of inmates in -

State Prison

Mental health problem
Any mental health problem
Recent history of mental health problem
Told had disorder by mental health professional
Had overnight hospital stay
Used prescribed medications
Had professional mental health therapy
Symptoms of mental health disorders
Major depressive disorder
Mania disorder
Psychotic disorder

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol4/iss1/6

56.2%
24.3%
9.4
5.4
18.0
15.1
49.2%
23.5
43.2
15.4

Federal Prison

44.8%
13.8%
5.4
2.1
10.3
8.3
39.8%
16.0
35.1
10.2

Local Jail

64.2%
20.6%
10.9
4.9
14.4
10.3
60.5%
29.7
54.5
23.9
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So, how did the criminal justice system get put in the position of a de facto
mental health treatment provider? The answer is found in the history of mental health
hospitals, deinstitutionalization, and the application of a 1939 study that coined the term
"Penrose's Law." As the default mental health provider, the criminal justice system has
attempted to deal with mental illness. However, it has been largely ineffective, as
evidenced by inmate deterioration and recidivism rates. The inability of the system to
appropriately handle mental health issues is a significant concern that needs immediate
attention.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MENTAL HEALTH HOSPITALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

State hospitals that treat individuals with mental health disorders have existed
since 1773.18 The call for state hospitals grew out of families' inability to handle mentally
ill individuals and their resulting incarceration in jails or poorhouses.1 9 As Virginia's
Royal Governor stated in 1766:
[A] poor unhappy set of People who are deprived of their Senses and
wander about the Country, terrifying the Rest of their Fellow Creatures.
A legal Confinement, and proper Provision, ought to be appointed for
these miserable Objects, who cannot help themselves. Every civilized
Country has an [sic] Hospital for these People, where they are confined,
maintained and attended by able Physicians, to endeavor to restore them
their lost Reason.2 0
These concerns led to the establishment of the Eastern Lunatic Asylum of Virginia in
1773.21 It was the first hospital to treat mental illnesses in the United States.2 2
The public demand for the creation of state hospitals and asylums grew because
the understanding of the causes of mental health disorders shifted from a religious
23
24
perspective to a more scientific approach. Hospitalization would thus seem to be an
enlightened approach to treating mental illnesses. First, it recognizes mental illnesses as a
health issue. Second, the approach recognizes that families and communities are ill
equipped to care for individuals who are suffering from a serious mental impairment. Yet,

Id. at Table 3. Note: The above table includes "inmates who reported an impairment due to a mental problem."
Id. This data is "based on the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2004, and the
Survey of Inmates in Local Jails, 2002." Id.; see generally Jailsand Prisons: The Nations LargestPsychiatric
Facilities, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER 3-4 (April 2009),

http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/jails
I

andprisons--apr 09.pdf

Lawrence Osborn, From Beauty to Despair:The Rise and Fall of the American State Mental Hospital, 80

PSYCHIATRIC Q. 219, 221 (2009), available at http://www.psychodyssey.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/FromBeauty-to-Despair-The-Rise-and-Fall.pdf
9
Id. at 220.
20

Id.

2 1

Id. at 221.

22

Id.

See id. at 220 ("American colonists looked to religion as an explanation for madness. Mather, a minister in
colonial Massachusetts . . wrote that Satan himself caused turmoil and melancholy.") (footnote omitted). Other
explanations for mental disorders included an "imbalance of humors, blood phlegm, choler (yellow bile) and
black bile." Id.
24 See id. at 221. Benjamin Rush attributed mental disorders
to the vascular system. Id. (citing BENJAMIN RUSH,
MEDICAL INOIUTRTFS AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DTSEASE OF THEMTIND (Kimber & Richardson eds 1812))
23
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25
early institutional treatment for the mentally ill resembled a prison more than a hospital.
" [P]hysicians placed lunatics in the basement of the hospital in barred cells while violent
patients were restrained with straight waistcoats, mad shirts, or iron chains. The hospital
did little to actually treat their insanity." 26

The "moral treatment" was developed in the United States, as attention focused
more on the scientific approach to explain the causes of mental illness. 27 Phillipe Pinel
advanced the theory that mental illnesses have a medical origin, and thus focused on
treatment that cared for the patient without using restraint, bleeding, or seclusion. 28 The
treatment regimen he proposed suggested that the physiological and psychological causes
29
of insanity were curable. Pinel believed that in order to conquer the illness, one must
first gain confidence, hope, and the belief that their treatment will work. 30 Under this style
of treatment "the physician would hold the dominant role in the asylum and would seek to
skillfully break the will of the insane person so he would not object to the treatment the
3
physician prescribed." 1
Even though the moral approach to the treatment of mental illnesses gained
traction, the need for public institutions increased as populations grew.32 By the 1850s, the
increased population and need for institutions led to the development of a selfsustainability model,33 known as the Kirkbride Model.34 Under this model, the "hospital
would be linear with symmetrical wings coming off a central administrative building, with
a minimum of eight wards per wing.3 5 The wings allowed for proper ventilation and light
,36
to reach every part of the hospital ....
Under the Kirkbride Model, it was important to
provide patients with light and visibility to the outside world but also to provide structure
37
and security in the asylum.

'

This model also sought to separate the violent patients from the non-violent
patients, in order to keep peace and reduce agitation of calm patients.3 8 Likewise, this
model took pride in its appearance; it believed that buildings "should impress favorably
not only on the patients," but also on "others who may visit." 39 This "therapeutic beauty"
included "gardens, fountains, trails, and a grandiose architecture . . . .,40 The "plan was to
make the hospital look as attractive and as impressive as possible to reassure and calm the
4
patients, while bolstering support of family members who committed their loved ones."
25
26
27

Id. at 222.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 22 1.

28 Id.

29 Id. (citing PHILIPPE PINEL, A TREATISE ON INSANITY (Davis. London & W. Todd trans., 1806)).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32

Id. at 222.

3 Id.
34

Id. (citing THOMAS KIRKBRIDE, ON THE CONSTRUCTION, ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF
HOSPITALS FOR THE INSANE (1854)).

3 Id.
36 Id.

3 Id.
38 Id.

3 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Funding for institutions also shifted from private donors to public funding,42
allowing for the expansion of existing institutions as well as the building of new
facilities.4 3 With the confluence of the medical model for mental health treatment, the
creation of institutions dedicated to it (and public funding), treatment in an asylum for the
mentally ill was the "consensus among the public and medical community."
Unfortunately, by the end of the nineteenth century, public institutions found
themselves underfunded and grossly overpopulated. One article noted:
As the population increased in America, so did the insane. In 1860 the
population of the United States was 31.4 million and the patient
population in asylums was roughly 8,500. By 1890 the population in the
United States doubled to 63 million and the patient population in
asylums increased nine fold to 75,000. Asylums, from their very
beginning, faced increased pressure to expand. Growth of population led
to larger asylums being constructed which had a toll on the ability to
control regimen and moral treatment. Asylums sometimes had a patient
census that was triple what the institution was designed for. Without the
ability to control regimen and moral treatment slipping, asylum care
suffered as well.4 6
The increasing population led to a shift in treatment away from an institutional focus to
custodial institutionalization (i.e., warehousing the mentally ill).47 This change was driven
by both the lack of funding of the institutions and the disillusionment with the moral
treatment because the mentally ill were not cured. Thus, the treatment model morphed
into the custodial model.
In the custodial model, inadequate funding and overcrowding led to an inevitable
lack of treatment, or in the worst situations, abuse:
[S]tates had to rely, heavily, on the state hospital; it was difficult to
ignore the great amount of distress that was occurring with custodial
care.... With a doctor ratio sometimes of 1 to 500, and a nurse ratio of
1 to 1,320, there was little treatment that could be properly administered.
. . Whether it was from lack of care, no care, or high use of physical
and chemical restraint because of understaffing, abuses occurred.4 9
With the explosion in the number of patients at state hospitals came the development and
implementation of new therapies such as "insulin therapy, electroshock therapy
(electroconvulsive therapy, ECT), hydrotherapy, psychotherapy and lobotomy."50 The

42

Id. at 223 (footnote omitted).

43 Id. ("By 1880, almost 140 asylums were built and by 1890 at least 70 were constructed according to the

Kirkbride Model.").
44

45
46

47

Id. at 224.

Id. at 225-26.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 227.

48 Id.
49 Id.
5

o Id at 228
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therapies were employed despite physicians not understanding why or how such therapies
worked.
Due to the deplorable conditions,5 2 and as result of underfunding, the movement
to deinstitutionalization and community-based treatment took hold post-World War II. 5 3
With the addition of new psychotropic drugs in the 1950s the move toward communitybased treatment was further fuelled;5 4 along with the legal doctrine of least restrictive
alternative for mental health commitments, deinstitutionalization became the new norm.55
Although deinstitutionalization forged ahead, little attention, and much less funding, was
56
given to state-supported, community-based mental health services. The result was a
transformation of patients in state hospitals to mentally ill inmates in jails and prisons.
Sadly, this result was predicted over a decade earlier.

III.

PENROSE'S LAW

In 1939, researcher Lionel Penrose published a study from 18 European countries
that found an inverse relationship between the number of beds in state mental health
facilities and prison populations. Simply put, Penrose's Law states that a reduction of
mental health beds increases the number of mentally ill prisoners. 8 Penrose also predicted
an increase in crime rates with the reduction of mental health facilities.5 9
The predictive value of Penrose's Law has been fleshed out by several studies. 60
One Canadian study stated:
In 1955, there were 559,000 state hospital beds for a population of 164
million people. By 1994, there were only 72,000 state hospital beds for a
population of 250 million people. The beds per 100,000 people had
dropped dramatically from 339 to 29. Contemporaneously, the number
51 Id. "Psychosurgery for example, specifically the lobotomy, was developed by Egas Moniz and
widely

popularized by Walter Freeman. Freeman spent much time and effort campaigning that his tmnsorbital lobotomy
procedure was successful. The outcomes were mixed, with some producing death, but Freeman claimed the
success of the procedure until his death." Id. (footnotes omitted).
52 Id. at 227 (noting that patients were secluded in straightjackets and finding the conditions comparable to that
of
a "snake pit").
5 Id. at 228.
54 Id. The first generation of anti-psychotic medications were developed in the mid-1950s, and were thought to
support the concept that patients could indeed get better via medicine. Id.
5 See id. ("In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a case that became known as the least restrictive
alternative. The ruling, once applied, meant that involuntary commitment to a hospital was only possible if there
were no other treatments that would give more freedom to the patient. . . . [T]reatment of the mentally ill shifted
from the state hospitals to community care. The least restrictive alternative is only one in a series of court rulings
that led to and facilitated deinstitutionalization.") (footnote omitted).
56 Id. 228-29. "With the help of anti-psychotic medications and deinstitutionalization, the inpatient population
decreased by nearly 80% over the next 30 years. The hope was that community care could provide a smaller,
more humane place to treat the mentally ill. In actuality many consider deinstitutionalization and community care
a failure on some levels." Id. (footnote omitted).
5 Lionel Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline ofComparative Study ofEuropean Statistics, 18 BRIT. J.
MED.PSYCHOL. 1, 1-15 (1939).
51 Pl Hartvig & Ellen Kjelsberg, Penrose's Law Revisited: The Relationship Between Mental Institution Beds,
PrisonPopulation and Crime Rate, 63 NORDIC J. PSYCHIATRY 51, 51-56 (2009).
59

Id. at 54.

60 Id. at 51 nn. 2-3 (citations omitted).
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of people in jails and prisons also rose significantly. The other side of
the same phenomenon was the increasing number of prisoners
associated with the reduction in psychiatric hospitals. Between 1980 and
1995, the total number of people incarcerated in the United States rose
from 501,836 to 1,587,791, a 216 per cent increase-the population at
61
that time increased by only 16 per cent.
As for the United States, a 2009 study reported:
As previously stated, community care is not able to handle serious and
chronically mentally ill persons.... [B]etween 1955 and 2000 the
number of persons being treated in hospitals dropped from 560,000 to
around 55,000. Today there is an estimated 300,000 being treated in
prisons, with the LA County Jail being the largest public mental health
facility in America. In Virginia, the Joint Commission on Health Care
reports that regional and local jails house 59% of persons with mental
illness versus 23% in state hospitals.6 2
These studies indicate that Penrose's Law is correct, and the criminal justice system has
been forced into its role as the de facto mental health provider. If that is the case, how is
the criminal justice system reacting to the influx of mentally ill defendants?
IV.

CURRENT TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Dealing with mental health issues has been problematic for the criminal justice
system. This is partly because of the system's lack of understanding with regard to mental
health diagnosis, maintenance of mental illness, and the treatment required.
Schizophrenia is one common example of a mental disorder criminals are often
63
diagnosed with. In the normal population, prevalence of schizophrenia ranges from 0.5%
to 1.5%. However, it is over twice as common in the prison population, where its
prevalence ranges from 2.3% to 3.9%.64 The onset of the disease usually occurs between
65
the late-teens and the mid-thirties. Interestingly, these ages are also subject to the highest
66
arrest rates.
To understand the appropriate treatment of this mental illness within the criminal
justice system, it is necessary to focus on the illness from the perspective of health care
professionals. Like many psychological disorders, schizophrenia is complicated in
symptomology, diagnosis, and treatment. It is a challenging mental illness and it is
incredibly resource-intensive. Such a psychological condition is even more straining on
the criminal justice system.

Gary Chaimowitz, The Criminalization ofPeople with Mental Illness, 57 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 2, 2 (2012).
Osborn, supra note 18, at 229-30.
6' Richard Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal
Law (and a Primer
61

62

on
How to Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 407, 409-10 (2004).
64 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, supra note 12; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 308 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
65 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64,
at 307.
66 F.B.I., AGE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES AND RACE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES 1993-

2001, 3 (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucr-publications/agerace
01.pdf

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2014

arrest93-

117

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

112

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

A.

[Vol. 4

Symptoms

The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) currently describes the disease
as a chronic, severe, and disabling brain disorder:
People with the disorder may hear voices other people don't hear. They
may believe other people are reading their minds, controlling their
thoughts, or plotting to harm them. This can terrify people with the
illness and make them withdrawn or extremely agitated. People with
schizophrenia may not make sense when they talk. They may sit for
hours without moving or talking. Sometimes people with schizophrenia
seem perfectly fine until they talk about what they are really thinking.
Families and society are affected by schizophrenia too. Many people
with schizophrenia have difficulty holding a job or caring for
themselves, so they rely on others for help. Treatment helps relieve
many symptoms of schizophrenia, but most people who have the
disorder cope with symptoms throughout their lives.6 7
68

69

Symptoms of schizophrenia include hallucinations, 6 delusions, thought disorders,
7
movement disorders negative symptoms,72 and cognitive symptoms.73
67

70

Schizophrenia, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH
(Sept. 8, 2009),

http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia/what-is-schizophrenia.shtml; see also DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 64, at 298-302.
' Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Hallucinations are things a person sees, hears, smells, or feels that no one else
can see, hear, smell, or feel. 'Voices' are the most common type of hallucination in schizophrenia. Many people
with the disorder hear voices. The voices may talk to the person about his or her behavior, order the person to do
things, or warn the person of danger. Sometimes the voices talk to each other. People with schizophrenia may
hear voices for a long time before family and friends notice the problem. Other types of hallucinations include
seeing people or objects that are not there, smelling odors that no one else detects, and feeling things like
invisible fingers touching their bodies when no one is near."); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64, at 299-300.
69 Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Delusions are false beliefs that are not part of the person's culture and do not

change. The person believes delusions even after other people prove that the beliefs are not true or logical.
People with schizophrenia can have delusions that seem bizarre, such as believing that neighbors can control
their behavior with magnetic waves. They may also believe that people on television are directing special
messages to them, or that radio stations are broadcasting their thoughts aloud to others. Sometimes they believe
they are someone else, such as a famous historical figure. They may have paranoid delusions and believe that
others are trying to ham them, such as by cheating, harassing, poisoning, spying on, or plotting against them or
the people they care about. These beliefs are called 'delusions of persecution."'); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 64, at 299.
7o Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Thought disorders are unusual or dysfunctional ways of thinking. One form of
thought disorder is called 'disorganized thinking.' This is when a person has trouble organizing his or her
thoughts or connecting them logically. They may talk in a garbled way that is hard to understand. Another form
is called 'thought blocking.' This is when a person stops speaking abruptly in the middle of a thought. When
asked why he or she stopped talking, the person may say that it felt as if the thought had been taken out of his or
her head. Finally, a person with a thought disorder might make up meaningless words, or 'neologisms."'); DSMIV-TR, supra note 64, at 300.
71 Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Movement disorders may appear as agitated body movements. A person with a
movement disorder may repeat certain motions over and over. In the other extreme, a person may become
catatonic. Catatonia is a state in which a person does not move and does not respond to others. Catatonia is rare
today, but it was more common when treatment for schizophrenia was not available.") (footnote omitted); see
also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64, at 300-01.
Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Negative symptoms are associated with disruptions to normal emotions and
behaviors. These symptoms are harder to recognize as part of the disorder and can be mistaken for depression or
other conditions. These symptoms include the following: [f]lat affect' (a person's face does not move or he or
she talks in a dull or monotonous voice), [1]ack of pleasure in everyday life, [1]ack of ability to begin and sustain
planned activities, [s]peaking little, even when forced to interact. People with negative symptoms need help with
everyday tasks. They often neglect basic personal hygiene. This may make them seem lazy or unwilling to help
themselves, but the problems are symptoms caused by the schizophrenia."); see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64,
72

at 301.
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In addition to these incredibly difficult symptoms, the issue of dual diagnosis can
further complicate diagnosis and treatment:
Dual diagnosis [occurs when someone] has both a mental disorder and
an alcohol or drug problem. These conditions occur together frequently.
In particular, alcohol and drug problems tend to occur with [d]epression,
[a]nxiety disorders, [s]chizophrenia, [and] [p]ersonality disorders.
Sometimes the mental problem occurs first. This can lead people to use
alcohol or drugs that make them feel better temporarily. Sometimes the
substance abuse occurs first. Over time, that can lead to emotional and
mental problems.
As a feature of the disease, substance abuse complicates treatment. 5 Regardless
of the combination of symptoms, once the diagnosis has been made, then the question of
treatment comes into play. The NIMH advocates a multi-faceted approach to treating the
76
disease.
B.

Multi-FacetedTreatment Approach

There is no cure for schizophrenia. Depending on the severity of the disease and
responsiveness to treatment, some individuals learn to function very well, while others
continue with life-long impairments. Once diagnosed, treatment for schizophrenia can
include anti-psychotic drugs, psychosocial therapy, and rehabilitative strategies. If the
individual has a dual diagnosis, the NIMH recommends that substance abuse treatment
79
can be used concurrently with other treatment regimens for schizophrenia.
The treatment for schizophrenia entails the administration of antipsychotic
drugs.o Antipsychotic drugs can have severe side-effects including drowsiness, dizziness,
blurred vision, rapid heartbeat, sun sensitivity, skin rashes, and, in women, menstrual
problems. There are also physical manifestations such as rigidity, muscle spasms,
tremors, and restlessness.8 2 A severe physical side effect of long-term use of antipsychotic
' Schizophrenia, supra note 67 ("Cognitive symptoms are subtle. Like negative symptoms, cognitive symptoms
may be difficult to recognize as part of the disorder. Often, they are detected only when other tests are
performed. Cognitive symptoms include the following: [p]oor 'executive functioning' (the ability to understand
information and use it to make decisions), [t]rouble focusing or paying attention, [p]roblems with 'working
memory' (the ability to use information immediately after learning it). Cognitive symptoms often make it hard to
lead a normal life and earn a living. They can cause great emotional distress."); DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64, at
305 (describing the symptoms with associated laboratory findings).
7 Nat'l Inst. of Health, Dual Diagnosis,MEDICINE PLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/dualdiagnosis.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2014); see also DSM-IV-TR,

supra note 64, at 304, 309-10 (describing comorbidity and differential diagnosis based on etiology).
7 Dual Diagnosis, supra note 74.
76

Schizophrenia, supra note 67.

77 Schizophrenia, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, http://www.psychiatry.org/schizophrenia (last visited June 29, 2014).
78 Id.

7 Schizophrenia, supra note 67.
"o Id. ("Antipsychotic medications have been available since the mid-1950's. The older types are called
conventional or 'typical' antipsychotics.... In the 1990's, new antipsychotic medications were developed. These
new medications are called second generation, or 'atypical' antipsychotics. One of these medications, clozapine
(Clozaril) is an effective medication that treats psychotic symptoms, hallucinations, and breaks with reality.");
see also ClinicalAntipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE), NAT'L INST. FOR MENTAL HEALTH,
www.nimh.nih.gov/funding/clinical-trials-for-researchers/practical/catie/index.shtml
(last visited February 22,
2014) (providing additional information regarding antipsychotic medications and their effectiveness and side
effects).
I

Schizophrenia, supra note 67.

82 Id
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medication is tardive dyskinesia,8 3 a condition causing uncontrollable muscle movement
that may not be curable.
If the medications relieve some of the symptoms, there are additional therapies
administered to help the individual function effectively. One such therapy is
psychosocial treatment.86 The purpose of psychosocial therapy is to help individuals deal
with everyday challenges including "difficulty with communication, self-care, work, 7 and
forming and keeping relationships." In some cases, where symptoms persist in an
individual despite treatment with medication, cognitive behavioral therapy is used.8 9 The
purpose of the therapy is to enable individuals to "test the reality of their thoughts and
perceptions, how to 'not listen' to their voices, and how to manage their symptoms
overall." 90
The NIMH also recommends a rehabilitative strategy be developed to assist the
individual to function with day-to-day stressors that include "job counseling and training,
money management counseling, help in learning to use public transportation, and
opportunities to practice communication skills." 91 Family members can assist individuals
in maintaining medication compliance and developing coping skills to deal with the
disease. 92 NIMH also recommends self-help groups as a way to assist individuals with
schizophrenia cope with the disease.93
These are the current treatment recommendations by NIMH. The question is
whether or not the criminal justice system can provide this type of treatment to individuals
who come into contact with it. Mental health issues must be dealt with from the time of
arrest and through the pretrial detention, pretrial proceedings, trial, and post-trial
proceedings-which include sentencing. In the event of a guilty verdict, treatment of
Id. ("Long-term use of typical antipsychotic medications may lead to a condition called tardive dyskinesia
(TD). TD causes muscle movements a person can't control. The movements commonly happen around the
mouth.").
84 Id. ("TD can range from mild to severe, and in some people the problem
cannot be cured. Sometimes people
8

with TD recover partially or fully after they stop taking the medication.").
" Id. ("Antipsychotics are usually in pill or liquid form. Some anti-psychotics are shots that are given once or
twice a month. Symptoms of schizophrenia, such as feeling agitated and having hallucinations, usually go away
within days. Symptoms like delusions usually go away within a few weeks. After about six weeks, many people
will see a lot of improvement. However, people respond in different ways to antipsychotic medications, and no
one can tell beforehand how a person will respond.").
86 Id.

Id. ("Rehabilitation programs can include job counseling and training, money management counseling, help in
learning to use public transportation, and opportunities to practice communication skills. Rehabilitation programs
work well when they include both job training and specific therapy designed to improve cognitive or thinking
skills. Programs like this help patients hold jobs, remember important details, and improve their functioning.").
88 Id.
87

89 Id.
90 Id.

Id. ("Rehabilitation emphasizes social and vocational training to help people with schizophrenia function better
in their communities. Because schizophrenia usually develops in people during the critical career-forming years
of life (ages 18 to 35), and because the disease makes normal thinking and functioning difficult, most patients do
not receive training in the skills needed for a job.").
92 Id. ("People with schizophrenia are often discharged from the hospital into the care of their families. So it is
important that family members know as much as possible about the disease. With the help of a therapist, family
members can learn coping strategies and problem-solving skills.").
" Id. ("Self help groups for people with schizophrenia and their families are becoming more common.
Professional therapists usually are not involved, but group members support and comfort each other. People in
self help groups know that others are facing the same problems, which can help everyone feel less isolated. . ..
Once patients learn basic facts about schizophrenia and its treatment, they can make informed decisions about
their care.").
9
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mentally ill inmates must continue until the individual completes their sentence.
Throughout this process, which may last decades, the individual's competency and
treatment are constantly revisited by a system that was never designed or intended to cope
with mental health diagnosis or treatment.
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V. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND COMPETENCY
A.

Law Enforcement Interactionwith IndividualsHaving Mental Health Issues

Community law enforcement agencies are often the de facto diagnosticians when
encountering individuals with mental health problems. 94 Although not all law enforcement
encounters involve individuals with disorders as severe as schizophrenia, run-ins are
common with people who have less severe mental illnesses. 95 In professor Linda Teplin's
2000 article, Keeping the Peace: Police Discretion and Mentally Ill Persons, she describes
three options available to police when confronted on the street with individuals who have
mental health issues.9 6 These options include: (1) informal disposition, (2) arrest, or (3)
97
hospitalization.
Informal disposition is overwhelmingly preferred by officers, with 72% of
encounters handled accordingly.98 These individuals are typically described as the
neighborhood characters,9 9 troublemakers, 00 or quiet, unobtrusive "mentals."' 0 Informal
dispositions by officers are a reflection of a long-term trend toward
deinstitutionalization.1 02

94 H. Richard Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger, & Walter J. DeCuir, Jr., The Police and Mental Health, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. (Oct. 1, 2002), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articlelD=87145 (pointing out that police have
inadequate training in handling encounters with this segment of the community); Tucker et al., supra note 11.
9 Gary Cordner, Peoplewith Mental Illness, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (2006),

http://www.popcenter.org/problems/mentalillness.
96

Linda A. Teplin, Keeping the Peace: Police Discretion and Mentally Ill Persons, NAT'L INST. JUST. J. 9, 9-10

(July 2000), availableathttps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ji000244c.pdf.
9 Id.
9' Id. at 9 (noting that police resolve situations informally 72% of the time.).
9 Id. at 11 ("Neighborhood characters were persons whose idiosyncrasies were well known to police in their
precinct. Virtually any officer could talk about 'Crazy Harry,' 'Batman,' or 'Mailbox Molly.' These were
neighborhood characters who were defined by police as 'mentals' but who were never hospitalized because they
were known quantities. Police had certain expectations regarding the parameters of their behavior. As a
consequence, the police tolerated a greater degree of deviance from them. More important, officers' familiarity
with each citizen's particular symptoms enabled them to 'cool them out,' making an informal disposition that
much easier The following is a rather common encounter of this type: There's a lady in the area who claims she
has neighbors who are beaming rays up into her apartment. The officer said he usually handles the situation by
telling her, 'We'll go downstairs and tell the people to stop beaming the rays,' and she's happy. The officer
seemed quite happy about this method of handling the problem. He could do something for the lady, and even
though it's not the same kind of assistance he might give another type of situation, he could allay the lady's fears
by just talking to her.").
l00 Id. ("If an emotionally disturbed citizen has been labeled a 'troublemaker,' hospitalization or arrest is very
unlikely. Intervention in such cases is considered not worth the trouble. An example was a woman rejected by
the mental hospital, who, 'whenever she came into the station, caused an absolute disruption. She would take off
her clothes, run around the station nude, and urinate on the sergeant's desk. Officers felt it was such a hassle to
have her in the station and in lockup that they simply stopped arresting her."').
vo Id ("Persons whose symptoms of mental disorder are relatively unobtrusive are likely to be handled
informally. They offend neither the populace nor the police with obvious manifestations of their illness, and their
symptoms are not considered serious enough to warrant hospitalization. Moreover, quiet 'mentals' are
considered more disordered than disorderly and so are unlikely to provoke arrest. Through officers' experiences
with neighborhood characters, they know just how to soothe the emotionally disturbed person, to act as a 'streetcorner psychiatrist.' In this way, they help to maintain many mentally ill people within the community and make
deinstitutionalization a more viable public policy.").
102 Id. at 9; Tucker et al., supra note 11 ("The trend toward deinstitutionalization between the 1960s and 1980s
contributed to the increased contact between police and individuals with mental illness.").
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If the officer makes the decision to arrest, it triggers the involvement of the
criminal justice system that is woefully unprepared to handle mental health treatment. The
defendant's competency is usually the first post-arrest inquiry.1 03 The question of
competency is one that has befuddled courts for hundreds of years. Even now, for everyday functioning purposes, the level of competency acceptable for legal purposes is much
lower than that of what a physician treating a patient with a mental illness would deem
proficient. o0As the Supreme Court observed in evaluating the burden of proof in a
competency proceeding:
The prohibition against trying the incompetent defendant was well
established by the time Hale and Blackstone wrote their famous
commentaries. ("[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offence . . [a]nd if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he
shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence?"). The English
cases which predate our Constitution provide no guidance, however,
concerning the applicable standard of proof in competency
determinations.
Beginning in the late 18th century, cases appear which provide an
inkling of the proper standard. In King v. Frith, for example, the court
instructed the jury to "diligently inquire . . whether John Frith, the now
prisoner at the bar . . be of sound mind and understanding or not...."
Some 50 years later the jurors received a nearly identical admonition in
Queen v. Goode,: "'You shall diligently inquire, and true presentment
make . . whether John Goode . . be insane or not....'" Similarly, in King
v. Pritchard,the court empaneled ajury to consider "whether the
prisoner is mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he can plead to the
indictment or not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial....
The fundamental importance of a defendant's competency to stand trial was articulated in
Riggins v. Nevada:
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main
part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to
effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or
to remain silent without penalty for doing so. 106
In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Dusky v. United States,107 and set a
parameter to measure a defendant's competency to stand trial. The Court stated:

'o' Criminal Justice Section Standards: Mental Health, A.B.A.,

http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminaljusticesection
.html (last visited June 29 2014).

archive/crimjust standardsmentalhealth toc

104 See generally Kirk Heilbrun, et al., Standards ofPractice and Care in Forensic Mental Health Assessment:
Legal, Professional, and Principles-Based Considerations, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 3-4 (2008),

available at http://www.mentalcompetency.org/resources/guides-standards/files/Heilbrun,%/`20et%/o20al.%/p20-%20Standards%20of%/20Practice%/o20and%/o20Care-pdf
'0 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356-57 (1996) (citations omitted).
1o6 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992).
1o7 362 US 402 402 (1960)
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[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant (is)
oriented to time and place and (has) some recollection of events,' but
that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.'os
In just three paragraphs, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of a criminal
defendant needing to have a "rational understanding" of how to assist counsel, appreciate
the charges against them, and understand the proceedings.1 09
In 1966, the Court in Pate v. Robinson"t0 held a murder conviction should be set
aside because the lower court did not grant a hearing on the issue of the defendant's
competency."' Then, in Drope v. Missouri,112 the Court announced the current three part
test for competency: "It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial."113
The Supreme Court has held that the constitution presumes a defendant is
competent. To prove otherwise, the burden is on the defendant to establish his
incompetency." Furthermore, the Court found that the constitution requires the defendant
to prove his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, while also finding that the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence violates due process." 5

.

"o Id. The Court's decision was premised on the sufficiency of the record found in Dusky v. U.S., 271 F.2d 385,
387-89 (8th Cir 1959). The lower court reviewed the evidence produced at hearing, where experts opined: "He
is oriented as to time, place, and person. He denies complete memory of the events of the day of the alleged
offense.... It is the opinion of the staff, following interview of the patient, that he had improved in recent weeks
but his condition is still such that he is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings with reference to the
charges against him and is unable to properly assist counsel in his defense. The patient is receiving tranquilizing
medications and would probably deteriorate quickly if treatment was stopped at this time. . . . Doctor Sturgell
also expressed the opinion that the defendant understood what he was charged with, knew that if there was a trial
it would be before a judge and jury, knew that if found guilty he could be punished, and knew who his attorney
was and that it was his duty to protect the defendant's rights." Id.
109 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402-03.
110 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
..Id. at 385.
112 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
..Id. at 171.
14
1 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) ("Based on our review of the historical treatment of the
burden of proof in competency proceedings, the opemtion of the challenged rule, and our precedents, we cannot
say that the allocation of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant to prove incompetence 'offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."')
(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). The Court further found there is "no historical basis
for concluding that the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to the defendant violates due process .
" Medina, 305 U.S. at 448.
15 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69 (1996) ("The prohibition against requiring the criminal defendant
to demonstrate incompetence by clear and convincing evidence safeguards the fundamental right not to stand
trial while incompetent. Because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to put to trial a defendant who is
more likely than not incompetent, the rule is incompatible with the dictates of due process.").
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Duty ofDefense Counsel

On a daily basis, criminal defense attorneys confront clients who are mentally
impaired-some with disorders as severe as schizophrenia.116 The choices that attorneys
are left with while representing these individuals are bleak. On one hand, counsel is to
represent a client "zealously" within the limits of the law." 7 On the other hand, lawyers
are sworn to uphold the Constitution.' Since it is a violation of due process to allow an
incompetent individual to proceed in the criminal justice system,'1 9 is the defense counsel
obliged to investigate the client's competency to stand trial even when the client resists?
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (MCPR) attempts to address that issue.1 20 The rules dictate "the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client."121 Of course, however, for the practitioner sitting in an interview room with a
client suffering from a serious mental disorder,122 such a rule provides little or no
guidance. The commentary to the rule is a bit more helpful:
In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer
should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to
articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind,
and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive
fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known
long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate
circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate
diagnostician.123
Again, the reality of practice overshadows the rule and its commentary. The attorney is
confronted with confidential information that leads them to believe the client is mentally
impaired. At this point in the criminal justice process, the lawyer is asked to assume the
role of both psychiatrist and advocate. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards state:

116
117
118

See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE cmt. 2 (2013).
See Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer's Oath: Both Ancient andModern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 3, 48

(2009) ("Twenty-one states and most federal courts use a simple oath in which the lawyer swears to support the
relevant laws and constitution and also promises good conduct.").
"9 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) ("The State concedes 'the conviction of an accused person
while he is legally incompetent violates due process."').
120

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 ("(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately

considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental
impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal clientlawyer relationship with the client. (b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other ham unless action is taken and cannot adequately
act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting
with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases,
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. (c) Information relating to the
representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action
pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the
client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.").
2 1
Id. at R. 1.14(a).
122 See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 64, at 273-315 (discussing the symptoms and features of
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders).
123

MODEL RtULES OFPROF', CONDUCT R 1 14 cmt 6
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Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant's
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good faith
doubt as to the defendant's competence. If the client objects to such a
motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation over the client's
objection. In any event, counsel should make known to the court and to
the prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith
doubt of competence. 124
While seemingly answering the question about defense counsel's obligation to
raise the issue, the standards then require counsel to file a motion and "set forth the
specific facts that have formed the basis for the motion," 2 5 while at the same time
admonishing defense counsel that they "should not divulge confidential communications
or communications protected by the attorney-client privilege."126 Since confidential
information is often revealed by the client, these internally contradictory standards put
defense counsel in a difficult, if not impossible, situation. Defense counsel can develop
other sources of information: prior hospitalization or treatment (if the defendant discloses
and signs waivers); prior prosecutions where mental health issues were raised (the
applications and orders would be public record but the substance of evaluations and
attorney interviews would require waivers from the client); and family, friends, or
acquaintances (this again requires the client to cooperate and give the information to the
27
attorney if it exists).1
Even if counsel files an application for a competency hearing and the defendant
is found incompetent, the case is not over. The criminal case is stayed until the
defendant's competency is restored.1 28 The goal of mental health treatment is to restore
competency so that the criminal case proceeds, not to treat the defendant or to manage the
underlying mental illness on a long-term basis. Consequently, in cases where a defendant
may have a stark diagnosis, the goal is only to bring the defendant to a level where they
can function for their criminal case, not to manage their symptoms. At that point, the case
is revived and the mental health inquiries focus on potential defenses to the crime charged
with the competency question lingering in the background.
Competency is often only met for a limited period of time and then the client
lapses, dropping their mental capacity below the required baseline.129 This oscillation
undercuts the premise that an individual meets the standards for competency. Mental
capacity varies from day-to-day in each individual. A static ruling by the court on a given
day does not assure the defendant will remain competent for any particular length of time.

124 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
125
126

§

7-4.2(c) (2013).

Id. at R. 7-4.2(d).
Id. at R. 7-4.2(f).

127 See Mental Illness, Your Client, and Criminal Law, CONN. APPLESEED NETWORK
1, 25-26 (May 2007),

http://ctappleseed.org/pdfs/707/mi-criminallawhandbook.pdf
128 See Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1lth Cir. 2002) (explaining that because the
defendant was found to have competence restored, the criminal proceeding continued); See also Restoration of
Competency to Stand Trial, HOGG FOUND. FOR MENTAL HEALTH (March 2013),

http://www.hogg.utexas.edu/uploads/documents/Competency%/`20Restoration%/o2OBrief pdf.
129 John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution ofJudgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal

Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 231-32 (2008).
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Issues RegardingMedication

Another problem in addressing competency is the use of psychotropic
medication. Those with a mental illness are not always compliant in treatment due to a
lack of insight into their diagnosis or a lack of interest in getting better.1 30 In the 1992
decision Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court attempted to address the problem of
forcibly medicating an individual in order to maintain competency and the defendant's
right to effectively present a defense.131 On one hand, it is a violation of due process to try
an individual who isn't competent.1 32 On the other hand, the defendant is entitled to
present a defense in a fashion that the jury understands.133 In its analysis, the Court drew a
distinction between Riggins (a pretrial detainee) and individuals who had been convicted
and who were being forcibly medicated while incarcerated.1 34 The Court had previously
noted the effects of antipsychotic medications in Washington v. Harper:
The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient's
brain, leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her
cognitive processes. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic
drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have
serious, even fatal, side effects. One such side effect identified by the
trial court is acute dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper
body, tongue, throat, or eyes. The trial court found that it may be treated
and reversed within a few minutes through use of the medication
Cogentin. Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness, often
characterized by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malignant syndrome
(a relatively rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac
dysfunction); and tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side
effect of antipsychotic drugs. Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological
disorder, irreversible in some cases, that is characterized by involuntary,
uncontrollable movements of various muscles, especially around the
face.... [T]he proportion of patients treated with antipsychotic drugs who
exhibit the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia ranges from 10% to 25%.
According to the American Psychiatric Association, studies of the
condition indicate that 60% of tardive dyskinesia is mild or minimal in
effect, and about 10% may be characterized as severe.135

1o Tania M. Lincoln et al., Correlatesand Long-Term Consequences ofPoorInsight in Patients with
Schizophrenia:A Systematic Review, 33(6) SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1324, 1324-42 (Nov. 2007), available at

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2779879/.
13 504 U.S. 127, 132-33 (1992).
132 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
133 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133 ("The record in this case narrowly defines the issues before us. The parties have
indicated that once the District Court denied [the defendant's] motion to terminate use of [the antipsychotic
drug], subsequent administration of the drug was involuntary.").
134 Id. at 133-34 ("In Harper, a prison inmate alleged that the State of Washington and various individuals
violated his right to due process by giving him Mellaril and other antipsychotic drugs against his will. Although
the inmate did not prevail, we agreed that his interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 'The forcible injection of
medication into a non-consenting person's body,' we said, "represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty."' (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)) (footnotes omitted).
15 494 US at 229-30 (citations omitted)
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The Court concluded that the record lacked enough detailed findings as to warrant the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication to Riggins.136 In Harper, the Court
previously held that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs would be
constitutionally permissible:
First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it. Second, a court must consider "the impact accommodation of
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally." Third, "the absence
of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison
regulation," but this does not mean that prison officials "have to set up
and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." 137
The Court concluded:
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
38
inmate's medical interest.1
The questions remain regarding a defendant's competency to stand trial, ability to present
a defense, and the right to a full and fair trial. The complications of understanding a
psychiatric diagnosis and discerning the effects of psychotropic medications force the
criminal justice system to enter a quagmire from which it cannot extricate itself. The list
of drugs used to treat individuals with mental illnesses presents a maze which is difficult
for psychiatrists and psychologists to navigate. NIMI lists more than 100 different
medications to treat disorders ranging from psychosis to ADHD.1 39
For the attorneys and judges handling cases involving mental health issues, the
complexity and nuances of understanding the disease process and medications used in
treating the disease are so overwhelming. Often, they simply give up and rely on reluctant
experts who do not understand the criminal justice system to guide them in their decision
making process. The premise that a medicated client is a competent client is simply not
true.
D.

Insanity and DiminishedResponsibility

Most jurisdictions still employ the 1843 M'Naghten standard to gauge a
defendant's sanity. 140 The M'Naghten rule examines whether, at the time of the
16 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 ("Because the record contains no finding that might support
a conclusion that
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy, however, we
have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this case was justified.").
17 494 U.S. at 224-25 (citations omitted).
138

Id. at 227 (footnote omitted).

"9 NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH MEDICATIONS 17-24 (2012), available at

http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/mental-health-medications/index.shtml.
The InsanityDefense Among the States, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/theinsanity-defense-among-the-states.htmIl (last visited June 30, 2014) (indicating that the states currently using the
M'Naghten rule are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
14
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commission of the offense, the defendant knew the difference from right and wrong or
understood the nature and quality of his acts.' 4 The second test regarding insanity is the
Model Penal Code rule.1 42 The third test is the Durham rule, which was articulated in the
1954 decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.143 The test is a
condemnation of the M'Naghten rule:
The science of psychiatry now recognizes that a man is an integrated
personality and that reason, which is only one element in that
personality, is not the sole determinant of his conduct. The right-wrong
test, which considers knowledge or reason alone, is therefore an
inadequate guide to mental responsibility for criminal behavior. As
Professor Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School points out in
discussing the right-wrong tests, which he calls the knowledge tests:
'It is evident that the knowledge tests unscientifically abstract out of
the mental make-up but one phase or element of mental life, the
cognitive, which, in this era of dynamic psychology, is beginning to be
regarded as not the most important factor in conduct and its disorders. In
brief, these tests proceed upon the following questionable assumptions
of an outworn era in psychiatry: (1) that lack of knowledge of the
'nature or quality' of an act (assuming the meaning of such terms to be
clear), or incapacity to know right from wrong, is the sole or even the
most important symptom of mental disorder; (2) that such knowledge is
the sole instigator and guide of conduct, or at least the most important
element therein, and consequently should be the sole criterion of
responsibility when insanity is involved; and (3) that the capacity of
knowing right from wrong can be completely intact and functioning
perfectly even though a defendant is otherwise demonstrably of
144
disordered mind.'
Meanwhile, some jurisdictions have eliminated insanity as a defense to a crime.

Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
141 R v. M'Naughten, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) ("Notwithstanding
a party accused did an act, which was in
itself criminal, under the influence of insane delusion, with a view of redressing or revenging some supposed
grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable if he knew at the time that
he was acting contrary to law. That if the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do;
and if the act was at the same time contrary to law, he is punishable. In all cases of this kind the jurors ought to
be told that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for
his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction: and that to establish a defence on the ground of

insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time ofcommitting the act the party accused was labouring under
such a defect ofreason, from disease ofthe mind, as not to know the nature and quality ofthe act he was doing,
or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong.") (emphasis added).
142 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2013) ("(1) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As used in
this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.").
143 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir 1954) (stating
that "an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.") (footnote omitted),
abrogatedby United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
144 Id. at 871-72 (discussing the history of the M'Naghten test and
objections to its continued use).

145

The Insanity Defense Among the States, supra note 140 (stating that Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah do not

allow the insanity defense).
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Again, the problem with formulating legal tests to establish criminal culpability
is that antiquated concepts of mental health still exist-as well as a disregard for
developments in science. The notion that we would treat mental illnesses with the same
therapies in existence in 1843 (when M'Naghten's case articulated the prevailing test for
insanity) would result in gasps of disbelief from medical practitioners. Legal tests should
be developed in deference to and in incorporation with current medical diagnoses and
treatment.
E.

The CriminalJustice System 's Inabilityto Address MentalHealth Issues

For the mentally ill, the criminal justice system typically reacts by medicating
them to control their illness.1 46 The notion that medication is the panacea to treat mental
health issues is prevalent among the bench and bar. 47 As previously noted in this article,
administering antipsychotic medication is one part of the treatment of schizophrenia. 48
However, in a recent clinical study regarding the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication
in treating schizophrenia, one finding indicated antipsychotic medication does not
significantly improve cognition.149 In other words, medication alone does not assist an
individual to produce and understand language, engage in problem solving, and make
decisions.15 0 This cognitive process is essential for an individual to have "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding," and to have a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." 15 The fundamental legal question of competency is undercut by current
science and its evaluation of medications used to treat schizophrenia.
146

Lael Montgomery, When Worlds Collide: Mentally Ill CriminalDefendents-PartII,
29(7) COLO. LAW. 101,

101-05 (July 2000).
147

Id.
148 Schizophrenia, supra note 67.
149 Hon H. et al., Antipsychotic Medication and Cognitive Function in Schizophrenia, 86 SCHIZOPHRENIA
RES.

138, 138-146 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/-16793238.
15o See id.

151 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). The Supreme Court's decision was premised on
the

sufficiency of the record from the lower court: "At a hearing held pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 42.4, on January 21,
1959, to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial, the court had before [it] a detailed report
of a Neuropsychiatric Examination of the defendant. This report was dated October 30, 1958, and was signed by
Doctor L. Moreau, Staff Psychiatrist at Medical Center. On the last page of the report appears the following: 'He
is oriented as to time, place, and person. He denies complete memory of the events of the day of the alleged
offense.... This patient, charged with kidnapping, has no previous criminal record. In November, 1949, he was
investigated for robbery and was released the same day. He was reared in an atmosphere of severely traumatic
circumstances because of the discord between his parents and has always suffered from feelings of inadequacy.
He has been grossly maladjusted since childhood. He was discharged charged [sic] from the Navy because of a
psychoneurosis and has been a patient in Veterans Administration hospitals on two occasions since 1956. He has
also received psychiatric care through the psychiatric receiving center in Kansas City, Missouri. Since admission
to the Medical Center he has shown marked emotional turmoil, insomnia, tension, feelings of self-devaluation,
ambivalent feelings, and impaired judgment and insight. He complains plains [sic] of having feelings of being
followed and visual hallucinations. Almost since admission he has required the use of tranquilizing medications.
...
I Attached to this report was a report of the Psychiatric Staff of the Medical Center, dated October 30, 1958,
signed by Doctor Joseph C. Sturgell, Chief of the Neuropsychiatric Service, reading as follows: 'The findings of
psychiatric examination were presented by Dr. Louis Moreau. Other records were reviewed and the patient was
interviewed by the members of the Psychiatric Staff It is the opinion of the staff, following interview of the
patient, that he had improved in recent weeks but his condition is still such that he is unable to understand the
nature of the proceedings with reference to the charges against him and is unable to properly assist counsel in his
defense. The patient is receiving tranquilizing medications and would probably deteriorate quickly if treatment
was stopped at this time. . . .' The court also had before it a report of the Neuropsychiatric Staff of the Medical
Center, dated January 20, 1959, as to an examination of the defendant on January 8, 1959, signed by Doctor
Sturgell for the Psychiatric Staff It reads as follows: . .. 'When examined by the staff, the patient again
presented evidence of symptoms mentioned above. The staff is of the opinion that this man is mentally ill with a
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VI. MENTAL HEALTH COURTS AND DIVERSION PROGRAMS

The criminal justice system has been forced to react because of the influx of the
mentally ill. In an effort to adjust to additional problems posed by this influx, courts have
created its own ad hoc mental health treatment delivery systems. There are two systems of
52
diversion programs: prebooking and postbooking.1
A.

PrebookingDiversion

Prebooking diversion of an individual with a mental illness comes in several
variants. Prebooking diversion programs consist of law enforcement authorities
53
determining whether to place an individual in a mental health setting rather than arrest.1
These programs often employ specialized police units or Crisis Intervention Teams.
This model includes a variant in which officers are specially trained to act as "liaisons to
[the] mental health system." 55 Another model involves departments hiring mental health
professionals who can provide real-time consultation with field officers.156 The third
model includes employing mobile mental health crisis teams who are part of the local
mental health system. 57 There are also additional responses employed by law enforcement
to deal with individuals with mental illnesses. 5' If the case is not diverted and an arrest

diagnosis of schizophrenia. Because of this illness, he is unable to properly understand the proceedings against
him and unable to adequately assist counsel in his defense.' The only witness testifying at the hearing was
Doctor Sturgell, whose testimony was in substantial conformity with the reports in evidence. He explained the
statement in Doctor Moreau's report that the defendant was oriented as to time, place and person, as follows:
'This means that he is able to know the day of the week, the hour, the place in which he finds himself
geographically, and the circumstances of his present situation. He knows he is in a court room; he knows the day
of the week and the day of the year, and he knows that you are his attorney and Judge Smith is the judge. This is
the orientation to person. He knows it all.' Doctor Sturgell also expressed the opinion that the defendant
understood what he was charged with, knew that if there was a trial it would be before ajudge and jury, knew
that if found guilty he could be punished, and knew who his attorney was and that it was his duty to protect the
defendant's rights." Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 387-90 (8th Cir. 1959) rev'd, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
152 See Frank Sirotich, The Criminal Justice Outcomes ofJail DiversionProgramsfor Persons with Mental
Illness: A Review ofthe Evidence, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 461, 462-63 (2009).
153
154

Id. at 462.
Id.

155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.

151 See id. at 462-63 ("In addition to these models . .
[there are] three additional precharge diversion models:
joint police/mental health teams, specialized reception centers, and joint protocol initiatives. Joint police/mental
health teams are composed of a mental health crisis worker and a plain-clothes police officer The crisis worker
undertakes mental health assessments, while the police officer can effect an apprehension pursuant to civil
mental health legislation and transport individuals in psychiatric crisis to a hospital when civil commitment is
required. When civil commitment criteria are not met, the team attempts to steer the subject of the police call to
community care services in lieu of criminal arrest for behavior that could constitute low-level criminal offenses.
Reception center models involve specialized crisis response sites where police officers can take an individual in
psychiatric crisis requiring psychiatric assessment and immediately return to their regular patrol duties. These
reception centers are secure facilities that have the legal authority to take custody of persons in crisis and can
provide assessment, mental health treatment, and referral to outpatient community mental health and addiction
services. Detoxification services are frequently located on site. Operating 24 hours a day, these one-stop service
centers are thought to promote diversion by providing an expeditious alternative to transporting individuals in
crisis to an emergency department where officers may have to wait long periods to have an individual assessed
and may face refusals to admit individuals because of unmet criteria for civil commitment. Finally, joint protocol
initiatives represent a generic category of prebooking diversion initiatives for models in which mental health
service providers and the police mutually develop common operating procedures that enable police officers to
connect an individual with a mental health agency, in lieu of laying a charge.").
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occurs, the defendant will be booked, and the criminal justice system will come into play
with the possibility of postbooking diversion. 5 9
B. Mental Health Courts
60
Mental health courts are a "dedicated docket for persons" with a mental illness.1
The court and other actors in mental health courts have training to deal with individuals
who are mentally ill.161 The first problem with mental health courts is that the underlying
premise behind the concept is to only accept individuals who are rational enough to obey
treatment recommendations under the threat of sanctions-or self-selectivity.162 The
63
criteria for acceptance is restricted by the nature of the mental illness the defendant has,1
64
the type of crime the defendant is charged with,1 and whether or not the defendant has a
concurrent substance abuse problem.165 The referrers-as one would expect-include
judges, attorneys, jailors, and mental health professionals, while non-traditional referrers
include "families, service providers, law enforcement personnel, community agencies, and
parole officers."166 With success rates or graduationl67 rates driving the discussion of
mental health courts, proponents can devise a system where the courts are handling low
risk offenders with minimal mental health disorders to demonstrate a greater success rate.
159 Id.
6

1 o Id. at 463.
161 Id ("[Miental health courts are diversion initiatives in which the diversion process occurs in one specialized

court. The judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer, and other court staff may have specialized training in working with
persons with serious mental illness and will often work collaboratively, in conjunction with mental health court
liaison staff, to link the accused to treatment and supports. These courts mandate community-based mental health
treatment and monitor participants' treatment adherence, using both praise and sanctions to encourage treatment
compliance. Moreover, the promise of dismissed charges or the avoidance of incarceration is used as an incentive
to participate in treatment.").
162 See Julie B. Raines & Glenn T. Laws, Mental Health Court Survey, 45 CRIM. L. BULL.
4, 5 (Summer 2009)
("An area of concern for any public agency is having positive outcomes-no matter what the program. One
common problem among the mentally ill is compliance to authority. In order to investigate compliance amongst
participants in mental health court systems, the following issues were examined: how the court manages
participant compliance; how many participants on average drop out of the program; and the recidivism rate of
graduates. The respondents were asked what they did to manage participant compliance and they were given the
following response categories: (1) use rewards to encourage participation such as fewer therapy sessions and/or
court sessions; (2) apply sanctions for non-compliance such as more therapy sessions, more court sessions,
and/orjail time; (3) no sanctions; and (4) problems with compliance so there is no need to manage compliance.
The respondents were instructed to choose all that applied. Overwhelmingly 100% of respondents used sanctions
while 93% used rewards to encourage compliance. A miniscule 3% recorded having no problems with
compliance. The largest number of respondents, 31%, reported a drop out rate of less than 5% of participants and
only 10% reported a drop out rate of 30% or more."); see also Sirotich, supra note 152, at 463 ("[E]nrollment in
the mental health court is voluntary.").
161 See Sirotich, supra note 152, at 463 ("Although they share several common features, mental health courts
vary considerably in their operation. They differ on the type of charges that they accept (misdemeanor versus
felony versus a combination), on the type of community supervision that they employ (community treatment
providers monitoring treatment adherence and reporting back to the court versus probation officers or court
personnel monitoring compliance), and on the type of dispositions that they entertain (dismissal of charges,
guilty plea but deferred sentence, or conviction with probation in lieu of ajail sentence). The courts also vary in
the duration of court supervision of treatment and in the frequency of status review hearings of treatment
progress. Finally, they vary in the use of sanctions for noncompliance with treatment conditions. Sanctions may
include returning the person to court for hearings, admonishments, imposition of stricter treatment conditions,
and reincarceration."); see also Raines & Laws, supra note 162, at Figure 1-1 (illustrating that the categories
include: depression, bipolar, mania, psychosis, personality disorder, and other.).
164 Raines & Laws, supra note 162, at Figure 1-2.
165
166

Id. at Figure 1-5.
Id. at Figure 1-4.

167 Id. at Figure 2-1 (questioning the use of the term "gmduation" when dealing with individuals suffering from

mental health issues).
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The secondary problem with mental health courts is the relatively low number of
individuals involved in the system. 16 As for a reduction in recidivism for participants in
mental health courts, one survey seems to be hopeful; 169 however, a more comprehensive
review of other studies reveals a mixed bag of results, with two studies finding "no
difference between participants and nonparticipants in the prevalence rates of
70
recidivism."o
Given that the goal of any criminal justice system is to reduce recidivism,
these results undercut the value of mental health courts per se.
C.

PostbookingDiversion

The second model of diversion is postbooking.' 7 ' There is jail-based diversion,
where pretrial services screen and assign individuals to community based mental health
services,1 72 and court-based diversion, where mental health professionals working in the
court system screen and assign individuals to community-based mental health services.173
This system operates in multiple courts.' 7 4 One study comparing prebooking diversion
programs with postbooking programs notes that individuals in postbooking programs were
more "functionally impaired" than individuals involved in prebooking programs. 75 It also
notes that postbooking programs were coercive in their nature, as a "part of a continuum
of social control."1 76
The goal of these programs is to eliminate or reduce the need for the criminal
justice system's interaction with mentally ill individuals. An evaluation of the programs
would necessarily focus on the amount of time in incarceration and rates of recidivism. A
161 See id. ("Some courts, 10%, have fewer than 15 participants at any given time. However the largest number
of respondents, about one-third, see between 16-30 participants at any point in time. There are numerous factors
that play into these figures; such as the size of the jurisdiction, the size of the budget, the amount of manpower,
and the amount of local services available. Likewise, when survey respondents were asked how many
participants were seen in a year's time, the numbers varied greatly. The highest percentage of respondents, 24%,
provided this program to over 150 participants during the course of a year. How long is the typical participant
involved in a diversion program prior to graduation? The majority of courts, 71%, stated that their participants
were in the progmm for over a year. From the eleven to twelve month time frame, 18% of courts gmduated
participants and the last 11% of the courts surveyed graduated participants within anywhere from five to ten
months.") (citation omitted).
169 Id. ("Figure 3-1 shows that the majority of mental health court participants are staying in their treatment
programs. Likewise, the recidivism rate, according to respondents, seems equally encouraging: 42% of
respondents recorded a recidivism rate of 5% or less (see Figure 3-1). Although the recidivism rate appears low,
25% of the respondents unfortunately did not track recidivism, skewing the results.").
170 Sirotich, supra note 152, at 468.
171 Id. at 462.
172 Id. at 463 ("Jail-based postbooking diversion programs are typically operated
by pretrial service personnel or
specialized jail personnel who identify, assess, and divert mentally ill detainees from custody to communitybased mental health treatment with the consent of the prosecutor, judge, and defense lawyer. Jail liaisons
undertake mental health assessments of detainees and develop a treatment plan for individuals in cooperation
with jail mental health staff and community-based mental health service providers.").
171 Id. ("[C]ourt-based postbooking diversion programs employ mental health clinicians who work within the
courthouse. They screen the arraignment lists for known clients and receive additional referrals from court staff.
They conduct assessments and, in negotiations with the prosecutor, defense, and judge, develop a treatment plan
to secure a bail release of the mentally ill accused person. Typically cases are continued for a brief period to
ensure that the patient is linked and adhering to the necessary treatment services before charges are withdrawn.
Alternatively, an accused person may be convicted and receive probation with special treatment conditions rather
than a custodial sentence. Diversion occurs in multiple courts before multiple judges.").

174
175

Id.
Pamela K. Lattimore et al., A Comparison ofPrebooking and PostbookingDiversion Programsfor Mentally

Ill Substance-UsingIndividuals with JusticeInvolvement, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 30, 58 (Feb. 2003).
176 Id
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review of current studies indicates that diversion programs do not reduce recidivism.
Mental health courts,1 78 court based diversion,1 79 jail based diversion,'8 o and prebooking
diversion'8 all seem to have a minimal effect on recidivism. However, these programs do
significantly reduce the amount of time the mentally ill are incarcerated. 8 2 These studies
need to continue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the discussion of mental health and the criminal justice system in
the 21st century is hauntingly familiar. The problem with the treatment of the mentally ill
is that it has not changed since 1766, when the medical model of treatment gained support.
It came with the recognition that individual families and communities were not able to
handle the problem. As a result, jails, prisons, and workhouses were filled with the
mentally ill. Public mental health hospitals were created to alleviate the problem. Yet,
chronic overcrowding and underfunding of the state hospitals created warehousing of the
mentally ill and led to neglect and abuse of patients in state hospitals. This mistreatment of
patients within the state hospital system led to deinstitutionalization. Community-based
treatment was believed to provide a better delivery system for mental health services.
Unfortunately, community-based treatment was never developed or implemented. The
mentally ill were turned out of hospitals onto the streets-homeless with no treatment or
support system-which, in many cases, led to a repeated cycle of arrest and prosecution.
The role of treating individuals with a mental illness was deposited in the
criminal justice system as a result of deinstitutionalization. Currently, the role of
psychiatrist is passed among the participants in the criminal justice system. From the
officer on the street, to defense counsel, to the courts, and ultimately to the jails and
prisons, individuals with little or no mental health training are making treatment decisions.
177 Sirotich, supra note 152, at 469 ("[E]vidence suggests that diversion programs in general do not reduce
recidivism among persons with mental illness. In addition . . . evidence suggests that the diversion initiatives, as
a broad category of interventions targeting persons with serious mental illness, reduce time spent in custody by
adults with serious mental illness. Tentative evidence suggests that court-based diversion programs that mandate
treatment adherence serve to reduce the amount ofjail time that the mentally ill accused serve relative to
treatment as usual or to jail-based diversion programs that do not mandate and monitor treatment compliance.
Further study is needed to verify this finding.").
171 Id. at 468 ("Six studies were located in which the criminal justice outcomes of mental health courts
was
evaluated. Of the six, four reported on the prevalence rates of recidivism. One study, with a retrospective
observational design and propensity-weighted regression analyses used to attenuate the biasing effects of
nonmndom assignment, found a 26 percent reduction in the probability of a new charge among mental health
court participants relative to nonparticipants. Another study, with a prospective quasi-experimental design that
compared subjects who opted into a mental health court with those who opted out, found an increase in the
prevalence of recidivism among the opt-in group The remaining two studies, a retrospective cohort study and a
pre-post with comparison group study, found no difference between participants and nonparticipants in the
prevalence rates of recidivism.").
179 See id. ("[E]vidence supports the use of court-based diversion to reduce the length and prevalence of
incarceration among persons with serious mental illness; however, there is as yet no evidence to suggest that this
diversion model serves to reduce the incidence or prevalence of recidivism in this group.").
"'Id- at 467 ("[E]vidence indicated no overall reduction in the subsequent criminal activity of individuals
receiving jail-based diversion relative to their nondiverted counterparts, but very tentative evidence of an
interaction effect showing that jail-based diversion may reduce the incidence of arrest among low-level
misdemeanants.").
"' See id. ("[E]vidence supports the use of prebooking programs to reduce the amount of time that mentally ill
persons spend in custody with greatest support for a police-based specialized police response model; however,
the existing evidence does not support the use of prebooking programs to prevent recidivism in this
population.").
182 Id. at 466,
Table 2.
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Legislatures have attempted to solve a medical problem with a legal solution-a solution
that has failed miserably.
Legal tests formulated for competency, insanity, and diminished responsibility
are flawed in that they treat mental health issues like an on-off switch-the individual is
competent or not competent; the individual is sane or insane; the individual can form the
culpable mental state (mens rea) or the individual cannot. This approach in formulating
legal tests does nothing to address the medical issues arising on a routine basis in the
criminal justice system.
This fundamental misunderstanding of mental illnesses results in mistreatment
and death for those involved in the system. Although diversion programs are reducing the
number of days incarcerated, there is no evidence they reduce recidivism. It should be
remembered that diversion programs are really a reaction to deinstitutionalization and
constitute a mental health treatment delivery system. They are, simply put, the newest
variant in a series of failed programs.
The result of the application of Penrose's Law is increased crime rates and
incarceration of the mentally ill. We have come full circle. Brown v. Plata8 3 appears to
have been predictable and inevitable based on studies that have been completed by the
psychiatric community. Until policy makers are willing to establish and maintain
sustained funding for a mental health treatment system run by medical personnel, changes
in existing delivery systems are the equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
84
We end where we began, with Scrooge asking: "Are there no prisons?"
8
Unfortunately, the answer today is the same as it was then: Yes, "Plenty of prisons."

5

...
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
184 DICKENS,
185

supra note 1.

Id
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TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW: INTEGRATING PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Robert Batey*
As indicated in another article,' my days of teaching first-year Criminal Law are
probably over. Before exiting, I would like to detail a few of the ways in which I tried to
introduce ethical issues into that course. Whenever possible, I used cases involving lawyer
defendants, or lawyers whose trial tactics ran afoul of the law, to show the kinds of messes
wayward attorneys can get themselves into. In this respect, one particularly rich area is the
law of theft, where I not only used lawyer cases, but also devised a series of hypotheticals
raising ethical questions for both lawyers and law students. However, my most serious
foray into professional responsibility came when discussing the law of mens rea and its
temptations for the subornation of client perjury.

The study of almost all the topics in Criminal Law can be adorned with cases
involving lawyer defendants or lawyers using questionable trial tactics. Not only do such
cases illustrate the topic being studied, they also strongly suggest that students ought to
avoid these lawyers' behaviors. Moreover, students might realize the scope of misconduct
in the profession they are about to enter and begin to understand the need for higher
standards of professional behavior.
Following the casebook I long used,2 the first topic covered in depth in my
Criminal Law course was the vagueness doctrine. For years, I included a note on United

Professor of Law Emeritus, Stetson University, College of Law. LL.M. University of Illinois 1976, J.D.
University of Virginia 1974, B.A. Yale University 1970.
'See Robert Batey, Teaching CriminalLaw: Buzzgroups, Short Writings, and Hypotheticals, STETSONU.

COLLEGE OF L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Oct. 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291153 (last updated
Nov. 21, 2013).
2 PETER

W. LOW ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1986). For the last two decades, I have

combined excerpts from this casebook and its successor editions (with appropriate copyright notices) with notes
on cases, statutes, and other legal developments in a single ring-bound book. Almost all of the legal materials
mentioned in this article were presented to the students in this way. The local publisher of the book took
responsibility for all copyright issues and still managed to sell the book at less than the cost of the casebook. I
received no profits from any of the book's sales.
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States v. Rybicki,3 the prosecution of two lawyers for mail fraud.4 The lawyers had given
kickbacks to insurance adjusters regarding the settlement of tort claims.5 The prosecution
was unable to prove that the settlements were higher than they would have been without
the kickbacks and argued instead that the lawyers had used the mails to deprive the
adjusters' employers of their right to the adjusters' "honest services" under 18 U.S.C. sec.
1346. 6 The lawyers contended that sec. 1346 was unconstitutionally vague - an argument
subsequently accepted by the Supreme Court in Skilling v. UnitedStates. The same claim
8
was rejected by the Second Circuit eight years before Skilling. Rybicki thus adds a sidebar
on lawyer misconduct to the fascinating interaction of the "honest services" statute and the
vagueness doctrine.
Attorney misfeasance surfaced in the succeeding unit, on statutory construction.
In United States v. Baum,9 a criminal defense attorney concocted a plan to try to win a
reduction for his already-sentenced client, in which a former client would lure a suspected
drug dealer to the United States (in exchange for some money from the current client), but
Baum would get this cooperation credited to the current client by lying to the government
about the relationship between his two clients (that they were close friends) and about the
money.' 0 When this scheme blew up (because the current client decided instead to
cooperate with the government in its investigation of the lawyer), Baum was charged with
obstruction of justice." Baum countered that because the current client had already been
sentenced, there had been no "pending proceeding" - a requirement case law had read into
the federal obstruction of justice statute 2 - but District Judge Denny Chin (since
promoted to the Second Circuit) read the requirement broadly. Specifically, " [c]orrupt
attorneys pose a grave threat to our adversarial system of justice."1 3 In addition to
illustrating that policy considerations sometimes push judges to construe criminal statutes
broadly, 14 Baum thus also portrays attorney behavior that students need to be warned
against.
In teaching possession, I mentioned in passing Schalk v. State, 5 the prosecution
of a criminal defense lawyer who arranged a drug buy from a police confidential
informant in order to discredit the informant, who was an integral part of the case against
one of Schalk's clients.16 The courts rejected Schalk's many variations on the theme of
innocent possession, a concept that has been recognized in other contexts. 17 Another
lawyer prosecution given brief attention, in the unit on mens rea, is United States v.
Flores,'8 where Flores facilitated several transactions for his client that were ultimately

See 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Batey, supra note 1, at 9 n.21.
4 Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 127.
5

Id.

6 Id. at 128.

130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 126-27. Skilling's rewriting of the statute in order to save it from vagueness, which limits §
1346 to cases of bribery and kickbacks, would likely have upheld the convictions in Rybicki. See Skilling, 130 S.
Ct. at 2929-31. Thus Rybicki could be used in class discussion to tease out the meaning of Skilling.
9 32 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
o Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 643-44.
12 Id. at
648.
1" Id. at 650.
14 A few students may see how the same policy considerations affected the
resolution of the vagueness issue in
Rybicki. See UnitedStates v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129-32 (2d Cir. 2003).
15943 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
6
Id. at 428.
17 See, e.g., Stanton v. State, 746 So. 2d 1229, 1229-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
S454 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2006).
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found to be money laundering.1 9 With the assistance of the client's testimony, the
government was able to convict Flores of conspiracy to commit money laundering on a
willful blindness theoy.20
Flores could also have been used in the unit on conspiracy, but instead I noted a
similar case, United States v. Sharpe,2 1 where willful blindness was used to convict a
lawyer who managed the proceeds of his client's fraud and let a coconspirator use the
lawyer's office in furtherance of the fraud.22 Sharpe can profitably be contrasted with
Vinluan v. Doyle,23 in which the appellate court enjoined the conspiracy prosecution of an
attorney for advising his clients, nurses in a contract dispute with their nursing home
employer, that they could resign en masse.2 4 The prosecution charged a conspiracy to
endanger some of the patients at the nursing home, specifically, chronically ill children on
ventilators.25 While such endangerment was certainly foreseeable to the lawyer, the
appellate court prevented his prosecution because "it would eviscerate the right to give
and receive legal counsel with respect to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be
charged with conspiracy . . .whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that advice." 2 6
So policy reasons overcame any application of willful blindness or of any other version of
the mens rea necessary for conspiracy.
Supplementing these lawyer defendant cases were a few cases involving much
paler forms of lawyer misconduct. Prosecutors frequently err in stating the burden of
persuasion to the juy.2 7 One flamboyant example involved a PowerPoint presentation:
The Power Point program begins with a blue screen. When the program
is started, a slide show begins in which six different puzzle pieces of a
picture come onto the screen sequentially. The picture is immediately
and easily recognizable as the Statue of Liberty. The slide show finishes
when the sixth puzzle piece is in place, leaving two rectangular pieces
missing from the picture of the Statue of Liberty-one in the center of
the image that includes a portion of the statue's face and one in the upper
left hand corner of the image.
The prosecutor went on to tell the jury that "[w]e know this picture is
beyond a reasonable doubt without looking at all the pieces of that
picture. We know that that's a picture of the Statue of Liberty, we don't
need all the pieces of the [sic] it. And ladies and gentlemen, if we fill in
the other two pieces" [at this point the prosecutor apparently clicks the
computer mouse again, which triggers the program to add the upper left
hand rectangle that includes the image of the torch in the statue's right
hand and the central rectangle that completes the entire image of the
'9 Id. at 152, 154-56.

Id. at 154-56, 159.
F.3d 852 (5th Cir. 1999).
22 Id. at 870-72.
23 837 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
24
Id. at 82-83.
25 See id.
at 76.
20

21193

26
2

Id. at 83.
7 See, e.g., Bristol v. State, 987 So. 2d 184, 185-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) ("If you find the Defendant not

guilty, what's the evidence?"); Paul v. State, 980 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) ('[I]f [the defense
attorney] wants to present theories of how she believes this case should play out, there's got to be some level of
proof that [the state's star witness] was lying") (emphasis omitted). The ethical implications of Bristol are
doubled because the defendant's actual claim was that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecution's statement. 987 So. 2d at 185.
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statue], "we see that it is, in fact, the [S]tatue of [L]iberty. And I will tell
you in this case, your standard is to judge this case beyond a reasonable
doubt." The prosecutor argued such standard was met by the evidence. 28
The appellate court declared this PowerPoint unacceptable, 29 which emphasizes
to prospective prosecutors the need to rein in at least some of their more inventive
attempts to succeed with juries.
The same caution applies to defense attorneys tempted to make a nullification
argument. Hardingv. State30 approves the trial judge's actions in the following situation:
During closing argument, Harding's counsel told the jury that
"sometimes the law doesn't fit, sometimes it just isn't right. The ends
don't always justify the means." Counsel then baldly said, "I'm standing
up in front of you as Gary Harding's attorney and asking you not to
follow the law." The trial court immediately interrupted and stated,
"Counsel, that's improper and I'll instruct the jury to disregard, and if
they do that, that'll be a violation of your oath that you took when you
were sworn in to try this case. I don't want to hear another word about
3
that." 1
Cases like Hardinghelp to clarify the otherwise airy contentions surrounding nullification,
while also providing valuable practice lessons for the student.
A final instance of lawyer misconduct arose when I taught duress. In situations of
arguable duress, the prosecution occasionally seeks to convict both the threatener and the
32
threatened, in separate proceedings of course. This may cause the state to take
inconsistent positions regarding the influence of the threatener, as was the case in the
separate homicide prosecutions of Deidre Hunt and her abusive boyfriend Konstantinos
Fotopoulos.33 Hunt, the shooter, was the second to be prosecuted; her lawyer quoted the
prosecution's statements in Fotopoulos' trial about his "clear pattern of physical assault,
abuse, intimidation, and coercion --...
the direct and primary cause of Deidre Hunt's
criminal activity." 3 4 But the trial court refused to instruct Hunt's jury on duress, and the
appellate court agreed, because "duress is not a defense to homicide." 35 So the case not
only illustrates that hoary rule of duress law, but also instances what two justices of the
state supreme court, writing in Fotopoulos' appeal, considered a clear violation of due
process: "[I]t is repugnant to the tenets of due process and fundamental fairness that the
State would purposefully present differing renditions of the same factual scenario during
,36
separate proceedings, simply to obtain a particular result against codefendants." Cases

People v. Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr 3d 122, 125 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 126.
30 736 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
" Id. at 1230. For a more permissive approach, see UnitedStates v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
32 See, e.g., Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122, 1125-26 (Fla. 2003).
" Compare id. at 1128-29 (discussing the State's assertion that Fotopoulos was dominating Hunt), with Hunt v.
State, 753 So. 2d 609, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing State's assertion that Hunt voluntarily
murdered Ramsay without duress).
34 Hunt, 753 So. 2d at 611.
5
1 Id. at 613.
36 Fotopoulos, 838 So. 2d at 1137 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only); accordIn re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931
(Cal. 2005) (ruling similarly in a non-duress case).
28

29
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like these, and the others in this part, show that a professor can raise important ethical
issues while teaching the basic rules of criminal law.

Theft law provides a particularly rich environment for examining lawyer ethics.
Combining normal human avarice with the many opportunities attorneys have to separate
others from their property produces a wealth of examples of criminal, or at least unethical,
conduct.
The bottom line of my class on theft was that the complexity of the "common
law" offenses has caused many jurisdictions to adopt remarkably broad consolidated theft
statutes. To show the charging difficulties created by the old law of larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses - as discussed in Joshua Dressler's chapter on theft in
UnderstandingCriminalLaw, 37 portions of which were assigned for reading - I usually
38
gave the students a streamlined version of Graham v. United States. For example, A, a
criminal lawyer, induces his client to give the lawyer $2,200, telling the client that $2,000
of this money is necessary to bribe a police officer into dropping the charges against the
defendant. The officer drops the charges after talking to the lawyer, who keeps all the
money. If you were the prosecutor under the old law of theft, with which crime would you
charge A?
Most students would opt for larceny by trick, on the theory that A accepted the
$2,000 with the intent to defraud the client. 39 But this charge would be vulnerable to the
contention that A decided to keep all the money only while talking to the officer, in which
case the crime could only be embezzlement.40 One could even contend that title to the
$2,000 passed to the attorney at that time (as title to the $200 fee surely did), as payment
for services legal and illegal, which would make A guilty of obtaining property by false
41
pretenses. Conversely, if the court deemed A's false promise to bribe the officer a
promise of future conduct, A would be guilty of neither larceny, embezzlement, nor false
pretenses.42 The point of the exercise was not to teach the distinctions between the
"common law" theft offenses, but to demonstrate the need for reform through another
instance of lawyer misconduct.43
While some American jurisdictions took the Model Penal Code's more measured
approach to reforming the theft offenses (codifying each of the former crimes but granting
1 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 543-65 (6th ed. 2012).
" 187 F. 2d 87, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1950), discussed in DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 562.

' See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 550. The court in Graham accepted this reasoning. See 187 F.2d at 88-89.
40 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 560-6 1. The defendant in Graham unsuccessfully argued that the trial judge's
charge to the jury did not sufficiently distinguish larceny from embezzlement. 187 F.2d at 89-90.
41 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 561-64. Graham's primary contention
was that the prosecution should have
charged him with obtaining property by false pretenses. See 187 F.2d at 88.
See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 564.
43 A more recent lawyer case, Durie v. State, can be used to make the same point. 751 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
42

App. 2000). Durie, a plaintiff's attorney representing two men injured in a bar fight, attempted to avoid a
Medicaid lien on the amount recovered by one of his clients, by telling the insurance company that only 0.5% of
the $100,000 coming from the bar's liability insurance policy would be going to the client with the Medicaid
lien, when in actuality that client was slated to receive 80% of the money. Id. Larceny (and of whom)?
Embezzlement? Obtaining property by false pretenses? None of the above? Another example is Winters v.
Mulholland, in which a disgruntled 15-year associate copied and stored some client files without authorization
from his firm, and through an accomplice, tampered with client contact data in the firm's computer system. Upon
leaving the firm, the associate took client files with him and lied to some of those clients about the firm's ability
to continue to represent them. 33 So. 3d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Which "common law" theft offense is the
taking of the files? Are the associate's other actions any form of theft?
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the court the right to conform the charge to the proof at trial), 44 others have chosen to
45
create a single consolidated crime, usually denominated theft. Florida's theft statute is on
such law, modeled on a proposal by Professor G. Robert Blakey and a coauthor. 46 1
usually walked the students through its remarkably broad provisions:
A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or
endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to,
either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from
the property.
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any
person not entitled to the use of the property.
Breadth continues in the statute's definition of key terms. "'Property' means
anything of value," including "services," which are defined as "anything of value resulting
from a person's physical or mental labor or skill"'4 ; "property of another" is defined to
include property in which the defendant "has an interest" as long as someone else has an
interest in the property upon which the defendant "is not privileged to infringe without
consent."49 But the broadest provision of all is the definition of "obtains or uses":
[A]ny manner of:
(a) Taking or exercising control over property.
(b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property.
(c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future
act, or false promise.
(d) (1) Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining;
abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation;
conversion; or obtaining property by false pretenses, fraud, or
deception; or
0
(2) Other conduct similar in nature.

'

Despite the "kitchen sink" approach of this definition, the Florida Supreme Court
5
rather summarily rejected a vagueness challenge to it.

44 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 565 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 223.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft

1962)).
45 See generally Sherry A. Moore, Nevada's Comprehensive Theft Statute: Consolidation or Confusion?, 8 NEV.

L.J. 672, 673-74 & n.11 (2008).
46 See Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 234 (Fla. 1984). See also G. Robert Blakey & Michael Goldsmith,
CriminalRedistribution of Stolen Property: The Need for Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1620-26 (1974)

(including a model statute). When one of my former colleagues contacted Professor Blakey by telephone, he
seemed surprised that Florida had enacted his proposal and implied that it might need some revision.
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(i) (West 2013).
48 Id. § 812.012(4), (6).
49 Id. § 812.012(5). This provision, meant to deal with the question (among others) of whether a partner could be
guilty of stealing partnership property (famously raised in the classic case of Peoplev. Sobiek, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973)), should have been used to decide Rigal v. State, in which a lawyer in dispute with other
lawyers at his firm pocketed checks meant for the firm. 2000 WL 348109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2000),
superseded by 780 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 200 1). The appellate court first decided that Rigal could not be
prosecuted for theft because a partner could not steal partnership property, but then changed its mind, holding
that Rigal was never a partner. Id. Neither opinion uses the definition of "property of another," which would
have reached the eventual result with far greater ease.
5o § 812.012(3).
5I Dunniganv. State, 364 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1978).
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To better understand the comprehensiveness of this statute and to return to the
theme of ethical conduct, the students were required to prepare oral answers to three
hypotheticals:
1)

2)

3)

X, a lawyer, holds a client's retainer in a trust account. Unable to
meet payroll one month, the lawyer takes money from the trust
account for this purpose (in violation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct), intending to put it back into the trust account
within a month. Is X guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute?
Why or why not?
Y, an upper-class law student authorized to use a computer legal
research program, but for educational purposes only, uses the
program for compensated research for a local lawyer for whom the
lawyer is clerking. Is Y guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute?
Why or why not?
Z, a first year law student taking an exam, copies from the student
sitting next to him the answers to several multiple choice questions,
without that student's knowledge. Is Z guilty of theft under
Florida's theft statute? Why or why not?

Most students had little problem with the first hypothetical. X, whose actions
would at the least jeopardize his license to practice law, also made an unauthorized use of
the money. 52 Even though he had a trustee's interest in the money, the client also had an
interest on which the lawyer was not privileged to infringe. He might not have an intent to
deprive the client of any benefit from the property (as Florida is an IOTA state, with the
interest on most trust accounts going to a charitable fund that among other things provides
grants to law schools 53), X does intend to temporarily appropriate the property to his own

use.

54

Usually only a few students failed to see the guilt of Y (whose actions also would
violate her law school's contract with Westlaw or Lexis and thus risk suspension of that
contract, triggering serious consequences for her law school and her55 ). She knowingly
made unauthorized use of a service - the definition of which includes "[p]rivate . .
communication . . services,"56 and she intended both to deprive the company providing
the computer research program of the fees her employer would otherwise have had to pay,
and to appropriate the computer service to the use of another.
While acknowledging that Z has violated his law school's honor code, some
students typically balked at criminal liability for him. Z knowingly made unauthorized use
of the other student's answers, they would say, but are those answers property? Well, yes,
if property includes services and services are defined as "anything of value resulting from
a person's . . mental labor or skill." 57 But, they would follow up, doesn't their value
52

Note that the statute does not even require an unauthorized use, but that seems the only sensible way to read its

language.
5 Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA), FLA. BAR,

http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/ 1 19bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/b33301c604dd6bd
a8525669e004f836cIOpenDocument (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
54 Florida's theft statute does not indicate whether its two intent requirements are conjunctive or disjunctive, but
courts appear to have read an "or" into the statute.
5 See, e.g., Pace Law, Lexis and Westlaw, http://www.law.pace.edu/lexis-and-westlaw (last visited Feb. 11,
2014).
56

57

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 812.012(6)(c)

(West 2001).

Id. § 812.012(6).
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depend on whether the answers are correct? Not under the statute's definition of value,
which refers to "market value . . at the time and place of the event. 5" They would finally
complain, Z had no intent to deprive the other student of the value of her answer, as she
would get credit (or not) regardless of Z's answer. At this point, other students who
understood the curving of grades would begin to howl, while the calmer members of the
class would point out that in any event Z did have the intent to appropriate the answers to
her own use.
I would usually finish the class by pointing out that prosecution of persons like
X, Y, and Z are exceedingly rare; it is not the language of the statute that prohibits them,
but prosecutorial discretion. 59 Fear of the courts' reaction to a prosecutor's pushing the
edges of the theft envelope, by strictly construing the statute or raising anew the question
of its vagueness, may explain some of this reticence. In addition to striking these by now
familiar chords, and teaching the tedious process of applying the elements of a criminal
statute to particular facts, this class also reminded students of the ethical burdens they
already bear and of greater ones in their future.
Just to drive the point home, I usually finished by giving the class a bouquet of
recent cautionary headlines. Here is the last batch: "Punishing Lawyers in Corporate
Frauds,"60 "Disbarred Attorney Pleads Guilty to Guardian Account Thefts,"61 "2 Lawyers
Charged in Claimed $1. 1M Client Embezzlement Scheme,"62 "Fla. Lawyer in $83M Real
Estate Fraud: I Didn't Think It Was Criminal,"63 "Chicago Lawyer Sentenced to 7 Years
in Prison,"64 "Former Boston Lawyer Sentenced to Four Years for Mortgage Fraud,"65
"Attorney Gets Four Years for Stealing."66 These headlines, plus the other uses of legal
chicanery in the theft class, tend to break down the distance that law students typically feel
from criminal defendants, reminding the class how easy it is to slip from attorney to client.

My most serious foray into legal ethics in the first-year Criminal Law class
resulted from a student comment. I was rather blithely using variations on the facts of
United States v. Short67 to teach the differences between the common law and Model
Penal Code approaches to mistake of fact. Specifically, under what circumstances would
51

Id.

§ 812.012(10)(a)(1).

5 See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1114-15 (9th ed. 2012).
60 Peter J. Henning, PunishingLawyers in CorporateFrauds,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (Jan. 10, 2010),

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/punishing-lawyers-in-corporate-frauds/.
61

Vesselin Mitev, DisbarredAttorney Pleads Guilty to GuardianAccount Thefts,
LAW.COM (Nov. 6, 2009),

http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id= 1202435221538.
62

Martha Neil, 2 Lawyers Chargedin Claimed $1.IM Client Embezzlement Scheme, ABA J. LAW NEWS
Now

(Nov. 5, 2009, 3:29 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/2_lawyers
63

chargedin claimed 1lm client embezzlement scheme/.

Martha Neil, Fla. Lawyer in $83M Real Estate Fraud: I Didn't Think It Was Criminal,ABA J. LAW NEWS

NOW (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fla._1awyer in 83m real estate fraud i didnt think it was criminal.
64 Larry Neumeister, Chicago Lawyer Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison, U-T SAN DIEGO (Jan. 14, 2010, 11:54

AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/jan/14/chicago-lawyer-sentenced-to-7-years-in-prison/.
Sheri Qualters, Former Boston Lawyer Sentenced to Four Years for Mortgage Fraud, LAW.COM (May 18,
2011),

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/articlejsp?id= 120249438 1380&FormerBostonLawyer Sentencedto_4_Years_f
or Mortgage Fraud.
Todd Ruger, Attorney Gets Four Years for Stealing, SARASOTAHERALD-TRIB., Jan. 27, 2011, at BNL,

available at http://www.hemldtribune.com/article/20110127/ARTICLE/ 101271047?p=2&tc=pg.
674 U.S.C.M.A. 437 (1954) (deciding case of drunken soldier in occupied Japan who physically accosts a young
Japanese woman, claiming to believe she was a prostitute and that he was trying to agree with her on a price).
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Short's mistaken belief in consent be a defense if Short were charged with assault with
intent to rape at common law (the actual case)? If Short were charged with rape at
common law (assuming contrary to the actual case that penetration did occur)? If Short
were charged with rape under the Model Penal Code (again assuming penetration)?
Discussing the last hypothetical, I drew out the answer that his mistake would be a defense
if it negated the consciousness of risk necessary for recklessness, the minimum required
culpability for rape under the Code,68 at the end of which I said something careless like,
"What would you say to your client?" The naive reply I got from a very good student was,
"I would tell Short to say that it never occurred to him that Tomobe was not consenting to
his actions." I knew in a flash that I had to include a class on the ethical perils of client
perury.
I would set up that class by asking the students to prepare an answer to a
somewhat more careful version of my client advice question,69 but I also required them to
read the relevant portions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct7 o as well as an
excerpted version of "Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions"71 before answering. Thus primed, I began the class by
cautioning the students not to follow what I consider natural human behavior - to be as
helpful to the client as possible, by telling him about the legal significance of his lack of
consciousness of the risk of non-consent. Both ethical considerations and the law
regarding subornation of perjury require criminal defense attorneys to behave in a much
less straightforward way.
To illustrate the point, I showed clips from Otto Preminger's great trial film
Anatomy of a Murder. 72 First, the discussion between the defense attorney (James Stewart)
and his disbarred friend (Arthur O'Connell) about their prospective client (Ben Gazzara),
an Air Force officer accused of murdering the man who had allegedly raped the officer's
wife (Lee Remick) some hours before the killing. In the discussion the friend suggests that
the lawyer give his client "a chance" to find a defense by describing the relevant law to
him. Second, a subsequent discussion with the would-be client, in which the lawyer
nudges 73 the client toward facts that would support an insanity plea (punctuated by the
client's hilarious question, "Am I getting warmer?"). Third, a later brief conference in
6

1See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(3), 2.04(1(a), 213(1)(a) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
69 "If you were the defense attorney for Short in [my third hypothetical], speaking to your client before he has

told his side of the story to anyone, how would you advise him?"
70 I used excerpts from Florida's versions of rules. See FLA. STAT. ANN. Bar Ch. 4 - 1.1 (West 2013)
(Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), 2.1 (Advisor), 3.3 (Candor
toward the Tribunal), 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor), and 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third
Persons) and from Florida's comments to rules 1.6 and 3.3. For additional excerpts I should have included, see
infra note 91.
71 See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest

Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). This brief article needs only minor excerpting: a reference to the
supersession of the Canons of Ethics, on which Freedman relies, by first the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and then the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; removal of Freedman's discussions of the
defense attorney unwilling on ethical grounds to enter a guilty plea for a client whom the lawyer believes
innocent, made irrelevant by the Supreme Court's implicit approval of such behavior in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); and deletion of the postscript, which replies to criticisms from other members of the
symposium in which the article appeared.
72 See ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959). Freedman's article discusses the novel on which the
movie is based. See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1481-82 (citing Robert TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER
(1958)). A far more brief discussion of this movie appears in Robert Batey, Literature in a Criminal Law
Course: Aeschylus, Burgess, Oates, Camus, Poe, andMelville, 22 LEGAL STUDS. F. 45, 75-76 (1998).

7 The lawyer in the novel is more direct than the one in the movie, see Traver, supra note 72, at 20-49, though
not as direct as Freedman's paraphrase of the novel, see Freedman,supra note 71, at 1481.
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which the now well-schooled client describes his irresistible-impulse state of mind,
74
causing the lawyer to (finally) accept his case.
Film almost always captures the students' attention, and the novelty of a rather
grainy black-and-white video helps. Turning the students to a discussion of Freedman's
article, I began with a basic question - if a criminal trial is a search for truth, what
obligation does the defendant have to participate in that search? The answer Freedman
provides is clear. None at all.7 If even a guilty defendant has the right to force the state to
prove her guilt, the defense lawyer's duty of competent representation requires a zealous
challenge to that proof.76 This makes the answer to Freedman's first "hard" question rather
easy. It is "proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliability or
77
credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the truth."
The defendant's sole obligation to the search for truth in a criminal trial is not to
commit perjury. 7 Not only may the client be guilty, but anyone who counsels the client to
commit perjury, including her defense attorney, may be prosecuted for subornation of
perjury.79 The natural-human-behavior response in advising a client like Short, as well as
my good student's naive response to my careless question, could be a path to prison.
Having made this point, I shifted to Freedman's more complicated issue, the problem of
the criminal defense attorney who merely knows, rather than suggests, that his client (or
some other defense witness) is about to commit perjury.so
In 1966, Freedman argued that a defense lawyer who knows 8 a witness is
committing perjury should not suffer ethical punishment for calling that witness and
questioning her like any other witness.8 2 He reasoned that the duty of maintaining client
confidentiality requires this conduct 83 because the knowledge that perjury is being
committed almost always comes from a confidential disclosure by the client. For even
making this radical suggestion (in a speech to some members of the District of Columbia

74 ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra note 72.
776 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004). Freedman's reliance on the now superseded Canons of
Ethics is helpful, because they explicitly include the obligation of "warm zeal," which the Model Rules now
subsume in the concept of "competent representation." See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1470 (quoting CANONS
OFPROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908)).

77 Freedman, supra note 71, at 1469, 1474-75. The requirement of zealous advocacy thus trumps Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4, entitled "Respect for the Rights of Third Persons." For another perspective on this
question, see Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discreditingthe Truthful Witness: Demonstratingthe
Reality ofAdversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055 (2000).
78 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471.
See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 69-79 (3d ed. 1999).

As a few previous examples indicate, prosecutors seem especially interested in going after defense attorneys,
even to the point of making plea deals with the client in exchange for testimony against the defense attorney. See
also supra text accompanying notes 11 & 20.
'o "Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit perjury?" Freedman, supra note 71,
at 1469.
" Freedman rightly rejects the "how can you ever really know anything?" copout that some defense lawyers use.
See id. at 1472. Interest in the mysteries of epistemology is not a common trait among a very practical lot of
criminal defense attorneys, so its popping up at this point raises doubts. For some cases dealing with the
knowledge issue, see United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003); Farnbaughv. State, 778 So. 2d 369

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). See generally J. Vincent
Aprile II, Client Perjury: When Do You Know the ClientIsLying?, 19 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 (2004) (offering more
examples of the criminal lawyer's dilemma).
82 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475-78.
84

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004).
Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475.
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bar), several Washington-area judges (including Supreme Court Chief Justice-to-be
Warren Burger) wanted Freedman disbarred or suspended from practice. 5
Every state rejected Freedman's contention, instead adopting some version of
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.86 That rule and its comments outline a three-step
process for the lawyer who knows of potential perjury. First the lawyer should
remonstrate with the potential witness about the impropriety and danger of committing
perjury, 8 9 including the likelihood of being exposed by a prosecutor well trained in the art
of cross-examination. 90 If the remonstration fails, the lawyer should seek to withdraw
from the case,91 though as Freedman notes judges are usually quite unwilling (for reasons
both practical and ethical) to allow lawyers, especially appointed lawyers, to take this
second step.9 2 If withdrawal is not a possibility, the lawyer faces disclosure of the perjury
93
to the court.
In the words of the official commentary to rule 3.3, "The disclosure of a client's
false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense
of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury." 94 So lawyers
seek at all costs to avoid the knowledge of client perjury that will place them at the top of
rule 3.3's three-step slippery slope, and thus behave like the defense attorney in Anatomy
of a Murder, who advised the client about the law before hearing his version of the facts.
This tactic raises the third of Freedman's hard questions: "Is it proper to give your client
legal advice when you have reason to believe that the knowledge you give him will tempt
95
him to commit perjury?"

The proceedings against Freedman were ultimately dropped. See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1469 ni.
Regarding Burger's participation, see Paul R. Tremblay, MoralActivism Manque, 44 S. TEx. L. REv. 127, 138
n.24 (2002).
85

See, e.g., Variationsof theABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct Rule: 3.3: CandorToward the Tribunal,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/mrpc_3_3.authcheckda
86

m.pdf (last updated Aug. 16, 2013).
87

See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.3.

I would pointedly define this word in class and then made sure to use it in a multiple-choice question on the
final exam.
8

89

See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6.

90 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1478. As Freedman notes in another context, such remonstration is
particularly likely to cause any client, but especially an indigent one with appointed counsel, to wonder whose
side her lawyer is really on. See id. at 1473.
9

See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 2; cf id. 3.3 cmt.10 (mentioning withdrawal in passing). I

probably should have included pans of rule 1.16 and its comments in the assigned reading for the class on
criminal defense ethics. See supra note 70.
92 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475-76; see infra note 94. Some cases cast doubt on the withdrawal option.
See State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2002); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 2003);
People v. DePallo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 2000), aff'd, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 2001).
9 See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10.
94

Id. cmt. 11. For an example of how bad things can get, see State v. Chambers. 994 A.2d 1248 (Conn. 2010).
Chambers' lawyer disclosed and attempted to withdraw, but the judge instead allowed Chambers to testify in
narrative form and limited the defense's right to object during Chambers' cross-examination. During cross
Chambers admitted several times that he was lying. Prior to closing arguments, the defense attorney again
attempted to withdraw, because he could not ethically comment on Chambers' testimony in the defense's
closing. Again the judge refused, instead giving both the defense attorney and Chambers himself the right to
make closing arguments. Apparently throwing in the towel, the defense attorney gave no closing and convinced
his client to remain silent too. Chambers was convicted, and the state supreme court affirmed. See also Brown v.
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2007) (judge allowed defense attorney to leave the courtroom during
defendant's testimony; conviction reversed on grounds of ineffective assistance).
9 Freedman, supra note 71, at 1469.
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As Freedman points out, giving such advice "creates the appearance that the
attorney is encouraging or condoning perjury."96 Nevertheless, this conduct is widely
condoned.97 In support of this contention I show excerpts from "To Defend a Killer," one
installment of the 1988 PBS series Ethics in America.9 8 It consists of a roundtable
discussion in which Professor Charles Ogletree poses dilemmas for experts ranging from
Justice Scalia to several prominent criminal defense lawyers (at least one of whom was
subsequently disbarred). 99
Ogletree portrays a man who has killed his girlfriend, but his role in Wendy's
murder likely will not be discovered. 0oo He confesses to a clergyman and a psychiatrist
(two panel members), both of whom suggest that he turn himself in.101 I would begin
rolling the tape as he approaches James Neal, who won fame both as a criminal defense
attorney and as a Watergate prosecutor.1 02 Neal drolly advises that he wants to tell
Ogletree about the law before the lawyer hears Ogletree's version of the facts. Neal's brief
rendition of the law includes the statements, "If you tell me that you stabbed Wendy, I
can't put you on the stand and have you deny that you stabbed Wendy," and "don't go
around talking to any more preachers or psychiatrists." 03 "There are very few deaf and
dumb people in the penitentiary." 0 4
I would usually let the tape roll, as Professor Stephen Gillers, another panel
member, defends the conception of criminal defense that condones Neal's invitation to
perjury o0while acknowledging its "psychic toll,"106 followed by a philosopher who seems
horrified by that conception, which sparks stirring advocacy from defense attorney Jack
Litman.1 07 Stopping the video at this point, I would usually ask the students to ponder
whether they want to live with this psychic toll,os before commenting briefly on the much
96

Id. at 1478.

9 One might even argue that it is required. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT 2.1 ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall . . render candid advice.").
98ETHICS

IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER (Columbia University Seminars on Media and Society 1989) (on

file with Annenberg Learner) available at http://www.learner.org/vod/vod window.html?pid=192.
9 See C. Vernon Mason, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C. VernonMason (last modified Dec. 12,
2013).

100

ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98.
Id. at 3:00-14:20.
102 See James F. Neal, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JamesF._Neal (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
1o3 ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98, at 23:40-25:15.
104 Id. See Robert Batey, Commentary: Symposium: CriminalLaw Defense, Ethics, and the Client
Who Plans to
101

Lie, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 637-38 (2010) for another hypothetical of client perjury, this time in the
sentencing context.
15

ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98. But note that Gillers disagrees rather vehemently

with Freedman's resolution of his second hard question. See Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman'sSolution to the
Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma Is Wrong As A Matter ofPolicy and ConstitutionalLaw, 34 HOFSTRA L.

REV. 821, 823 (2006).
16 ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98. For a fuller version of Gillers' comment, see
Robert Batey, Alienationby Contractin Paris Trout, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 289, 302 n.67 (1994).

107 TO DEFEND AKILLER, supra note 98 at 25:15-28:30. In an attempt to balance this exchange (compared to
Litman, the philosopher blusters a great deal, but is undone mostly by an egregious toupee), I usually noted
Litman's much-criticized defense of the "preppie killer" Robert Chambers, Jr., with its many variations on
"blame the victim." See Jack Litman, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackLitman (last updated Dec. 2,
2013) (describing Litman's criminal defense strategies).
los Demonstrating the psychic toll is a quote, included in the reading assignment for this class, from the
protagonist of The Lincoln Lawyer:

I headed back to the door, my steps quick. I hate being inside a jail. I'm not sure why. I guess it's
because sometimes the line seems so thin. The line between being a criminal attorney and a
criminal attorney. Sometimes I'm not sure which side of the bars I am on. To me it's always a
dead-bang miracle that I get to walk out the way I walked in.
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different ethical rules that apply to prosecutors.1 09 1 would end the class by using this
asymmetry in the professional responsibilities of prosecutors and criminal defense
attorneys as another example of the bias for liberty in American criminal law."10
I have never taught the Professional Responsibility course nor do I pretend to be
an expert in any of its topics."' However, I did feel the obligation as a teacher of Criminal
Law to at least alert future lawyers about the ethical issues they do and will confront.
Cases and hypotheticals involving wayward lawyers, especially in the area of theft, and
the foregoing brief foray into the problem of client perjuy were my ways of trying to
meet this obligation.

MICHAEL CONNELLY, THE LINCOLN LAWYER 15 (2005).
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004) (explaining that the prosecutor should not pursue a case
if she knows probable cause is lacking; prosecutor must turn over all information favorable to the defense). The
reading for this class also included citations to a few cases and several articles discussing prosecutorial
improprieties, most notably the Duke lacrosse rape prosecution, which resulted in the disbarment of district

attorney Michael B. Nifong. See, e.g, Prosecutorin Duke LacrosseRape Case is Disbarredfor Intentional

Misconduct, 81 Crim. L. Rep. 470 (2007).
110 See SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 311 (Penguin Books 2010) (1977), explaining that while initially frustrated as a
prosecutor by "the manifold ways in which the truth becomes distorted in a criminal courtroom," Turow became
"like Saul on the road,... converted . . [T]here was a moral vision at work here . . [W]e could not safely
deprive any human being of his or her liberty without first knowing that the provable facts could not be contorted
into a shape reasonably consistent with innocence."
..For that reason, I cited students to a number of articles discussing client perjury. See Monroe H. Friedman,
Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2008); Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth,
and Honesty in RepresentingClients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209 (2006); Evan A. Jenness,
Ethics andAdvocacy Dilemmas-PossessingEvidence ofa Client's Crime, 34 CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, at 16;
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Deceit in Defense Investigations, 25 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 36; L.
Timothy Perrin, The PerplexingProblem of Client Perjury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1707 (2007). See also Michael
Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the ClientIs Guilty: Client Confessions in Legal Ethics,
PopularCulture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229 (2009). I also referred them to a broader
perspective on legal ethics. See Douglas Ammar & Tosha Downey, Transformative CriminalDefense Practice:
Truth, Love, and IndividualRights-The Innovative Approach ofthe GeorgiaJusticeProject, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 49 (2003). But see Cheryl G. Bader, "ForgiveMe Victim for I Have Sinned": Why Repentance and the
CriminalJustice System Do Not Mix-A Lesson from Jewish Law, 3 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69 (2003).
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